The Supernatural in the New Testament, Possible, Credible, and Historical / Or, An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine Revelation

by C. A. Row

I fully admit, however, that there is a system of professed mental science, which, if its truth could be proved, would establish the fact that possession was impossible. I need hardly say that I allude to that which affirms that thought is the result of a function of the brain, and nothing else. According to the views of these philosophers, the brain secretes thought as a gland secretes its own peculiar secretion. Until this philosophy has succeeded in proving the truth of its first principles, it is useless to consider its bearing on this particular question.

There is another abnormal mental condition, the existence of which is unquestionable, and which has a close connection with the present question, namely, the ecstatic state. The forms in which this has manifested itself have been extremely various, and it is impossible for any one to assert that our mental philosophy has fully fathomed them, and has succeeded in assigning them to forces originating within the mind itself. On the contrary it is not too much to affirm that it has as yet wholly failed to analyze its nature, or to account for the abnormal powers displayed by the mind when in this condition. In the ancient world this state of mind was closely connected with the manifestations of [pg 280] the prophetic power, the reality of which was recognized by many of its philosophers. It will of course be observed that I am not speaking of this power as it existed in the Jewish church, but of its supposed manifestations in the heathen world. Similar ecstatic states have frequently displayed themselves in modern times. When in this condition the mind is especially liable to be acted on by external influences. Is it possible, I ask, in the present state of our mental philosophy, to assert that we know their nature, or the forces which produce them? The ecstatic in union with a phrenzied state of the mind was apparently the condition of the Delphian priestess when she delivered oracles to those who consulted her. According to all the accounts that we possess, she presented the appearance of being subject to an overpowering external influence. Every other description which we possess of the manifestation of this prophetic power, (and we have several) describes it as presenting phenomena closely allied to raving madness, an influence of some kind apparently overpowering the prophet's personality. Until the forces which produced these phenomena in the ancient world, and the somewhat similar ones which have been manifested in modern times, can be shown to owe their origin to forces originating in the mind itself, and to nothing else, it is absurd to affirm that such a phenomenon as possession is in contradiction to our scientific knowledge of the human mind.

There is another point which demands our attention, namely, the close connection between the extreme forms of moral wickedness, and madness. It is an unquestionable fact that nothing is more difficult than to draw the precise line where moral wickedness ends, and madness begins. In their great outlines they are easily distinguishable, but in the more advanced stages [pg 281] of moral evil, the one passes into the other by insensible degrees. So difficult is it to lay down the precise line which separates them, that scientific men are not wanting, who affirm that every extreme case of moral wickedness is a species of mania. Consistently with this theory frequent efforts are made to save the most abandoned criminals from the consequences of their crimes. If the principle is correct, it is impossible not to assign lesser degrees of moral evil to the same cause. Such a principle logically leads to the denial of any distinction between moral and physical action. Happily however, although this conclusion is one which has been arrived at by a considerable number of physicists, it is one which the common sense of mankind steadily refuses to accept. It is sufficient for the present purpose, that extreme forms of moral evil shade off into mania by insensible degrees; and that ultimately they are capable of producing insanity. If insanity can be produced by moral causes, it follows that a superhuman influence powerful for evil, acting on a degraded moral nature, may be attended with a similar result, and produce such a phenomenon as possession.

But further: while madness is produced by physical causes, it is a certain fact that it is frequently occasioned by causes purely mental. Of this the instances are innumerable. These mental causes react on the brain and the nervous system; and thus they superinduce disease on those parts of our bodily organization by means of which the mind exercises its powers. Still the disease itself originates in causes that are not seated in the body, but in the mind. The mind is therefore capable of acting powerfully on our bodily frame. If therefore possession be viewed as the action of one mind on another, there is no reason why it should not be able to superinduce those forms of [pg 282] bodily derangement which exhibited themselves in the demoniacs by the simple action of the mind upon the body. The mental causes capable of producing mania are, as we know, of a varied description; and among them is the action and influence which one mind is capable of exerting on another. As, therefore, in certain states of our minds, or of our nervous system, mania with all its results can be produced by the simple action of mind on mind, and through the action of the mind disorder may be produced in our bodily organization, there can be no reason why possession with all its attendant phenomena should not originate in similar causes. There is nothing to imply that the superhuman agency manifested in possession was directly exerted on the body of the possessed. An agency which was entirely mental was fully adequate to produce all the phenomena with which it was accompanied.

In cases of mania produced by mental action the removal of the exciting cause is the precondition of its cure, and in many cases effects it. Similarly, in cases of possession the removal of the exciting cause would produce similar results.

It follows, therefore, from the foregoing considerations, that the allegation that the possessions described in the New Testament are incredible, because they contradict the known truths of mental science, is disproved.

The question really resolves itself into the following one: Do evil beings, other than men, exist in the universe? Or, if they exist, is it credible that they are allowed to interfere in the affairs of men? This question we have already considered in a former chapter, and we have arrived at the conclusion that if we free ourselves from the trammels of à priori theories, [pg 283] and judge only by the facts of the universe as it exists, neither their existence nor their intervention in human affairs is contrary to our reason.

Two things, however, must be steadily kept in mind. First: that if such interventions in human affairs are facts, the agency which can be exerted is only a permitted agency, and only capable of being exerted in subordination to the divine purposes in the government of the universe. A large number of the difficulties with which the subject is attended have originated in the wholly inaccurate idea that a power is attributed in the New Testament to Satan, of interfering both in the material and the moral universe at his own will and pleasure. This, however, is altogether contrary to the fact. Whatever power is attributed to him is an entirely permitted one, and exercised in subordination to the general purposes of God. Secondly, that although the disorder in the moral world might lead us to suspect the presence of an evil agency, different from that of man; yet as it is not a visible one, but confined to the regions of the mind, it is one which cannot come under our distinct observation, and could therefore only become known to us by revelation.

One more difficulty has to be considered. It is alleged that possession never takes place now. It is therefore inferred that it never took place at all.

I reply first, if we grant that demoniacal action, in the form of possession has now ceased, it by no means follows that it was not once real. The objection overlooks the fact that its action was a permitted one; and could only be exercised within the limits assigned to it. There may have been reasons at the time of the Advent why the exercise of a Satanic agency should be permitted at that particular period to a greater extent than it ever has been before or since.