The Supernatural in the New Testament, Possible, Credible, and Historical / Or, An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine Revelation

by C. A. Row

Let me again draw attention to the fact that the only correct conception of a miracle in connection with this controversy, is that of an event wrought in external nature with a definite moral aim and purpose. Extraordinary events, to which no such moral aim and purpose can be assigned, may be unusual occurrences, but are in no proper sense of the words evidential miracles. An isolated occurrence of an extraordinary nature, and an event marked with a definite moral purpose, are two wholly different things. The one may be credible, and the other wholly incredible. We habitually recognise the distinction in ordinary life, and it entirely affects our judgment of the probability of an event. We esteem the action of a particular person quite credible under one set of circumstances, which we should reject as incredible under another. Thus [pg 332] if we were informed that a friend with whom we were intimately acquainted, had precipitated himself from a height into the water, supposing him to be sane, we should not believe it. But if we received the information that he had done it to save a person from drowning, and we knew that he was a man of courage, we should accept the fact without the smallest hesitation. On this account, therefore, the moral aspect of the alleged miracle is of the utmost importance; and it is necessary for its correct conception that it should not only be an extraordinary occurrence in external nature, but that it should take place at the bidding of another, and in order to render it credible, that it should be calculated to effectuate some definite moral purpose.

Alleged supernatural events, which are destitute of these accompaniments, are always liable to a very high degree of à priori suspicion. In fact it would be difficult to prove them to be supernatural. All that could be affirmed respecting them would be that they were very unusual occurrences, which it was impossible to account for by the action of any known force. If the universe is under the government of God, all supernatural action must either be the result of His agency or permission. If He interferes with the order of occurrences, it is evident that such interference cannot be capricious, but must have a definite purpose. We are justified, therefore, in refusing to accept occurrences as supernatural, which are destitute of all appearance of purpose in their performance.

But further: the alleged miracle must be consistent with the character of God, before it is possible to attribute it to Him as wrought by His direct agency. This rests on the same principle on which we refuse to [pg 333] credit the reports of actions performed by men which are contradictory to their well known characters. But this is far more certain with respect to God than it can be of man. Human characters can at best be but imperfectly known, and there are unseen depths in the human heart which sometimes render actions possible, which stand in striking contrast to the general character of the agents. To state the truth generally, as it is impossible that man can act in opposition to the inmost principles of his moral being, so in a far higher degree is it impossible that God can contradict the perfections of His moral nature. This being so, it follows that we are entitled to reject all miracles alleged to have been wrought by God, which are contrary to His moral attributes; all which are low, mean, or grotesque, and unfitted to realize an elevated moral purpose.

It will here be objected that if these positions are true, demoniacal miracles are rendered impossible. I have already pointed out that if demoniacal supernaturalism is affirmed in the New Testament to be an actuality, its action is described as being limited to the human mind, and that whatever permitted activity is conceded to it, always bears the most distinctive marks of being from beneath. There is no possibility of mistaking between such supernatural occurrences and the miracles of God.

Such then are our general principles, the truth of which can hardly be contested. If they are true, the great mass of current supernaturalism is worthy of rejection for the following reasons.

1. While it claims to be the result of supernatural agency, it is destitute of all definite moral purpose, and such moral impress as it bears is mean and degraded. What end, I ask, was it designed to serve? It involved an almost continual interference with the order of [pg 334] nature; or if at times it claimed to be due to occult forces, they were only suited to confound the visible order of the universe. I am reasoning on the supposition that there is a God who rules the world. This being so, it is impossible to conceive that such a mode of acting can be His. Under this head of supernaturalism fall all the monstrous and the grotesque, and the entire range of magical phenomena.

2. The whole range of ancient supernaturalism is in contradiction to everything which we can conceive of the moral character of God. Let us take as an illustration the phenomena of Soothsaying. Who can believe that God employed the entrails of slaughtered beasts as the means of revealing the future? or that it was consistent with his character to manifest his will through a multitude of monstrous portents? There is perhaps not a single occurrence of ancient supernaturalism which does not offend against our primary conception of the Divine character; and, therefore, the whole is worthy of summary rejection.

3. Ancient supernaturalism assigned its occurrences to no cause adequate to produce them. Those who asserted its reality, referred it to the action of deities who possessed very limited power, or to occult powers in nature. Such occult powers we now know to have no existence, and the power attributed to the supposed deities was far too limited to be capable of producing the results in question. All reputed events, the alleged cause of which is unable to produce them, we are entitled to reject without further investigation.

4. A large amount of ancient supernaturalism rested on no evidence whatever. Of those portions for which any reasons were alleged, the evidence itself was of a character exactly suited to discredit it. Of this kind was the whole of the supernaturalism connected [pg 335] with the state religions. These were in the hands of men who used them for the purpose of acting on the vulgar, and who therefore readily accepted the report of anything, however incredible, which could subserve their end. Other portions were palpable impostures worked for the basest and most selfish purposes. A very brief acquaintance with the nature of the evidence on which it rests is sufficient to justify us in rejecting it without entering on any inquiry as to its details.

Such being the general character of ancient supernaturalism, it is absurd to argue that its existence is a reason for rejecting along with it another order of supernaturalism, which stands contrasted with it in every particular. We might as well urge the existence of a vast number of counterfeits as a reason for rejecting everything which is genuine. We do not reject it because it is supernatural, but because it is utterly incredible. A statement of a few particulars will exhibit the contrast between it and the supernaturalism of the New Testament in a striking point of view.