2. It is not correct to assert that the belief in miracles has been confined to ages of ignorance. Will it be affirmed that the most flourishing period of Grecian literature was an age of ignorance? Yet a belief in a current supernaturalism prevailed in it. Was the Augustan age an age of ignorance? Both ages were ignorant of physical science: but during few periods has the human intellect been equally active. Each age contained men endowed with common sense sufficient to make them adequate judges whether the supernatural occurrences above referred to were possible or not.
3. It is inaccurate to affirm that the Christian miracles are interposed between two similar series of supernatural occurrences. There is only one point in common between them; the claim to be supernatural. As I have proved, in every other respect they are strongly contrasted. It is, therefore, by no means extraordinary that a series of supernatural occurrences, which have the highest moral impress, and possess other distinguishing characteristics, should be true; and that the others, one of which took place before and the other after that in question, and which are stamped with the very opposite characteristics, should be false.
The same author adduces the following objections, as lying at the root of miraculous testimony to a revelation: “Surely supernatural evidence of so common and prodigal a nature betrays great want of force [pg 352] and divine originality. How could that be considered as special evidence for a new revelation, which was already so well known to all the world, and which was scattered broadcast over so many centuries, as well as successfully simulated by Satan.” Again: “Instead of a few evidential miracles taking place at one epoch of history, and filling the world with surprise at such novel and exceptional phenomena, we find miracles represented as taking place in all ages and in all countries. The Gospel miracles are set in the midst of a series of similar wonders which commenced many centuries before the dawn of Christianity, and continued without interruption fifteen centuries after it. No divine originality characterized the evidence selected to accredit the divine revelation.” (P. 192.)
I reply, First: It behoves those who except against the plan of attesting a divine revelation by miracles, to inform us in what other way it is possible that the truth of a divine commission can be attested. It is doubtless possible for God to make a special revelation of His will to each individual man; yet even this would involve supernatural agency of some kind; and it is very questionable whether to do so would be consistent with the plan of God's moral government which comes under our actual observation. But the Christian revelation is founded on the idea of making a divine manifestation additional to, and of a different order from, that which is made by the created universe; and not simply of imparting so much additional information to each individual. This manifestation professes to be made by the Incarnation. How, I ask, was such a manifestation to be made except by a supernatural action of some kind? It is clear, therefore, that every manifestation of God differing from that made by the ordinary forces of nature, or by the moral nature of [pg 353] man, must be supernatural. There can be no doubt as to the means which must be employed. The only question which can be raised is one which I have considered elsewhere, namely: whether it is the purpose of God to make such a manifestation of Himself.
It will be objected that such a manifestation might have been made self-evident to the moral nature of man, and consequently it would have required no additional attestation. To this I reply that, on the supposition that it is God's purpose to make such an additional manifestation of Himself, He must be allowed to be the only adequate judge of the right mode of accomplishing it.
But even if a revelation involved no such manifestation of God, but only a communication of truth to man, it is incumbent on those who object to its attestation by miracles, to find some other method by which the reality of a divine commission could be attested, and to show that this mode would be preferable to an attestation by miracles.
But further: if we regard a miracle as a supernatural occurrence wrought in attestation of a divine commission, which is the unquestionable aspect of a considerable number of those recorded in the New Testament, the fact that there was a wide-spread belief in the existence of supernatural events is far from interfering with its efficacy. What did the current beliefs imply? That there existed beings, other than the blind forces of nature, who interfered in human affairs; and that they were in some way or other capable of communicating with man. What is the very conception implied by a revelation? That a God exists, who is the moral Governor of the universe, who cares for man, and is capable of holding communications with him. Both conceptions rest on a common ground—the existence of [pg 354] supernatural beings capable of manifesting themselves by outward indications. Why then should not the moral Governor of the universe, if it was His purpose to make a revelation, employ media, which were all but universally recognized? No inconsiderable number of the objections of unbelievers rest on the assumption, that if there be a God, it is derogatory to His character to suppose that He is capable of condescending to the weaknesses and imperfections of man. A God who neither will nor can do so may be a very grand conception; but one who is very ill adapted to the wants of human nature, and who is incapable of exciting human sympathies. The only thing that would be necessary, on the supposition that it was His purpose to make such a revelation, would be that His mode of manifesting His presence should be one clearly distinguishable from the events of current supernaturalism. What was requisite would have been to afford evidence that the manifestation in question was due to no other being than Himself; that is to say, that the miracles should bear the unquestionable impress of His own perfections. The subject of alleged demoniacal miracles I have considered elsewhere. The simple question before us is—Are the supernatural events recorded in the Gospels clearly distinguishable in their general character from the supernaturalism which was current previous to the Advent? I have already shown that it contains no doubtful indications as to who the agent must have been, if we suppose the facts to have been actual occurrences.
But further: if the objection has any validity, it presupposes that God ought not to make a revelation in ages of superstition and ignorance; but must wait until knowledge has cleared away the mists of ignorance and error, and supplied us with the means of [pg 355] infallibly discriminating between true miracles and false ones; or, in other words, we must wait for the much-talked-of jury of scientific men, who can submit His alleged miracles to the whole range of scientific tests. Happily, however, God has gifted a considerable number of men with common sense, which is quite adequate to determine whether a certain class of events wrought under certain circumstances are miraculous operations, or mere natural occurrences, or due to imposture. If this be so, what is there, I ask, unworthy of God, in making a revelation at such times as man stands in special need of one?
It is further objected that a miraculous attestation to a divine commission shows a want of force and divine originality. I ask, how? The fact is that with the exception of Judaism, no ancient religion professed to be so attested; and the Jew would naturally expect that any fresh revelation would be attested in a manner similar to that which he believed in as divine.
The objection that because the belief in supernaturalism was so general, therefore miracles must be worthless as evidence, I have already shown to be fallacious.