Before the close of the eighteenth century, however, Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin blew a loud trumpet blast, in her indignant “Vindication of the Rights of Women.” She treats the subject on lines that men and women are only now beginning to learn to read. “There can be no duty without reason. There can be no morality without equality. There can be no justice when its recipients are only of one sex. Let us first consider women in the broad light of human creatures, who, in common with men, are placed upon the earth to unfold their faculties.” “Who made man the exclusive judge, if woman partakes with him the gift of reason? Do you not act a tyrant’s part when you force all women by denying them civil and political rights, to remain immured in their families, groping in the dark? Surely you will not assert that a duty can be binding that is not founded on reason.” “Women may be convenient slaves, but slavery will have its constant effect, degrading both the master and the abject dependent.” “It is time to effect a revolution in female manners, time to restore to women their lost dignity and to make them labour by reforming themselves, to reform the world.” She was too much in advance of her times to be successful in spreading her views, especially as they were entangled with other opinions even more unpopular in her day. Yet she sowed the seed that is still growing. The society she pictures gives a painful illustration of the effects of the exclusively masculine creeds of her century.
Yet, during that dark age of women’s privilege, there were some Legal Cases tried and decided, refreshing in their results, as they showed that dispassionate judges could still do something for women, when they followed the ordinary principles of Philology, and decreed that a common term could stand for woman as well as for man, even when it meant a privilege.
“A woman was appointed by the Justices to be a governor of a workhouse at Chelmsford in Essex, and Mr. Parker moved to quash the order because it was an office not suitable to her sex, but the Justices upheld the appointment” (2 Lord Raymond, 1014). “My Lady Broughton was keeper of the Gatehouse Prison” (3 Keble, 32). “A woman was appointed clerk in the King’s Bench” (see Showers’ P.C.).
A lady’s appointment to be Commissioner of Sewers was also contested, but it was “decided that as the office by statute” shall be granted to such person or persons as the said Lords should appoint, “the word person stands indifferently for either sex ... and though women have been discreetly spared ... yet I am of opinion, for the authorities and reasons aforesaid, that this appointment is warrantable in law. Women have been secluded as unfit, but they are not in law to be excluded as incapable,” i.e., the election determined eligibility; and so the Countess of Warwick was allowed to retain the benefits of her election. (See Callis. 250.)
In Hilary Term, 1739, the case of Olive v. Ingram was heard before Sir William Lee, Chief-Justice, Sir Francis Page, Sir Edmund Probyn, Sir William Chappel, Justices, to decide whether a woman could vote for a sexton, and whether she could be a sexton. A woman candidate for the office of sexton of the Church of St. Botolphs without Bishopsgate had 169 indisputable votes and 40 women’s votes; the plaintiff had 174 indisputable votes and 22 women’s votes. The woman had been declared elected.
The case was considered so important that it was heard four times. First, whether a woman could vote? The counsel against argued that women could not vote in this case, as they did not do so in others; that they did not vote for members of Parliament, quoting Coke. The counsel for argued that non-user did not imply inability; that women paying Scot and Lot had a right to vote on municipal affairs; that they voted in the great Companies; that it had been decided in Attorney-General v. Nicholson that women had a right to elect a preacher. If they could elect to a higher office, how could they not do so to a lower? It had been decided in Holt v. Lyle and Catharine v. Surrey, according to Hakewell, “that a feme sole, if she has a freehold, may vote for a Parliament man.” Women did come to the old County Courts, though not compellable thereto. Women are sui juris till they are married.
The Lord Chief-Justice said the case of Holt v. Lyle is a very strong case, but as I am not bound now to say whether a woman can vote for a Parliament man, I will reserve that point for further consideration. The question here is, whether a woman can be included in “all persons paying Scot and Lot.” It was a just rule that they who contributed to maintain the elected should themselves be electors. There is a difference between exemption and incapacity. If women are qualified to pay Scot and Lot, they are qualified to keep a sexton. They who pay must determine to whom they will pay. He decided that women could vote for a sexton. Justice Page agreed with Chief-Justice Lee on the general question, but added, “I see no disability in a woman for voting for a Parliament man.” Justice Probyn agreed that they who pay have a right to nominate. It might be thought that it required an improved understanding for a woman to vote for a Parliament man, but the case of Holt v. Lyle was a very strong case.
The woman having thus secured a majority of “indisputable votes,” the next question was, could she hold office? The objection was that women could not hold places of trust, of exertion, of anything to do with a church.
Chief-Justice Lee said a woman is allowed to be a Constable, an Overseer, a Governor of a Poorhouse, a Gaoler, a Keeper of a Prison, a Churchwarden, a Clerk of the Crown in the King’s Bench. Very high offices have been held by Ladies. In regard to the Church, women have been allowed to baptise; there have been Deaconesses, and female servants circa sacra. (Romans xvi. 21.) Women have presented to churches. He decided that a woman could be sexton. The others concurred. (Leach’s “Modern Term Reports,” vol. vii.)
Strange, the opposing counsel, in reporting the case shortly and confusingly, says that he knew many women sextons at the time. (See 27 Strange.)