By July 31st the following had been evacuated: Colonel Fletcher, Major H. K. Wilson, Captains Eccles and Steward, Lieutenants Alcock, Collinge, Evans, Royle, Rothwell, J. R. Paul, 2nd-Lieutenants E. E. Paul, Pegge, Little, and Wyatt, the new Padre, Weaver, and the new Medical Officer, Robinson. The Adjutant, who went on leave on the 29th, before the far-reaching effects of the gas had fully revealed themselves, went into hospital on his arrival in England. Company Sergeant-Major Heyworth had started with him but had been compelled to remain behind at the M.D.S., Fort Rompu, being quite blind and delirious. The stream of ambulances, lorries, general service waggons, and farm carts pouring into and out of Armentières, was a sight that will long be remembered. The whole of "B" Company and the whole of "C" Company, except 2nd-Lieutenant Fell and one man, became casualties. Of Battalion Headquarters there remained only one policeman and one store-keeper. The rest, including the Regimental Sergeant-Major, Regimental Quartermaster-Sergeant, orderly-room, medical, sanitary, and Quartermaster's staff, the cooks, the tailors, the bootmakers, and all the other details, were evacuated. The Battalion Orchestra, who were playing when the barrage opened, were badly gassed to a man, and their instruments destroyed. Captain Bowring suddenly found himself Commanding Officer, and his command consisted simply of "A" and "D" Companies and the transport. The total casualties, including the gassed, for July were: 17 officers wounded, of whom Lieutenant Collinge died from the effects of the gas, 12 men killed, and approximately 428 wounded. Of these a few died later, and more were invalided from the service, but a good many rejoined us in due course.
Before proceeding any further it will be as well to discuss briefly the cause of this disaster. In the first place, this was only the second concentrated bombardment with mustard gas that had occurred. The first had taken place at Ypres a month before, and caused extensive casualties, but the report of these did not reach us till the night of relief, when it came with the usual correspondence, which, owing to pressure of work, was not opened till after the disaster had happened. The significance of the new form of gas should certainly have been circulated earlier. With the dangers of ordinary gas we were familiar, and in any case no one could have lived for five minutes in the area most strongly affected without a respirator. The slightest breath of this new gas was like inhaling red-hot air and choked you immediately. After the first density of the gas had dispersed, the area became comparatively clear, and the insidious and silent evaporation, practically free from smell, caused no one inconvenience, and in some places was so slight as to be barely perceptible. It was this that affected the eyes, an entirely new phenomenon to us; and the comparatively small number that suffered from serious internal gassing proves that the ordinary precautions were taken. Moreover, most of those badly gassed were actually caught in Armentières itself by the original barrage, which began at the rate of hundreds of shells in a minute. When it is remembered that as late as the spring of 1918, after mustard gas had long been recognized and widely advertised, and every possible precaution taken against it, a concentrated bombardment still produced casualties running into hundreds, it is not so very surprising that on the second occasion when it was used, and the first as far as we were concerned, only about fifty escaped out of the total troops in Armentières, consisting of two half battalions, some field and heavy batteries, and some Royal Engineer, Machine Gun Corps, and Trench Mortar sections. Of the civilian population, it is probable that scarcely one single person got off unscathed.
This bombardment was the climax of our long period in Houplines. We had been instructed to be as offensive as possible, in order to divert the attention of the enemy by our aggressive tactics from the operations scheduled to commence on July 31st, and now known as the Third Battle of Ypres. Little glory attaches to a "feint" attack, whether it be stationary or by movement; but if successful it brings down upon you severe hostile attention, which has to be endured without any compensating chance of sharing in the glory of a great victory. That we succeeded in our allotted task, and that the 171st Infantry Brigade bore the brunt of it, we know not only from what our Army Commander said, but because the Intelligence showed that the Division kept two German Divisions pinned down opposite to it right till the end, and this notwithstanding the fact that the hostile artillery was about ten times as great as our own. The steady increase of destructive shooting on the area immediately north and south of the Lys, the regular "crashing" of all lines of communication, the intense shelling of Armentières, culminating in the great gas bombardment, prove conclusively that the enemy was daily expecting an attack on Frelinghien, for which he imagined a force was concentrating in Armentières. That our casualties were not greater was due to the scattered position of the posts holding such a large sector, and to our constant efforts to provide such protection as could best be constructed under the circumstances.
CHAPTER V
FROM THE GAS ATTACK TO ST. HILAIRE—PASSCHENDAELE (FIRST TIME)—LOUCHES
The disorganization in the Brigade resulting from the gas bombardment was naturally very great. The 2/5th K.L.R. and ourselves were reduced by 50 per cent, not including Battalion Headquarters, and the relief of the battalion for reorganization was therefore imperative. Accordingly, on the evening of July 31st Captain Bowring, the Acting Commanding Officer, was instructed to move out to Bac St. Maur, the 2/5th King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment taking the place of "A" and "B" Companies in the subsidiary line. The move was made by sections, owing to the continued shelling and the state of the roads, which had not yet been cleared of débris. It was effected without incident beyond a drenching from the heavy rain which came steadily down.
The work of tracing the casualties now began. Most of the battalion records were half buried in Armentières. These were unearthed, and Lance-Corporal Longridge tackled his new duties as Orderly-Room Sergeant with the greatest determination and ability. Salvage work was also carried out, and such remnants of the battalion's equipment as were left from the fires and the subsequent looting were collected at Bac St. Maur. Little time was allowed, however, at the moment for reorganization. On August 2nd "D" Company and one platoon of "A" Company were ordered into the subsidiary line of La Boutillerie to relieve a similar force of 4/5th Loyal North Lancashires. On August 4th "the Battalion (less garrison of subsidiary line)"—so reads Operation Order No. 33—relieved the 2/7th K.L.R. The "Battalion," in fact, consisted only of three platoons of "A" Company and a few odd men who formed Battalion Headquarters. This same force was inspected next day by General Barnes, the Divisional Commander, who paid a very warm tribute to the work that the battalion had done during the past two months.
By the time Major H. K. Wilson returned from hospital, August 6th, Captain Bowring, in spite of the enormous difficulty of the task, had got the reorganization of the battalion well under way, for which he deserved the very greatest credit, and for which, in fact, he eventually received a "Mention." In this work he had been greatly assisted by the remaining officers of the battalion, who discharged their various new duties with great zeal and ability.