At 3 p.m. news was received that the enemy was falling back, and an attack on Proville Trench, on the east side of the Canal De l'Escaut, was ordered. The same formation was prescribed as before, and the advance began at 6.30 p.m. About 7.10 p.m. Captain Fell reported that his company ("D") were across the Canal de l'Escaut, little opposition being encountered. Shortly afterwards "C" and "B" Companies reported to the same effect. "A" Company were remaining in reserve on our side of the canal and La Folie Wood. But at this point our difficulties began. "C" Company, as darkness fell, found themselves floundering in a swamp, and could make no headway. "D" Company's left platoon reached Proville Trench, but came under heavy machine-gun fire and were forced back to the lock. The rest of that company were similarly checked by the fusilade, and the company established itself in the vicinity of the lock, about 400 yards west of Proville. Reference was made to Battalion Headquarters, and instructions were issued to wait for the dawn to renew the attack.
At 10 p.m. Battalion Headquarters moved up into La Folie Wood and occupied some huts close to the canal, where they were shelled continuously throughout the night with the utmost vigour. At 12.20 a.m. "A" Company was sent over the canal, and a further attack by the leading companies was attempted. However, the enemy machine guns, which had a perfect field of fire, were too much for the attackers, and caused severe casualties. All that could be done was done, Sergeant Bibby in particular distinguishing himself on this occasion, but it became evident that a mere frontal attack was useless. It was accordingly decided that "D" Company should renew the frontal attack while "A" Company supported by "C" Company was to work round the sunken road which ran from our right towards Proville. However, before this order could take effect we were informed that the 2/7th K.L.R. would take over and carry out this attack, which they did successfully, our battalion being concentrated west of the canal by 4 p.m.
At 6 p.m. the 2/5th King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment relieved us, and the battalion withdrew to bivouac in an open field just west of Fontaine and on the south side of the Cambrai—Bapaume road. This completed an awkward period of desultory but difficult fighting. We took twenty-one prisoners, with one machine gun and one trench mortar, but had two officers killed and two wounded, while among the men there were fifty-nine casualties. The officers killed were 2nd-Lieutenant Purdie, a most popular and gallant Scotsman who had been with us for a long while, and had seen active service during the greater part of the war; and 2nd-Lieutenant Alty, D.C.M., who had only joined us at Barly, but whose worth we knew, as he won his D.C.M. when serving at Houplines in the ranks of the 2/7th K.L.R. Of the officers wounded, Lieutenant James has been already mentioned; the other was 2nd-Lieutenant Shirt, who, like Alty, had joined us at Barly, and we regretted his swift departure to "Blighty." Among the men the loss of Company Sergeant-Major Woodward, of "C" Company, who was wounded during the concentration in front of the Canal du Nord, was the most serious. He was one of the very old members of the battalion who had risen steadily to warrant rank. He was badly wounded and his subsequent death in hospital was universally deplored. Company Quartermaster-Sergeant G. Lane was promoted to fill the vacancy that had occurred.
Official Photograph by permission of The Imperial War Museum.
For the whole of September, during a good part of which the battalion had been engaged in active operations, our casualties had totalled as follows:—Four officers killed and 10 wounded; 47 men killed and 188 wounded; 13 men missing. Our "effective strength" was 34 officers and 708 men, as against 42 officers and 919 men on September 1st. Our "trench strength" was, as always, considerably lower than our "effective strength," as the latter included everyone detached, whether on duty or leave, who was not counted in the war establishment of another unit. Moreover, the Transport, rear headquarters, and the 33⅓ per cent. forming the "nucleus party" have to be further deducted to show the number of "rifles" available for fighting purposes.
The battalion remained in its present position till October 4th. Our habitation consisted of the remnants of old enemy trenches and shell-holes in an open field. To the west of this, at a distance of some 200 yards from the nearest "bivvies," was a line of six 6-inch howitzers, which was continued by six 60-pounders. These two batteries were almost continuously in action, and were frequently engaged in firing salvos for barrages, and the effects of their presence had to be experienced to be properly appreciated. Except for these—and it is a very big exception—we were quiet enough. On October 1st some shells fell among our most eastern "bivvies" and wounded three men. Apart from this we were not troubled; but the hum of aeroplanes filled the air all night, while the detonations from bombs were sufficiently close to remind one of the unpleasant possibility of our turn coming next.
The weather was fine and mild, but beyond cleaning up and repairing the damage of war very little training was attempted, except some useful demonstrations of the best method of coping with hostile machine guns. On October 1st 2nd-Lieutenant Simpson and a draft of sixty men arrived, which was a welcome reinforcement. The Adjutant had also returned from the United Kingdom and resumed his duties, Captain Bowring departing shortly after to England for a well-earned leave.
Rear headquarters and the transport remained in the field on the north side of the Cambrai—Bapaume road close up to the south-west edge of Bourlon Wood, where they had moved on the evening of September 29th.