In 1427 even Frederick of Brandenburg and Cardinal Beaufort had actually prepared the way for a meeting which was to afford opportunities for doctrinal discussion; and, though Pope Martin was able at that time to prohibit the proposed conference, the Utraquists did not lose sight of the prospect then held out to them. But, though this conception of the more pacific purpose to which a Council might be turned, naturally induced the Utraquists to listen with some interest and hope to the arrangements for the meeting at Basel, that hope was strongly mixed with fear and suspicion. To them, at least, the memories of Constance brought nothing but bitterness and loathing; and the evident hostility of those who were calling for the Council, led them to doubt whether their experiences of Basel would be likely to be any more satisfactory than the unforgotten wrongs of Constance. But, above all other causes of discontent, was their ever-deepening distrust of the promises of Sigismund; and at no time had that distrust been more fully justified.

New promises for a fair hearing were despatched by him almost simultaneously with preparations for a new war; and concessions of the most hopeful kind were continually explained away. Even the great overthrow of the last crusade did not bring to an end the fierce desire of Sigismund to re-establish his power by force of arms; and the Duke of Bavaria and the Count Palatine of the Rhine were eager to second his efforts in a cause which most men now recognised as hopeless.

But the growing desire for peace was now increased by a terrible fear. The rulers of Europe remembered that desire to throw off the power of their predecessors, which had shown itself among the peasantry of Europe after the failure of the crusades in the thirteenth century; and which had been renewed after the overthrow of the French nobles by the English invaders of the fourteenth. This same feeling was now again apparent; and this time the hopes which accompanied it were evidently based on more reasonable grounds. That the Saracen generals should defeat the armies of Louis IX., or that the English nobles should overthrow the French at Crecy and Poictiers, might be convincing arguments of the weakness of the defeated parties; but they did not necessarily prove that those who yielded to such opponents, would succumb to the attacks of an untrained peasantry. Now, however, for twelve years past, the peasantry of Bohemia, armed mainly with their thrashing flails, had repeatedly put to flight the greatest armies of Europe, and overawed their own nobility. Surely such an example might give to the peasants of Germany and France some hope that a time was coming in which they too might be the equals of their oppressors! In the South of France the French peasantry rose in large numbers, demanding that the nobles should, for the future, be content to earn their bread by the sweat of their brow, and declaring that two priests were all that were required for the spiritual needs of the country. In Dauphiné collections were made on behalf of the Bohemians; while in the Rhine district three thousand peasants near Bonn and Speier declared their determination to overthrow the power of the clergy and nobles. Under these circumstances, there was a general cry that, if the Council did not come to terms with the Hussites, the peasant insurrection would spread throughout Europe.

Nor, on the other hand, were there wanting strong reasons why the Bohemians, on their side, should be eager for a peaceable settlement. On them had fallen the main misery of the war; and it is a curious fact that, in spite of their brilliant successes on the battlefield, much of their country was still in the hands of the enemy. Not only was the greater part of Moravia held down by Albert of Austria, but, in Bohemia itself, the strong fortress of Carlstein, and the important towns of Budweis (Budejóvice), Pilsen (Plz̆en), and Eger (Cheb), still held out against the Utraquists. Moreover, the discontent with the power which Procop had gained by his victories, was working among the more moderate section of the Utraquists in favour of a settlement in which learned men should have more power than soldiers.

Under these circumstances, an understanding was at last brought about; and, in January, 1433, the representatives of the Bohemians arrived in Basel. There seem to have been some five, or possibly six, Utraquists who had been chosen to represent their party; but the burden of the discussion, at any rate, fell upon four people, who were each entrusted with the defence of one of the Articles of Prague. The most important of these champions, and the one who was to gain most credit by the discussion, was, beyond all question, John Rokycana. He had been steadily advancing in reputation, both as a learned disputant and as a moderate and judicious leader. The teacher from whom he had derived his strongest convictions was Jakaubek of Kladrau; and he had, as it were, inherited from him a special devotion to the practice of Communion in both kinds. Rokycana, like Hus, had had great struggles with poverty in acquiring his early education; and, though his doctrines naturally connected him with the Calixtine section of the Utraquists, his obscure origin, combined with his strong will and individuality of character, often brought him out of sympathy with the aristocratic patrons of the movement.

JOHN ROKYCANA.

His first public action had been an attempt to make terms between the citizens of Prague and Z̆iz̆ka, in the last year of Z̆iz̆ka’s struggle with the nobles, and he induced the latter to abandon an attack upon the city. His next prominent appearance had been of a less pacific kind; for it was connected with his vehement opposition to the attempt of Prince Korybut to make terms with Sigismund. Though, however, on that occasion, Rokycana had been the chief promoter of the arrest of Korybut, Pr̆zibram, and other champions of compromise; yet he had steadily exerted himself to prevent bloodshed in the collision between the two parties; and he had afterwards encouraged arrangements for the bringing back of the Calixtine priests who had been expelled during the struggles. Since the death of Jakaubek, Rokycana seems to have divided the leadership of the Utraquist clergy of Prague with the Englishman, Peter Payne.

Payne, as has been already pointed out, belonged, in doctrine, to the extremer section of the Utraquists; but by his moderate policy he had often been drawn into sympathy with the Calixtines. Since the death of Z̆iz̆ka, he seems to have been frequently identified with that party of Orphans who claimed to represent, more exactly than the other Taborites, the policy of their leader. This choice of colleagues contributed still further to distinguish Payne from the main body of those who agreed with his doctrines; and lastly, the peculiarity of his position was increased by that reputation for learning which was always an object of suspicion to the peasant soldiers of Tabor.