Bohemia, from the earliest times to the fall of national independence in 1620 / With a short summary of later events

by C. Edmund Maurice

Budovĕc now entered into friendly relations with Z̆erotin; but, when the latter urged him to support the candidature of Matthias, Budovĕc maintained that it was more advisable to appeal again to Rudolf. His reasons may be easily imagined. Matthias, like Rudolf, was a Roman Catholic; and his chief adviser was Khlesl, Bishop of Vienna, who was by no means inclined to measures of toleration. It was true that Matthias had granted liberties to the Protestants of Hungary; but it was by no means certain that, if he were suffered to dictate his terms to Bohemia and Moravia at the point of the sword, backed by the whole support of his family, he might then grant equal liberties to them. Budovĕc therefore preferred to see what the Protestants could gain from Rudolf when under the fear of Matthias’s advance, rather than to trust to what Matthias would do if he came as a conqueror. When, then, Matthias, at the head of a Moravian, Austrian, and Hungarian army, marched into Bohemia, Budovĕc and his friends declared their willingness to stand by Rudolf.

When, on May 19, 1608, Rudolf, for the first time for many years, met the Assembly of Bohemia, Budovĕc at once demanded that, as Rudolf had already made concessions to the Protestants of Hungary, he should now grant the liberties required by the Protestants of Bohemia. The Bohemian Confession of 1575 was to be recognised. Defenders were to be chosen to protect the interests of the Protestants. Offices were to be granted in equal proportion to Protestants and Catholics. No foreigners were to be allowed to manage Bohemian affairs. And, above all, no one of any rank was to be interfered with in matters of religious liberty. The importance of this last clause is not perhaps easy to realise in our time; for, in fact, this is one of the very first assertions of the rights of all men to religious liberty. Although it is probable that expressions may have been often used which, if logically interpreted, would have involved principles of the most complete spiritual independence, yet both in Germany and Bohemia the maxim “Cujus regio ejus religio,” had always been accepted as the legal and natural rule in religious affairs.

In Bohemia, as already mentioned, the condition of the peasantry had become more dependent during the 16th century; and, in 1585, the Estates had distinctly forbidden servants to leave their masters for the purpose of entering trades, unless with the written permission of those masters. The struggle described above, in the earlier years of Rudolf’s reign, had been mainly a struggle between landed proprietors; and even a lady, who professed allegiance to the Brotherhood, had so far misunderstood their doctrines as to drive a Utraquist preacher from her estates, and to compel her peasantry to attend the sermons of a member of the Brotherhood. The principle, therefore, which Budovĕc asserted, was emphatically a new one; and he connected it, as will be seen, with appeals to the national feeling of Bohemia.

Besides the revival of the old and often repeated claim for the exclusion of foreigners from Bohemian offices, the petitioners emphasised their national position by a reference to the memories of their last national king. They demanded that the sword and crown which had been taken from the statue of King George, in the Teyn Church, should at once be restored to it. On this point alone Rudolf yielded. To the other demands he refused to give an immediate answer. Yet even this failure could not at once induce the Bohemian Estates to abandon the cause of Rudolf for that of a prince who was invading Bohemia at the head of a Hungarian army. This feeling was shared by the peasantry of Bohemia; and several collisions took place between them and the soldiers of Matthias.

But, though Matthias could not succeed in the conquest of Bohemia, Rudolf, on his part, was unable to defend or recover the rest of his hereditary dominions; nor is it probable that Budovĕc and his friends were at all prepared to engage in a war against their fellow-Protestants in Moravia, Hungary, and Austria. Rudolf, therefore, after vainly attempting a compromise, consented to renounce Hungary and Austria in favour of Matthias, and to allow him to administer Moravia during his lifetime. Matthias thereupon evacuated Bohemia; but Rudolf’s resistance was not yet at an end. He resented bitterly both the loss of his territories and the demands of the Bohemian Protestants; and, as he was not yet able to take any steps to recover his lost lands, he proceeded to turn his bitterness against Budovĕc and his allies.

In this course he was encouraged by three councillors, who were to play a memorable part in the history of Bohemia—the Chancellor Lobkovic and the ministers Slavata and Martinic. The first proposal of the Emperor was not merely to reject the petition of the Protestants, but to treat their agreement to stand by each other as a conspiracy; and he demanded that the document which contained the agreement should be handed to him to be destroyed. The Protestants chose a Committee of Twelve to remonstrate with Rudolf on this demand; and at the head of that committee they placed a man who was to become only too well known in Bohemian history, Count Matthias of Thurn. They waited on the King with the document for which he had asked, but told him that they had only produced it that he might know the names of his faithful subjects. Rudolf seems, for the moment, to have been impressed with this protest, and consented not to destroy the petition.

Budovĕc, however, and his friends were determined on using their opportunity to the utmost; and they were all the more eager in their pressure, because they found that the official leader of the Assembly, Adam of Sternberg, was entirely out of sympathy with their efforts, and that he was continually endeavouring, on the one hand, to make divisions between the Utraquists, the Lutherans, and the Brotherhood; while, on the other hand, he represented the Assembly to the Emperor as really willing to accept as satisfactory the offers which they in reality repudiated. The difficulties, which might have arisen from this latter part of Sternberg’s policy, were obviated by the attitude of uncompromising resistance which was taken up by Lobkovic, Slavata, and Martinic. At last, on the advice of these councillors, Rudolf decided to dissolve the Assembly. Then Budovĕc saw that the time for constitutional agitation was nearly over; and on April 1, 1609, he gathered his friends together, and gave notice to the chief Burggraf of Prague that they were resolved to use force to resist all injustice.

Although they were now obviously compelled to accept, in some respects, that leadership of Matthias which they had previously opposed, the Bohemian Protestants were not yet prepared to rely wholly on the King of Hungary. The Estates of Silesia and Lausitz, though largely in sympathy with the Protestant movement, had agreed with the Bohemians, in the previous year, in refusing to repudiate Rudolf. The Silesians were now ready to follow the Bohemians in their more determined policy; and the Bohemians, on their part, were disposed to strengthen this alliance, by granting to Silesia that position of independent equality which they had hitherto refused. A league was therefore formed between the Bohemian and Silesian Assemblies, of such a kind as might have been agreed upon between two independent Powers; and the Silesians were ready enough to co-operate under these circumstances.

But it was not only on their immediate neighbours that the Bohemians relied. They appealed also to the Protestant princes of Germany, both Lutheran and Calvinistic; and from them, too, they received encouraging answers. It was now evident that both sides were within a measurable distance of war; but it was also clear that Rudolf might still have a chance of preventing the insurrection from actually breaking out, by dividing the forces of his opponents, and depriving the movement of any legal centre. For greater security, the Assembly were now meeting in the Council House of the New Town of Prague; and Rudolf, therefore, ordered the Councillors of that part of the town to exclude the Assembly from their hall. The Town Council pleaded that they had given their promise, and were obliged to abide by it; but the Estates offered to meet even in the Castle itself, if a room were provided for them; and when Rudolf refused their proposal, they gathered in the open place between All Saints’ Church and the cathedral. There Rudolf came to them, and rebuked them for continuing to meet. They answered by requesting him to summon a General Assembly, which should represent not only Bohemia, but all its dependent provinces. After some hesitation, Rudolf consented to this proposal; but, as he persisted in forbidding the Estates to hold any meetings in the interval, they returned to their former position in the Council House of the New Town.

Adam von Sternberg had now been practically thrust aside by the Assembly; and Budovĕc was recognised not only as their actual but also as their official leader. He impressed on the movement that zealously religious character which the Brotherhood always endeavoured to maintain. He always opened the proceedings with prayer, and sternly repressed all immorality or disorder among the followers of the nobles, who were now flocking into the town. The Assembly felt that the use of physical force could not be much longer avoided; they attended the meetings ready armed; and on one occasion, when an attack from the king’s forces was expected, even the workmen hastened into the square and brandished their tools for the fray.