The Dawn of History: An Introduction to Pre-Historic Study

by C. F. Keary

Bournouf, Commentaire sur le Yaçna.
Bugge, Sæmundar Edda.
Bunsen, God in History (trs.).
Bunsen, Egypt’s Place, etc.
Busching, Nibelungen Lied.
Cox, Mythology of the Aryan Nations.
Edda den ældra ok Snorra.
Grimm, Deutsche Mythologie.
Grimm, Ueber das Verbr. der Leichen.
Grimm, Heldenbuch.
Keary, Outlines of Primitive Belief.
Kuhn, Herabkunft des Feuers.
Kuhn, Sagen, Gebräuche u. Mährchen.
Kuhn, in Zeitsch f. v. Sp. and Z. f. deut. Alt.
Lang, Myth, Ritual, and Religion.
Lepsius, Todtenbuch.
Maspero, Histoire Ancienne, etc.
Müller, Op. cit.
Müller, Lectures on the Science of Religion.
Müller, Chips from a German Workshop.
Müller, Origin and Growth of Religion (Hibbert Lectures).
Müller, Sacred Books of the East, vol. iv. Zend Avesta (Darmesteter).
Preller, Griechische Mythologie.
Ralston, Songs of the Russian People.
Ralston, Russian Folk-tales.
Rawlinson, Op. cit.
Rougé (Vte. de), Études sur le Rituel des Égypt.
Sayce, Religion of the Ancient Babylonians.
Simrock, Handbuch der. d. Myth.
Tiele, Outlines of the History of Religion (trs.).
Vigfusson and Powell, Corpus Poeticum Boreale.
Welcker, Griechische Götterlehre.
Wuttke, Deutsche Volksaberglaube.

The origin and history of religion and mythology is (as we might expect) a matter of keen controversy; and I cannot anticipate that the reader would rise from the perusal of all the books given in the above list with his mind not confused upon many points on which they touch. To explain the position taken up in Chapters VIII.-XI., I will add the following notes, which may help the reader over some difficult and disputed questions.

1. In the first place, we have confined our attention altogether to the essential framework of the religious system or the myth-system with which we were concerned. The irrational element is omitted, and the mere process of omitting this relieves us from entering upon many points which are strongly controverted at this moment. For instance, the work of Mr. A. Lang cited above (and which I specially mention here, as it is a good deal upon the tapis at the present moment) is altogether occupied in combating a certain theory of Mr. Max Müller’s, that the irrational element in Aryan mythologies (Greek and Sanskrit especially) could be shown to have arisen in most instances from an abuse of language, or, more exactly, from an oblivion of the true meaning of some essential word or name contained in the myth, whereby a wholly mistaken and wholly irrational element has been incorporated into the history of the god or hero.

This theory Mr. A. Lang combats by adducing the evidence that these irrational parts in mythology may be survivals of thought from an earlier age in the history of the people, when what seemed irrational (and often disgusting) to their literary successors, and seems irrational and disgusting to us, seemed neither one nor the other.

Into this controversy we are not required to enter. But it is important to point out to the reader how completely this lies outside the sphere of study which we have chosen; the more so because, through some criticisms of Mr. Lang’s book, a notion has gained currency (among those presumably who have not read the book in question) that Mr. Lang has revolutionized the whole study of religion and mythology, whereas he only proposes to deal with one section, and that a small one, of it.

Nor can it fairly be said that we are bound in these chapters to pay much attention to the irrational element in belief. If we were writing a complete treatise upon flint implements, we should be bound to include not only those flints which had been clearly chipped with a definite design, and which followed well-established forms, but with pieces of abnormal shape, and even with flakes and cores, the detritus, so to say, which had been left aside when the more available flints had been chosen. If, again, we were dealing completely with the history of village communities or systems of land tenure, we should be bound in like fashion to treat of abnormal as well as normal forms. But obviously that is not what is expected in the chapters of this book. We only profess to treat of early civilization under its more usual aspects and in its completest form. So with early beliefs; we only profess to concern ourselves with what is rational and normal in the creeds with which we are dealing.

There are always certain drawbacks, certain new liabilities to error, which follow the step of each fresh advance in science. The shadow of this kind which attends the comparative method which had been adopted with such splendid results, not only in many natural sciences, but in almost all branches of pre-historic study—the comparative study of laws, institutions, language, myths, and creeds—is a tendency to confound the condition of these things with which we are actually concerned with their condition at some previous time. As Mr. Tylor admirably says about language, that, interesting as it is to trace the history of words, our understanding of their actual meaning is not always facilitated by a misty sense that at some previous time they meant something else, so we may say of many other things—laws, for example, and customs, or, still more, myths and religions.

It will be obvious, for instance, that our appreciation of the place in history of certain personages will be very little affected by tracing some of the stories told about them to quite different countries and periods in the history of the world. Suppose (for example) that we should find in New Zealand legends a story closely analogous to the story of Harold’s oath to William the Bastard. It would be by no means safe to affirm that, if we sifted the multitudinous legends of the world, we should not be able to find some pretty close analogy to William’s celebrated trick of concealing the venerated relics beneath the altar. How, it may be asked, would such a discovery affect our estimate of the parts which William and Harold played as the rival claimants for the English throne? If the reader can answer that question he can decide the influence which studies into the religion of the Maoris or Andaman Islanders are likely to have over his estimate of the rational parts of an historic creed. Such a discovery as we have imagined would suggest the possibility that some remote channel of tradition had fathered an old myth upon Harold and William. But it would give us no clue as to how well it fitted upon their characters, how far it gained general currency at the time. Upon these questions alone depends our estimate of the position which the two historic personages occupied in the world of their day. For a story which is generally believed is almost the same as a story which is true.

Or, if the reader prefers a story which is really a myth, take the history of Hasting at the siege of Luna, with which most readers will be acquainted, and how he gained an entry into the town by feigning death and obtaining that his body should be carried within the walls for Christian burial. That is undoubtedly a myth; it is found to be sporadic among the histories of the Vikings and of the Normans, their descendants. Should we discover that a very similar story has been current among the Incas of Peru, how far could that discovery affect our estimate of the supposed character of Hasting?