[13]. Compare Liepmann, “Über Ideenflucht,” Halle 1904; also Jung, “Diagnost. Assoc. Stud.,” p. 103: “Denken als Unterordnung unter eine herrschende Vorstellung”; compare Ebbinghaus, “Kultur der Gegenwart,” p. 221. Külpe (“Gr. d. Psychologie,” p. 464) expresses himself in a similar manner: “In thinking it is a question of an anticipatory apperception which sometimes governs a greater, sometimes a smaller circle of individual reproductions, and is differentiated from accidental motives of reproduction only by the consequence with which all things outside this circle are held back or repressed.”
[14]. In his “Psychologia empirica meth. scientif. pertract.,” etc., 1732, p. 23, Christian Wolff says simply and precisely: “Cogitatio est actus animae quo sibi rerumque aliarum extra se conscia est.”
[15]. The moment of adaptation is emphasized especially by William James in his definition of reasoning: “Let us make this ability to deal with novel data the technical differentia of reasoning. This will sufficiently mark it out from common associative thinking, and will immediately enable us to say just what peculiarity it contains.”
[16]. “Thoughts are shadows of our experiences, always darker, emptier, simpler than these,” says Nietzsche. Lotze (“Logik,” p. 552) expresses himself in regard to this as follows: “Thought, left to the logical laws of its movement, encounters once more at the end of its regularly traversed course the things suppressed or hidden.”
[17]. Compare the remarks of Baldwin following in text. The eccentric philosopher Johann Georg Hamann (1730–88) even places intelligence and speech as identical (see Hamann’s writings, pub. by Roth, Berlin 1821). With Nietzsche intelligence fares even worse as “speech metaphysics” (Sprachmetaphysik). Friedrich Mauthner goes the furthest in this conception (“Sprache und Psychologie,” 1901). For him there exists absolutely no thought without speech, and speaking is thinking. His idea of the “fetish of the word” governing in science is worthy of notice.
[18]. Compare Kleinpaul: “Das Leben der Sprache,” 3 Bände. Leipzig 1893.
[19]. “Jardin d’Épicure,” p. 80.
[20]. Speech is generated by the intellect and in turn generates intellect.
[21]. It is difficult to calculate how great is the seductive influence of the primitive word-meaning upon a thought. “Anything which has even been in consciousness remains as an affective moment in the unconscious,” says Hermann Paul (“Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte,” 4th ed., 1909, p. 25). The old word-meanings have an after-effect, chiefly imperceptible, “within the dark chamber of the unconscious in the Soul” (Paul). J. G. Hamann, mentioned above, expresses himself unequivocably: “Metaphysics reduces all catchwords and all figures of speech of our empirical knowledge to empty hieroglyphics and types of ideal relations.” It is said that Kant learned some things from Hamann.
[22]. “Grundriss der Psychologie,” p. 365.