always met with machine-gun fire. In the morning of the 28th, however, an aeroplane reported the village empty, but at 8.30 a.m. patrols of the 8th Middlesex found only the western portion of the village clear. The whole battalion then advanced, and after some lively fighting occupied the village.
The 52nd Division, which had been relieved by the 57th Division, passed through the troops in the line and joined in the general attack of the 56th Division at 12.30 p.m. The action that followed is one of the utmost confusion. The Queen’s Westminsters, who led the attack, started from the line Nelly Avenue. The Germans on the right, in Guardian Reserve, held out, and the 167th Brigade found sufficient of the enemy to hold them up on the railway south-east of Croisilles. But two companies of the Queen’s Westminsters and part of the 2nd Londons lost direction, and seem to have become inextricably mixed with troops of the 57th Division somewhere to the north of Hendicourt.
Apparently trouble started on the previous day (27th), when the Queen’s Westminsters and part of the London Rifle Brigade were relieved by the London Scottish in front of Croisilles. The two former battalions had to march to a flank to get into the Hindenburg Line, and were severely shelled in doing so. On arriving at the Hindenburg Line, progress to their positions of assembly was seriously impeded by the 52nd Division, who, at that moment, were also assembling to attack on the following day. Col. Savill, who was commanding the Queen’s Westminsters, says that his men arrived “dead beat” at Nelly Avenue and Burg Support, having been on the move all night. He gives as the cause of the loss
of direction the heavy machine-gun fire which his troops met from the right on emerging from the trenches, but a glance at the map suggests another and more probable reason. He was unable to assemble his battalion on a front conforming with the general line of advance. The right of his leading companies was in Nelly Avenue, and the left in Burg Support with orders “to swing round at right angles to the Hindenburg system.”
It was pointed out at the battle of the Somme that the complicated manœuvre of changing direction at the commencement of an assault should be avoided. It is probable that the commanding officer had no other alternative, but the lesson is once more demonstrated. To the difficult task imposed upon them must be added the further embarrassment of never having seen the ground. True that the attack did not start until 12.30 p.m., but it was extremely difficult to fix landmarks owing to the country being so overgrown with long grass and weeds, and in any case there was rising ground between Burg Support and Bullecourt, so that the few hours from dawn to the attack were of little benefit.
The change of front by the left of the attacking force was further complicated by the thick wire between the trenches of the Hindenburg System. Before any manœuvre of the sort could be undertaken, these belts of wire had to be passed, and by the time this had been accomplished, all idea of direction had fled.
The London Rifle Brigade, in close support to the Queen’s Westminsters, had three companies in line, the fourth company being in support on the right and Battalion Headquarters on the left. The left
and centre companies followed the Queen’s Westminsters—even in field practice this would probably occur.
The 2nd London Regt. was already reduced to 11 officers and 193 other ranks, and assembled in King’s Avenue. The two left companies followed the Queen’s Westminsters, while the two right companies fought down Tunnel Trench.
Col. Savill, believing his battalion to be more or less on their way to Bullecourt, moved with his headquarters down Burg Support and very soon encountered the enemy. He was joined by the headquarters of the London Rifle Brigade and the 2nd London Regt. It was thought that the “mopping-up” had been badly done, and a message was sent for reinforcements while the staff details tried to bomb their way forward.