which laid their left and right flanks respectively open to counter-attack. It also caused great fatigue to the troops.
The nature of the hostile defences and new system of defence in depth. The enemy’s counter-attacks were so timed as to strike the leading waves about the same time as they reached their objectives, when they were more or less disorganised, and had been unable to consolidate the ground gained.
The concentration of hostile guns opposite the front. The heavy shelling prevented the moving up of reinforcements, machine guns, and replenishment of ammunition.”
It seems very certain that the British Staff was somewhat rattled by the German tactics in defence. Questions—long lists of them—were sent out, and reports asked for. The pill-box, it was agreed, disorganised our assaulting waves, although it did not stop them. But there is a limit to the possible advance of troops in a rush, and this had been calculated by the enemy, who placed his main forces so as to counter-attack the exhausted leading waves of attackers before they had time to consolidate, or even mop up the ground behind them. How was this to be overcome?
All officers of the 56th Division seemed to agree on this question. The answer was, “Do not try to penetrate too deeply.” Five hundred yards was a distance which troops could cover without exhaustion, and they would then be at such a distance from any troops assembled for counter-attack as would give them time to consolidate, bring up machine guns, and be ready for the counter-attack. Something of the sort was eventually done, so the experience of the 56th Division was of some service.
The attack was not renewed on this sector of the front until the 20th September, when the Second Army (Sir Herbert Plumer’s command was extended to his left) captured Glencorse and the half of Polygon Wood.
The fighting in Flanders was carried on until November. The French launched a big attack at Verdun on the 20th August, which met with notable success. Ludendorff confesses to a feeling of despair. Concrete had failed him, and as to his troops, “At some points they no longer displayed the firmness which I, in common with the local commanders, had hoped for.” By limiting the depth of penetration and breaking up the German counter-attacks with artillery fire the British troops were slowly eating their way through the defences in Flanders, in spite of having to wade through mud. Many were the consultations at German Headquarters. “Our defensive tactics had to be developed further, somehow or other.” The wastage of troops had “exceeded all expectations.” Seven divisions were sent to Italy. A countering blow was the best defence.
Sir Douglas Haig hoped that the phenomenal wet summer would be followed by a normal autumn, and continued his attacks through October. But the wet still continued, and important engagements, with large numbers of troops and tremendous expenditure of ammunition, only resulted in a “nibble” at the enemy territory.
The German-Austrian attack on Italy started on the 24th October, and resulted in the Italian Armies being driven back almost to the outskirts of Venice. This misfortune had the immediate effect of reducing the British Army on the Western Front by several
divisions, which were sent under the command of Sir Herbert Plumer, and later of Lord Cavan, to help our Italian Allies; it also determined Sir Douglas Haig to continue his operations in Flanders. The fierce battle for Passchendaele, in which the proud divisions from Canada added to their immortal fame, was fought, and operations in Flanders reached their final stages about the middle of November.