VIEW OF BAIRE, NEAR BAYAMO, FROM THE CUBAN TRENCHES.
of the summer, eighty thousand Spanish regulars, besides a number of volunteers and guerrillas, were in the field. The insurgent forces did not exceed twenty thousand men, a considerable proportion of whom were armed only with machetes. But the Spaniards shortly learned to dread this weapon more than the rifle.
Before the close of the year dynamite and the torch were brought into play. The revolutionists began, at first with discrimination, to burn plantations and to blow up bridges. On the other side the Spaniards commenced to execute insurgent chiefs who were captured.
In December the march to the west was vigorously pushed by Gomez and Maceo, whilst Campos employed all his resources in the effort to intercept it. The result was a series of technical movements in which the Spanish troops, although led by generals of experience, were usually worsted. Detached bodies of insurgents harassed the royalist commands, and diverted their attention, while Maceo steadily pushed westward, gathering recruits in his progress and leaving a train of active rebellion in his wake. The trochas, or trenches, strung with fortlets, to which the Spaniards resorted as a means of stemming the tide, proved of little efficacy. The insurgents, in large bodies, crossed them time and again. With one hundred thousand troops at his command, Campos found it impossible to check or circumscribe the rebel movements.
As time went on the insurgents became more and more unrestrained in the destruction of property. Cane-fields, sugar mills, residences, were given to the flames wherever they could be reached. This was done in pursuance of a definite policy which Gomez had repeatedly announced in his proclamations. He declared that the readiest means of inducing the Spaniards to leave the Island was to make it worthless to them. If this theory was somewhat farfetched, there could be no question of the practical effect of the destruction of the sugar crop in curtailing the resources of the administration.
Early in 1896, the insurgents had penetrated within a few miles of Habana and the proclamation of martial law was extended to embrace the whole Island. The Governor-General returned to the capital, which was in a state of turmoil and panic.
Gomez, however, did not for an instant entertain the idea of so rash an enterprise as an attack upon the City. His purpose was to make a spectacular demonstration for the sake of its moral effect and to concentrate the attention of the Spanish commanders upon himself in order that Maceo might push on to Pinar del Rio with less opposition. In both respects he was eminently successful.
Maceo traversed the entire length of Pinar del Rio, and that Province, in which rebellion had never before reared its head, was soon in open revolt from end to end. During January and February, Maceo ranged through Pinar del Rio and the southern portion of Habana, constantly engaged with one or another of the many detachments that were sent against him. For a brief space he transferred his operations to Matanzas, but returned to Pinar del Rio and for eight months withstood the numerous strong bodies of troops which General Weyler threw against him. Toward the close of the year 1896, Maceo began a march eastward and was killed in a chance encounter with a small force of Spanish soldiers.
In the execution of the plan for the invasion of the western portion of Cuba, which was conceived by Gomez, Antonio Maceo performed a splendid service for the insurgent cause. Although inferior in intellect to his chief and some other rebel leaders, Maceo was the most capable captain of them all, and his prestige among friends and foes was greater than that of any of his associates.