The only class of Cubans that is waxing fat and living in contentment is that composed of the office-holders,—the professional politicians. They toil not, but they reap with prodigious assiduity. They fill easy jobs on extravagant salaries and try to persuade the country that they are performing extremely difficult and important tasks. Their sole interest and concern is to fill their pockets with as little exertion as need be. The welfare of the people is a matter of no consideration to them. The only fly in their ointment is the fact that they can not all be in office at the same time, and so the “ins” are disturbed by the uncomfortable knowledge that the “outs” are constantly scheming to oust them.
The peasant has entirely lost whatever faith he may have had in the politician. The man who pulled the chestnuts out of the fire is growing impatient of supporting a lot of unnecessary office-holders. The peasant is supine to a shameful degree, but there is a limit to his forbearance, and it has almost been reached. He is ripe to serve the purposes of any agitators—any one who will offer a fair prospect of changed conditions.
But, be it well understood, this unrest and dissatisfaction are the outcome of basic causes. They can only be remedied by radical reformation of the economic and political state of the country. And such reformation is not to be expected from any native source. Cuba’s salvation depends upon guidance and aid from without, or, if not that, from the foreign element within her borders. This fact has become so obvious that even the organs of the politicians admit it. All classes, save the numerically smallest, are weary and disgusted with the condition of things. They can find no remedy at the polls. If the present administration is ejected, it is sure to be followed by another as bad, or worse.
When it comes to a consideration of the best means to relieve Cuba’s distress, the factors in the matter are found to be so complex, and the opinions on the subject so diverse, that it is extremely difficult to arrive at any definite conclusion. One point, at least, almost all students of the situation are agreed upon, and that is that the United States fell very short of affording the Cubans the assistance in rehabilitating themselves that they had a right to expect, and that the hasty manner in which they were left to their own resources is mainly responsible for the confusion that has existed ever since.
If the Cuban has not an actual ineptitude for exercising the functions of government, he must be disqualified by utter inexperience. The brief period of autonomy is hardly worth considering in this respect. Before the present century only a very small proportion of the population had ever exercised the elementary political function of voting. Under Spain the affairs of the country were regulated to the smallest detail by the national authority, which extended its paternal supervision to matters affecting the private life of the individual. For instance, regulations for the conduct of the bull-ring and the cock-pit emanated from the captain-general, and under his instructions the petty officers were constituted censors of the morals of private citizens, with power to punish offenders.
Another equally serious disqualification is to be found in the large proportion of illiterates in Cuba. These comprise more than half the total population. The great majority of them are campesinos, rustics. Nevertheless, it is to the country districts that we must look for the best thought and the greatest influence in future political movements. City dwellers are prone to act and think in mass, to be led by the crowd and to be unduly influenced by the press. The guajiro, who owns a little patch of ground, but is utterly lacking in education, is a safer and more valuable political unit than the average citizen of Habana.
Order was established and a workable form of government framed in Cuba by the United States, but its action in leaving this machinery entirely under the control of an inexperienced and immature people was like placing a razor in the hands of a child. The needs of the Island were sacrificed to the political exigencies of its protector. This is a fact that will hardly admit of dispute. The leading Cuban papers and the most representative citizens of the country declared unequivocally that the people were not prepared nor qualified to assume the responsibility of self-government. Governor Magoon, in a report which was suppressed, made similar representations to his superiors in Washington. Nevertheless, thirteen months after the transfer of the Island from Spain to the United States, President Roosevelt ordered that withdrawal should take place one year later and “under no circumstances and for no reason” should our occupancy be extended beyond the date set, which happened to be just before the assembling of the presidential conventions. We committed our first injustice to the country and made our first mistake in the treatment of it by that hasty and premature abandonment. We have already paid a heavy price for the blunder and Cuba has suffered severely from the effects of it. But our responsibility still exists and the task remains to be performed. There is no possibility of avoidance. Sooner or later we must take the work of Cuba’s regeneration in hand seriously and carry it out thoroughly. How this shall be done is difficult of conjecture.
A small number of men in this country, whose opinions on any subject command respect, believe that the best course will be found in leaving Cuba to work out her own difficulties without interference. The advocates of this laissez faire policy point to Mexico, the Argentine, and other Latin-American republics as shining examples of peoples who have independently worked out similar problems and have brought their countries through long periods of misery and disturbance to peaceful prosperity. But there are two strong objections to this policy. In the first place, the United States is pledged to the Cubans and the world at large to maintain order in the Island. No one who is familiar with conditions can believe that the Cubans are capable of carrying on a government for a period of five years without revolutionary eruptions. Is it conceivable that the people of the United States would allow their government to step in periodically to suppress disturbances and to step out promptly as soon as peace should be restored? It is safe to say, that the next occupation of Cuba by the United States, which can not be delayed many years, will last for a considerably longer period than did either of the preceding occupations. Then again, the situation in Cuba contains a very important element which destroys the applicability to it of the examples cited. During their formative stages Mexico, Argentina, and the other Latin-American countries contemplated were undeveloped and comparatively little foreign capital was invested in them. Cuba, on the contrary, is the scene of an advanced economic development. Almost the entire country belongs to aliens, who have billions of their money sunk in it. Is it at all probable that these persons and corporations would submit to the loss or deterioration of their property that would assuredly be involved in an independent government of Cuba by the Cubans? The monied interests form at present the most determined of the classes that look for a radical change in conditions. They know that trouble is constantly in the air and may take definite form at any moment.
What is the prospect of the Cubans working out an orderly and efficient government unaided? Up to the present, notwithstanding ample opportunity, there is not even the nucleus of a stable and rational political party in the country. The best men stand aloof, or find themselves hopelessly excluded from participation in public affairs. They complain, but their plaints are vague and indeterminate. All classes of Cubans, but one, are clamoring for a