The war myth in United States history

by C. H. Hamlin

United States citizens owned wealth in Cuba, to the amount of $50,000,000 and our commerce with Cuba amounted to $100,000,000 annually. These interests, of course, demanded intervention. Our Department of State in its correspondence with Spain estimated that $16,000,000 worth of American property had been destroyed in Cuba at the close of 1897, for which property Spain was held responsible. This was a greatly exaggerated figure, for at the close of the war a claims commission was created by Congress to investigate those claims, and this commission recognized as valid claims amounting to only about $362,252.

In October, 1897, Spain recalled Governor-General Weyler, and appointed in his place Blanco. The concentration order was revoked. Spain offered the natives a larger share of self-government, with their own constitution and legislature. Autonomy was granted. If it had been offered three years before, this would, no doubt, have solved the problem. But now it was difficult to reconcile the two factions in Cuba. The native Spaniards in Cuba opposed home rule, as it would give the Cubans too much power. The Cubans wanted independence, and were unwilling to co-operate with the Spaniards in home rule. A Cuban parliament was called on May 4, 1898.

The Hearst newspapers were then demanding intervention on the part of the United States and moulding public opinion in that direction. Although the election of 1896 was over, and it had settled the issue of free silver, yet other social elements had entered American politics through the election and campaign of 1896, and it was in the interests of some people to make use of a "vigorous foreign policy" to keep public attention away from the new issues. This is an old device for obliterating home issues or differences. Lincoln had been advised to precipitate the United States into a foreign war as a means of preventing the Civil War.

On February 9, 1898, the New York Journal, a strong advocate of intervention, violated the sanctity of the United States mails by securing through criminal methods a private letter written by Lome, the Spanish minister at Washington, to a friend. In this letter Lome severely criticised McKinley, and spoke of him with contempt. This letter was published by the New York Journal. It excited public opinion, and was, of course, made use of by the jingo press. However, it had nothing to do with the case, for a foreign minister naturally has a perfect legal and moral right to have any opinion of the President or any other public official he likes, and to express it privately to a friend. The actual crime was in stealing the letter from the United States mails, but that action was never investigated or punished by the United States, which should have been done. Lome's criticism of McKinley may have been unjust, but he had a personal right to it.

In the midst of the great excitement created by the Lome letter, another incident took place of advantage to the war party. On January 24, 1898, the Maine was ordered to Cuba on a "friendly visit." This trip was accepted officially as a complimentary visit, but privately both Spain and the United States regarding it in the opposite light. After being in Havana harbor for three weeks, the Maine was blown up on February 15, 1898. "Remember the Maine" now became the slogan of the war party. Spain denied any connection with its destruction, and no one now believes it was blown up by Spain. The actual cause of the explosion is not known, but it is now believed to have been done by the rebels in Cuba for the purpose of securing the intervention of the United States. It may have been an accident with which Spain could in no way be connected, yet, at the time, in the eyes of the public, Spain was held responsible.

McKinley, during this period, opposed intervention, but the war party, supported by the Hearst papers, was growing rapidly. Our able minister in Spain, General Woodford, was also opposed to our intervention. Congress, however, held the opposite attitude. A senator said to Assistant Secretary of State Day: "Day, doesn't your President know where the war-declaring power is lodged? Tell him that if he doesn't do something, Congress will exercise the power." Congressman Boutelle, who was opposed to the war, says that forty or fifty Republican members of Congress held a caucus and sent a committee to the President stating that unless he asked for a declaration of war, they would propose a resolution for war and carry it through. Secretary of War Alger, who was a notorious spoilsman, said to a senator: "I want you to advise the President to declare war. He is making a great mistake. He is in danger of ruining himself and the Republican party by standing in the way of the people's wishes. Congress will declare war in spite of him. He'll get run over and the party with him." Rhodes, in "McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations," on page 64, says: "McKinley feared a rupture in his own party, and on account of that fear, had not the nerve and power to resist the pressure for war. We may rest assured that if Mark Hanna had been President, there would have been no war with Spain."

McKinley was opposed to the war up to the last of March, 1898. Only two members of his cabinet were in favor of war. Also, the Vice-President was against it, as was Mark Hanna, the Speaker of the House, and nearly all the leading Republicans of the Senate.

On March 29, 1898, McKinley sent his ultimatum to Spain demanding the complete abandonment of the concentration policy, the granting of an armistice to Cuba, and the opening of peace negotiations through himself with the insurgents. Spain replied granting the complete abandonment of the concentration policy and did not refuse to grant the armistice, but told our minister, General Woodford, that she would gladly grant it, if the Cubans, who were the resistors, asked for it, for Spain could not first offer it. Our minister at Madrid then cabled McKinley that the Spanish government and people wished to settle the difficulty without war, and that in a few months' time, he would "get peace in Cuba, with justice to Cuba and protection to our great American interests."

Let us say, for example, that Japan had sent an ultimatum to McKinley during the Philippine insurrection, demanding that he change his policy of coercion and grant an armistice to the Philippines. Such a demand would have been treated with contempt, yet that is what we demanded of Spain.

On April 6, 1898, the representatives of Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria, Russia, and Italy made an appeal to McKinley to continue peaceful negotiations. The Pope also intervened for peace. He asked the Queen of Spain to comply fully with our ultimatum. Accordingly, on April 10, McKinley was notified by the Foreign Office at Madrid, that Spain would grant the armistice. But on the following day, Monday, April 11, 1898, McKinley appeared before Congress and asked for a declaration of war against Spain, without informing them of the latest concessions made by Spain. It is impossible to explain McKinley's action. Through the efforts of Minister Woodford, at Madrid, and others, a diplomatic victory had been won only to be thrown away by McKinley and Congress. The Spanish minister at Washington was notified that the President in his message to Congress on April 11, would explain the concession made by Spain, but this was not done—a reference only was made to it in his war message.