The war myth in United States history

by C. H. Hamlin

The British "Orders in Council" prohibiting the trading of neutral powers with France, and the British impressment of fugitive sailors from English ships, were the maritime controversies which resulted in the War of 1812. Both policies on the part of Great Britain were adopted as necessary measures in her conflict with Napoleon.

The New England Federalists were the people principally concerned in the United States, but they opposed the war. War was declared by a vote of 79 to 49 in the House, and 19 to 13 in the Senate. There was open discouragement of enlistment in New England. The Governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to honor President Madison's call for the militia. Henry Adams estimated that the New England bankers loaned more money to Great Britain than to the United States for war purposes. Of the $17,000,000 in specie in the country in 1812, about $10,000,000 was in the hands of the New England Federalists. They subscribed less than $3,000,000 to the United States war loan. Thus, strangely, enough, the War of 1812 was fought in spite of the protest of those for whom it was presumably fought.

But in recent years another cause of the war and the chief cause has been discovered. This was land hunger.

The United States entered the conflict at the insistence of the south and west, despite the opposition of the northeastern states. The inland section overruled the opposition of the maritime section. At that time, there was an ardent expansionist sentiment along the whole western and southern border looking towards the annexation of Canada and Florida, with a vaguer idea of seizing all of the Spanish possessions of North America. Spain then owned Florida. Spain and Great Britain were allies against Napoleon, and a war with one was looked upon as a war with both. The belief that the United States would some day annex Canada had existed continuously since the Revolution. Benjamin Franklin had advocated the buying of Canada by the United States, since we failed to take it during the Revolution. The Continental Congress made an effort to capture Canada, but our armies were repulsed. Washington had objected to leaving Canada in British hands. In 1803 Governor Morris of Pennsylvania wrote that at the time of the Constitutional Convention he knew "that all North America must at length be annexed to us—happy indeed if the lust of dominion stop there." This idea, however, was a vague dream till about 1810.

There had been friction in the northwest between the Americans and British. The British retained trading posts in the northwest after they had agreed to give them up by the treaty of 1783 recognizing the independence of the United States. These were held to compensate the Tories for their property confiscated during the Revolutionary War, which had not been done. For this reason, the British held the northwest posts until 1796, when they were given up by the Jay Treaty. All the Indian trouble in that section was attributed to British propaganda, which incited the Indians against the United States. The Canadian traders made friends with the Indians to get their trade while the Americans were aggressively pushing them back from their land. The result was that the Indian was more friendly to the British in Canada than to the United States.

The idea of annexing Canada was intensified after 1810 because of the belief that the Indians were being turned against the United States by the British. The south was almost unanimous in its demand for the annexation of Florida, while the southwest was taking a lively interest in Mexico. This land hunger was making its appearance rapidly, but it was several years later that the phrase "manifest destiny" was to come into general use.

President Madison and Secretary of State James Monroe were eager to annex Florida. Thomas Jefferson was interested in the annexation of Canada, Florida and Cuba. Jefferson considered the acquisition of Canada only a "question of marching," with Florida and Cuba easy prey from Spain. These expansionists were in favor of declaring war, while the rest of the country opposed the idea.

When Congress met in 1811, Henry Clay was elected Speaker of the House. He was leader of the war group known as "war hawks." Clay was the first Speaker of the House of Representatives to recognize the great power he could exercise over legislation through his appointment of committees. He was the first "Czar" of the House. On the Foreign Relations Committee, Clay appointed Peter B. Porter, Chairman, Calhoun of South Carolina, Grundy of Tennessee, Harper of New Hampshire, and Desha of Kentucky. All these were ardent expansionists and reliable war men. They represented the frontier section of 1812, and Clay had been chosen Speaker by the representatives from that section. In December, 1812, while on the Foreign Relations Committee, Porter said in discussing trouble with Great Britain, "We could deprive her of her extensive provinces lying along our border to the north." Grundy and Rhea, ardent expansionists from Tennessee, agreed.

R. M. Johnson of Kentucky during the same session made the statement, "I shall never die contented until I see her (Great Britain's) expulsion from North America, and her territories incorporated with the United States," and Harper of New Hampshire said in Congress: "To me, sir, it appears that the Author of Nature has marked our limits in the South by the Gulf of Mexico, and in the North by the regions of eternal frost."

These statements were representative of the sentiments of the members in Congress from the western section. The Federalist Party consisted chiefly of the mercantile and financial interests of the coast towns. They were solidly against expansion, which would give the economic advantage to the western section of the country.