The Pacification of Burma

by C. H. T. Crosthwaite

It will be convenient to take the northern portion of the district first—that part, namely, which begins from 24° 37' N. and goes right up to the Chinese boundary. It now forms a separate charge, known as the Myitkyina district, but at the time we are writing of, was the Mogaung subdivision of the Bhamo district, and contained about 10,000 square miles of country, of which two-thirds were, and still are, forest. The level and valley lands along the Irrawaddy and its tributaries, mostly on the right bank, are fertile, yielding rice as the main crop; but even now, after twenty years of peace, the area cultivated is very small. It is given in the Burma Gazetteer (vol. ii., p. 123) as twenty-eight square miles. The area in the hills tilled, after a primitive method, has not been estimated, but as there are between twenty and thirty thousand Kachins who live on its produce, it is probably larger.

Of the wide forest area, part is in the low hill ranges, part in the plains. Twenty-five years ago, when there was not a road, the dense undergrowth and bamboo jungle, and in the lower lands the wide seas of elephant-grass, made the passage of men and transport animals most difficult and laborious.

From a fiscal point of view Mogaung was supposed to be the most important part of the Bhamo district. The collection of a royalty on jade was farmed in the King's time for about Rs. 50,000, and there was also an income from the rubber-trees, mostly wild, but to a small extent cultivated.

In March, 1886, a force accompanied by Captain Cooke, the Deputy Commissioner, made its way to Mogaung. The Deputy Commissioner reported that the "country was then, for the most part, brought under control and settled administration." This was a figurative and official way of saying that a person of local influence, by name Maung Kala, had been recognized and put in charge as a magistrate in the British service.

After a very brief visit the Deputy Commissioner with the troops went back to Bhamo, and left Maung Kala to carry on the government as he best could, without police and with no military support nearer than Bhamo, which is at the least 150 miles from Mogaung, whether the journey is made by water or land. Even a handful of troops, lightly equipped, could not have been sent up in less than a fortnight. There was no telegraph to Mogaung. Maung Kala belonged to a family of great local influence, which had held office for several generations, and was reputed to be of Chinese descent. But whatever his influence, he was sure to make enemies in his endeavours to keep order and to collect revenues, and there was no visible force behind him. His reign was short, and he was soon assassinated.[41]

A Burman official was sent up from Bhamo by the Deputy Commissioner to succeed the murdered man. He soon found that he was not wanted at Mogaung and he retired to Sinbo, whence he could at least make a show of controlling the river-side villages. Po Saw, the son of Maung Kala, was then appointed by the people to his father's post, and whatever order or show of government there was in the country was due to him. Subsequently, in consequence of his having summarily executed a pretender who had endeavoured to impose himself on the people, the Deputy Commissioner recognised Po Saw's authority and withdrew the Burman. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the British Government had jurisdiction in Mogaung. No revenue was collected—at least, none was paid into the Bhamo treasury. In this respect, however, Mogaung was little worse than the southern portion of the district which was administered by the Deputy Commissioner himself, supported by the garrison at Bhamo. In September, 1886, Major Cooke reported: "This district has, I believe, been one of the quietest districts in Upper Burma. The tranquillity of the district is in a great measure due to the fact that no real attempt was made to collect the revenue until July or August." Even the tranquillity so purchased was, however, only comparative, and the soldiers had quite enough to do. In the open season of 1886-7 it was not found possible to give men for an effective expedition to the north. Things had to be allowed to take their own course for the time. The Administration had no choice.

Early in 1887, however, the military police began to arrive from India, and in the spring of that year five companies, mainly Gurkhas, under the command of Lieutenant O'Donnell, were posted to Bhamo. This strengthened the hands of the civil administration. It was then too late to start an expedition to Mogaung. But Lieutenant O'Donnell was sent up to Sinbo, a village of some importance on the right bank of the Irrawaddy, just above the first defile. Here a strong stockade was built and a Gurkha garrison posted in it. An Assistant Commissioner also, Mr. Twomey, was sent to watch the course of events in the north.

There were three routes by which Mogaung could be reached from Bhamo. One was by going up the Irrawaddy and turning into the Mogaung River, on which lies the town. This was quite possible for a very small force which had not to carry all its supplies and transport. The object, however, was not merely to reach Mogaung, but to go to the jade-mines and explore the country. Since an explorer (Lieutenant Bayfield) made his way to the mines in 1838, no European had visited them. Nothing was accurately known of the nature of the country, of the supplies it afforded, or of the numbers and temper of the Kachin tribes which dominated it. All that could be gathered from the Chinese and others showed that there would be much difficulty in all these matters. It was suspected that the Chinese were disposed to magnify the difficulties. Nevertheless it was necessary that the force should be prepared for all emergencies, and should be in every respect self-sufficing. Hence the river route was considered impracticable.

Another way was to land the force at Katha and march up through Mohnyin. Our knowledge of the route between Mohnyin and Mogaung also was imperfect. It was not under our control, and a force passing up would have to take everything with it. The third route was by the left bank of the Irrawaddy. It had this advantage, that although the marching would be difficult, boats could follow the force up the river, could meet it at fixed points, and could carry a large quantity of the supplies, certainly as far as Sinbo and probably in the smaller craft as far as Mogaung. After much consideration it was decided to send the expedition by this route. A fortified post was to be established at Mogaung, to be held by the military police, to serve as a base for the advance of the force to the jade-mines and other parts.