The Pacification of Burma

by C. H. T. Crosthwaite

The transition stage did not last long. The Indian police picked up their work with rapidity. No men could have learnt it quicker. They were constantly engaged with dacoits; they frequently followed up and inflicted punishment on them and recovered property without loss to themselves. The few mistakes were seized upon and magnified while the successes vastly greater in number were not noticed.

In the first orders regarding the military police the minimum garrison of a post was fixed at twenty-five men. This was found to be too weak and was raised to forty, and the minimum strength of a patrol was fixed at ten. I found it necessary to forbid any new post to be established without my sanction and to lay down the strength of the movable column to be maintained in each district. The local officers seemed unable to refrain from putting out posts until there was not a man left at headquarters.

In April, 1888, the Viceroy asked me if I saw any sensible signs of the reduction of our troops and the substitution of the police encouraging the dacoits or loosening our hold on the country. After explaining that the districts where the dacoits were most active and organized there had been no reduction of troops, but, on the contrary, constant military activity under keen commanders, I wrote:—

"I have carefully watched events and thought over the matter, and my conclusion is that the dacoits know that the troops have retired and that the police move in small numbers and have taken advantage of the occasion. If this is allowed to go on they will get bolder and will give trouble.... I am inclined to sit tight and wait until the men have learnt their work. The native officers will learn the language and the country.... The commissioners and district officers like to cover their districts with a perfect network of posts at short distances from each other. If they were allowed their own way there would not be a man left to move about. Last August (1887) this was foreseen, and the strength of the movable column to be kept for active operations in each district was laid down, and orders have been given and have been enforced forbidding the formation of new posts without my sanction."

Lord Dufferin accepted my views, saying that he would not go into the various considerations which I had placed before him, "except to say that I fully appreciate the calmness and good sense with which you have discussed the matter. A more excitable man might have gone off at a tangent and have been frightened into measures which would certainly have been very expensive and might not have been necessary. I have taken the Commander-in-Chief into counsel, and after going fully and very carefully into the whole matter we are content to accept your views."

There was in point of fact no reason for anxiety. Week by week the police improved. The first combined movement attempted with military police was in the difficult Popa country where four small columns under Captain Hastings, Commandant of the Myingyan battalion, succeeded in running Ya Nyun's gang hard, but did not capture him. And in various encounters in this district alone the dacoit gangs loss amounted to: killed, 105; wounded and captured, 29; captured, 486. Eighteen ponies were taken, 316 firearms, and many dahs and spears.

The casualties of the military police in Upper Burma, during 1888, were 46 killed and 76 wounded, whilst the dacoits lost 312 killed (actually counted after action), and 721 captured. The casualties in the Army in Upper Burma between the 1st of May, 1887, and the 31st of March, 1889, were: killed or died of wounds 60, and wounded 142. (Par. 26 of the Despatch of Major-General Sir George White, K.C.B., V.C., late Commanding the Upper Burma Force. Dated Simla, July 6, 1889.) The police could not have been more active than the soldiers had been. They probably suffered more in proportion to their numbers owing to their inferior training. During the year 1888 the military police were in the field constantly in almost every district in the province.

It became evident that we had not a sufficient number of British officers; if a man fell sick or was wounded, there was no one to take his place. Sixteen additional officers were sanctioned for the police, but they did not arrive until after the close of the year. They added much to the strength and efficiency of the force.