The Pacification of Burma

by C. H. T. Crosthwaite

It will be easily understood that the Government was not eager to lay hold of more territory than it was bound in honour to accept as the successor of the Burmese dynasty. We had already taken as much as we could administer or garrison with efficiency. Our authority was now definitely established up to the Salween. The country lying between that river and the Mekong was known to be mountainous, unhealthy, and unprofitable, destitute of roads, a succession of steep mountain ranges which made travelling most laborious. To maintain even a handful of troops in that region would be costly. Revenue, there would be none. It was asked where were our responsibilities to end? It was not easily answered. The problem had several sides—the military, the political, and the administrative. From the soldiers' point of view the arguments in favour of making the Salween our eastern boundary had considerable force. The river gave a clear and definite frontier drawn from north to south. The advance of a possible enemy through the country between the Mekong and the Salween could not, from the nature of the ground, be made without much difficulty; whereas the defence would have, in the wide plateau with its rolling prairies on the west of the Salween, an admirable position, with easy communications open to the Irrawaddy Valley.

Looking at the matter, moreover, from a broader point of view, it was doubtful whether the British dominion in India was not outgrowing its strength. In 1886 the annexation of Upper Burma added, roughly, 120,000 square miles to the area for which the Government of India was responsible. Of this, roughly speaking, 20,000 square miles lay across the Salween. Before Upper Burma was added to the Empire it had been argued by a great military authority that if we were seriously threatened by an enemy beyond the frontier of India, it would be necessary to recall the garrison of British Burma and to let that province go for the time. If there were any foundation for this opinion the difficulty in the event supposed would be very much increased by the addition of the new province. For no addition had been made to the army in India since the annexation. There were strong reasons, therefore, for not going a yard farther than was necessary. The advance beyond the Salween meant the inclusion of some 20,000 square miles of very difficult country and the possible neighbourhood of a troublesome power.

In support of the military arguments it was urged that the Salween was designed by nature for a boundary. It cut its way, in a line running almost due north and south, through steep mountains and rocks. It was not navigable in its upper reaches; the mouth and the navigable portion of the river were in our hands. But as a matter of fact, however adapted by its natural formation for such a purpose, the Salween has not been able to limit the spread of any race or power that has settled on its banks. On the north the Chinese hold both banks. The Shans have settled indiscriminately on either side. It proved no obstacle to the extension of the Burmese power to the eastward. In short, so far from having been "an uncompromising natural boundary," as it has been called, it has not been a boundary at all except for a short length of about sixty miles where it divides the Lower Burma Salween district from Siamese territory. Moreover, it is a timber-floating river. The teak cut on either bank must be rafted down to Moulmein; and hence disputes would be sure to arise. Rivers, as a rule, are held to be bad boundaries, and the Salween is no exception.

At first sight the strategical objections to crossing the Salween appeared to derive support from a consideration of the relations to foreign powers which might follow. It was not desired to take any step which might in the near future bring us into contact with France, and thus add a new factor to the frontier problems of our Indian Empire. The Government was even more anxious to avoid action which might give offence to Siam, or have the appearance of want of consideration in our dealings with that somewhat unreasonable power.

Further examination, however, led to a doubt as to the soundness of these views. Supposing that the British Government, influenced by these motives, decided to decline responsibility for these Trans-Salween States, what would become of them? Even Kengtung, the most powerful, could not stand alone. China and Siam might be invited to absorb them, and thus a belt of territory might be placed between our boundary and that of French dominion in Tonquin China. But China, it was believed, had no wish to increase her responsibilities in these regions, where her authority was very weak. Siam might be willing enough, but her rule would be feeble and unstable, and not welcome to the Shans. Both countries on this frontier were more likely to lose than to gain. If, with the view of avoiding the inconveniences that might arise from becoming conterminous with a great Western Power in these distant countries, we should invite Siam or China, or both, to relieve us of the charge of the Trans-Salween country, what security was there that either of these powers would retain the territory given to them? We might be creating the very conditions we wished to avert. The result of a cautious policy of this kind might be to make our dominion conterminous with that of France, not on or beyond the Mekong but on the Salween itself—an intolerable position.

Looking at the matter from an administrative and local point of view, the Chief Commissioner was against stopping short of the frontier claimed by the King of Burma. It was argued that our new subjects, whether in Burma proper or in the Shan States, would not understand such a policy, and that it would have a bad effect on their feelings towards us. We might dignify it by the names of prudence and forbearance; they would ascribe it to fear and weakness. To them we should seem to have lifted a burden too heavy for our strength. We were afraid of going into places which the King had held and prepared for us.

This, however, might be disputed, or treated as a question of sentiment. But the practical objections were evident and insuperable.

The Easternmost Point of the British-Indian Empire.
Reach of the Mé Khong where our boundary marches with French Indo-China.