If this situation continues, it raises the question whether our government will not be forced, in protection of its own mineral industries, also to take a direct part; for under present conditions, our importers and exporters find themselves dealing single-handed with governments or with private groups so closely identified with governments as to have much the same power. In matters of shipping, credits, exchange, tariffs, embargoes, and opportunity to acquire foreign reserves, the actual and potential disadvantage to American interests is obvious.
TENDENCIES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL COÖPERATION AND POSSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL[59] OF MINERALS
Under the pre-war conditions, unrestricted competition in world trade by private enterprise had led to a certain kind of internationalization of mineral deposits based on natural conditions of availability. There is a natural tendency to work back as quickly as possible to this condition, but new elements have entered which seem to make it difficult for governments to keep their hands off. The participation of governments in world mineral trade, when not modified by international coöperation or some other higher form of control, seems to be having a tendency in the opposite direction—to be closing the doors of equal opportunity and preventing the natural world use of the world's resources.
These new conditions, together with others outlined in the preceding section, have made it necessary to pay more attention to the possibilities of international coöperation than ever before,—not as a restrictive measure, except temporarily in regard to the Central European powers,—but as a means of insuring open channels of movement for raw materials, and of insuring equal economic opportunities to all. Many of our mineral industries have already appealed to our government for coöperation and aid in their international dealings. Further, mineral industries in private hands in the various Allied countries have attempted to get together to arrange for private coöperation, and appealed to the Peace Conference for authority to do so. In certain cases the necessity for coöperative action became so apparent that pressure was brought to bear on the Peace Conference for the forming of some sort of international economic body which would make possible some of these steps. These movements were all dictated by considerations of self-interest, but self-interest broadened and educated by a knowledge of the world's situation.
Just as the increasing size of the units engaged in the mineral trade within national boundaries has led to discussion of the possibilities of government control in the interest of the public, so the increasing size of the units in the international mineral trade, the units in many cases being governments, is leading to discussion of the possibility of some international or supernational control in the interest of the world good. Just as national interest is the lengthened shadow of individual interest, so international interest may be regarded in some aspects as the lengthened shadow of national interest.
The general purpose of the suggested control is to minimize international friction; but more specifically it has been suggested that some sort of international coöperation is necessary in order to insure equality of opportunity among nations, both in supplies and in markets, and thereby to prevent the crowding of the weaker by the stronger nations. This is the gist of one of the famous fourteen points. The purpose might be accomplished by direct allocation of supplies or by control of tariffs and exchange.
One of the conditions which seems to require international coöperation is the exploitation of mineral deposits in backward countries. Unrestricted competition among nations in such exploitation has been an important cause of international controversy. It was planned at Peace Conference that the mineral resources in countries taken over by the great powers under mandatories should be developed and used in the interest of the group of nations, rather than for the special interest of the nation taking the mandatory. One of the natural functions of any international or supernational organization would be the adjustment and settlement of difficulties arising from this provision.
This topic brings up the question as to the right of any nation or group of nations to exert any force on weaker nations in the exploitation of mineral resources. On the principal of self-determination and of the complete freedom of action of nations, this procedure seems unjustified. On the other hand, whether rightly or wrongly, civilization has created great material demands which must be satisfied. The individuals, companies, and governments which use force to exploit resources in weaker countries are merely the agents in supplying the demand created by all of us. While their methods are often indefensible, the exploiters cannot be regarded merely as irresponsible buccaneers who are projecting themselves unnecessarily into somebody else's business. Whatever the sentimental and ethical aspects of the question, it seems almost inevitable that the demands of civilization will continue to require the exploitation of weaker countries; and in proportion as these countries are backward in coöperating, they must feel the world pressure. An agreement for international coöperation in such matters, therefore, is not to be regarded as merely a cold-blooded attempt to rob weaker nations,—but rather as a means of improving methods in satisfying the actually existing material demands of civilization. For illustration, the criticism of England's attempt to develop the oil industry of Mesopotamia and Persia has to a large extent confused the methods with the aim sought for. It is the writer's view that development of these resources is inevitable, and that criticism should not be directed toward nations and groups attempting to attain these results, but rather to the methods applied. For the purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to go beyond the acceptance of the fact of demand, nor to argue the question as to whether the material demands of civilization should be curbed and progress restricted to matters of mind and human happiness.
Methods of International Coöperation
The first step in international consideration of minerals is obviously one of fact-finding. This became painfully evident during the great war, when the sudden cutting off of outside supplies and markets brought home the fact that the mineral question is only in part a domestic one. The average mining man had come to take the established marketing and commercial conditions more or less for granted, and had not looked into the underlying factors. There had been a tendency to assume that a kind Providence was in some manner looking after these elements in the situation. The nearest approach to Providence, as a matter of fact, was a small group of importers and exporters, possessing special knowledge of the international movements of certain commodities,—which knowledge was of unsuspected importance to the mineral industry. War conditions showed that neither the general public nor the mineral industry as a whole, much less the government, had even an elementary grasp of the important elements of the world mineral situation. The mobilizing of this information under high pressure, through the coöperation of government and private agencies, was an interesting and important feature in the complex activities back of the firing line. It is vastly to the credit of the men interested in the mineral industry in this country, and presumably also in other countries, that almost without exception they contributed their bits of knowledge to the common pool, even though these bits had been in a sense their private capital. Certain importers, who by their knowledge of international phases of the mineral situation had been able to exercise a profound influence on domestic markets, voluntarily sacrificed their own interest for the common cause and pointed out ways in which reductions of imports could be made.