Animal Life and Intelligence

by C. Lloyd Morgan

Why, then, rediscuss the question under these new terms? Because I believe that such rediscussion may place the matter in a fresh and, perhaps, clearer light. The question of the relation of animal intelligence to human reason is one upon which there is a good deal of disagreement, and one that has been discussed and rediscussed. I seek to put it in a somewhat new light. I have endeavoured to define carefully and accurately the terms I use, and the sense in which I use them. I have coined for my own purposes unfamiliar terms such as "construct," "isolate," and "predominant," that I might thereby be enabled to avoid the use of terms which, from the different senses in which they are employed by different writers, have become invested with a certain ambiguity. I trust, therefore, that even those with whom I seem most to disagree will allow that my aim has not been mere disputation, but scientific accuracy and precision in a difficult subject where these qualities are of essential importance.

I take first some observations communicated by Mr. H. L. Jenkins to Mr. Romanes, since, though they raise a point which we have already shortly considered, they form a transition from unconscious to perceptual inferences. Speaking of the intelligence of the elephant, Mr. Jenkins says,[GV] "What I particularly wish to observe is that there are good grounds for supposing that elephants possess abstract ideas; for instance, I think it is impossible to doubt that they acquire, through their own experience, notions of hardness and weight." He then details observations which show that elephants at first hand up things of all kinds to their mahouts with considerable force, but that after a time the soft articles are handed up rapidly and forcibly as before, but that hard and heavy things are handed up gently. "I have purposely," he says, "given elephants things to lift which they could never have seen before, and they were all handled in such a manner as to convince me that they recognized such qualities as hardness, sharpness, and weight."

Now, the question I wish here to ask is—Do the observations of Mr. Jenkins, the nature of which I have indicated, afford good or sufficient reasons for supposing that these animals possess abstract ideas? And I reply—That depends upon what is meant by abstract ideas. If it is implied that the abstract ideas are isolates; that is, qualities considered quite apart from the objects of which they are characteristic, I think not. But if Mr. Jenkins means that elephants, in a practical way, "recognize such qualities as hardness, sharpness, and weight" as predominant elements in the constructs they form, I am quite ready to agree with him. I much question, however, whether there is any conscious inference in the matter. The elephant sees a new object, and unconsciously and instinctively builds the element hardness or weight into the construct that he forms. And he shows his great intelligence by dealing in an appropriate manner with the object thus recognized. But I do not think any reasoning is required; that is to say, any process involving an analysis of the phenomena with subsequent synthesis, any introduction of the conceptual element.

Let us consider next an observation which shows a very high degree of perceptual intelligence on the part of the dog. Several observers have described dogs, which had occasion to swim across a stream, entering the water at such a point as to allow for the force of the current. And both Dr. Rae and Mr. Fothergill communicated to Mr. Romanes instances[GW] of the dog's observing whether the tide was ebbing or flowing, and acting accordingly. Now, I believe that the dog performs this action through intelligence, and that man explains it by reason. The dog has presumably had frequent experience of the effect of the stream in carrying him with it. He has been carried beyond the landing-place, and had bother with the mud; but when he has entered the stream higher up, he has nearly, if not quite, reached the landing-stage. His keen perceptions come to his aid, and he adjusts his action nicely to effect his purpose.

On the bank sits a young student watching him. He sees in the dog's action a problem, which he runs over rapidly in his mind. Velocity of stream, two miles an hour. Width, one-eighth of a mile. Dog takes ten minutes to swim one-eighth of a mile. Distance flowed by the stream in ten minutes, one-third of a mile. Clever dog that! He allows just about the right distance. A little short, though! Has rather a struggle at the end.

The dog intelligently performs the feat; the lad reasons it out.

I do not know whether I am making my point sufficiently clear. A wanton boy is constantly throwing stones at birds and all sorts of objects. He does not know much about the force of gravitation or the nature of the curve his stone marks out; but he allows pretty accurately for the fall of the stone during its passage through the air. He acquires a catapult; and, being an intelligent lad, he perceives that he must aim a little above the object he wishes to hit. This is a perceptual inference. Reason may subsequently step in and explain the matter, or very possibly, being human, sparks of reason fly around his intelligent action.

Am I using the word "reason" in an unnatural and forced sense? I think not. My use is in accord with the normal use of the word by educated people. Two men are working in the employ of a mechanical engineer. Listen to their employer as he describes them. "A most intelligent fellow is A; he does everything by rule of thumb; but he's wonderfully quick at perceiving the bearing of a new bit of work; he sees the right thing to do, though he cannot tell you why it should be done. Now, B is a very different man; he is slow, but he reasons everything out. A knows the right thing to do; and B can tell you why it must be done. A has the keenest intelligence, but B the clearest reasoning faculty. If I have occasion to question them about any mechanical contrivance, A says, 'Let me see it work;' but B says, 'Let me think it out.'"

In other words, A, the intelligent man, deals with phenomena as wholes, and his perceptual inferences are rapid and exact; while B, the reasoner, analyzes the phenomena, and draws conceptual inferences about them.

Let us take next Dr. Rae's[GX] most interesting description of the cunning of Arctic foxes. These clever animals, he tells us, soon learn to avoid the ordinary steel and wooden traps. The Hudson Bay trappers, therefore, set gun-traps. The bait is laid on the snow, and connected with the trigger of the gun by a string fifteen or twenty feet long, five or six inches of slack being left to allow for contraction from moisture. The fox, on taking up the bait, discharges the gun and is shot. But, after one or more foxes have been shot, the cunning beasts often adopt one of two devices. Either they gnaw through the string, and then take the bait; or they tunnel in the snow at right angles to the line of fire, and pull the bait downwards, thus discharging the gun, but remaining uninjured. This is regarded by Dr. Rae as a wonderful instance of "abstract reasoning."