Animal Life and Intelligence

by C. Lloyd Morgan

Now, we may divide the metakinetic concomitants of neural processes into two categories: first, those which are intimately associated with neural processes directly leading to motor-activities; secondly, those which are, so to speak, floated off from these into the region of thought and æsthetic emotion, and which are therefore associated with neural processes only indirectly or remotely leading to motor-activities. Both have, of course, kinetic equivalents in neural processes, but the former are directly associated with activities and conduct, and the latter are not.

Let me exemplify. Interpretations of nature, theories, hypotheses, belong to the latter class. Their association with activities is in the main indirect. Whether we believe in materialism, idealism, or monism, our conduct is much the same. People got out of the way of falling stones, and guarded against being caught by the incoming tide, before science comprised both phenomena under the theory of gravitation. The conduct of human-folk was not much altered by the replacement of the geocentric by a heliocentric explanation of the solar system. It matters not much how a man explains the lightning's flash so long as he avoids being struck. The bird continues to soar quite irrespective of man's prolonged discussion of how it can be explained on mechanical principles. And in general the practical activities of mankind remain much the same (I do not say quite the same, for there are remote and indirect results of the greatest importance in the long run) whatever their particular theory of the universe may be.

Now, let us note the implication. We have said a good deal in earlier chapters about natural elimination and selection. To which category of neural kineses do they apply—to those associated with practical results; or to those associated with theoretical results (supposing these to obtain below the level of man); or to both? Clearly to those associated with practical results. It matters not what theories a lion, or an adder, or a spider hold (supposing, again, that they are capable of theorizing, which I doubt). Its practical activities determine whether it survives or not. So, too, with men, so far as they are subject to natural elimination. It matters not what may be the nature of their thoughts, their æsthetic yearnings, their ideals. According to their practical conduct, they are eliminated or escape elimination. In other words, elimination or natural selection applies only remotely or indirectly to the human race regarded as theorists, æsthetes, or interpreters of nature.

Before proceeding to indicate to what laws our theories and interpretations of nature and moral ideals are subject, we may note that there are sundry activities of man, the outcome of his conceptual thought and emotion, which are also, under the conditions of social life, to a large extent beyond the pale of elimination. I refer to the æsthetic activities—music, painting, sculpture, and the like; in a word, the activities associated with art, literature, and pure science. These, in the main, take rank alongside the ideas of which they are the outward expression. Natural selection, which deals with practical, life-preserving, and life-continuing activities, has little to say to them. They are neutral variations which, so far as elimination is concerned, are neither advantageous nor disadvantageous, and, therefore, remain unmolested.

We may, therefore, fully agree with Mr. Wallace, when he says,[KK] "We conclude, then, that the present gigantic development of the mathematical faculty [as also of the musical and artistic faculties] is wholly unexplained by the theory of natural selection, and must be due to some altogether distinct cause." Nay, we may go further, and say that it is only by misunderstanding the range of natural selection as an eliminator that any one could suppose that these faculties could be explained by that theory.

We must admit, then, that there are certain neural kineses which, from the fact that they are unassociated with life-preserving and life-continuing activities, are not subject to the law of elimination; and in the development of which natural selection cannot have been an essential factor. These, in their metakinetic aspect, are conceptual thoughts, emotions, and ideas. Remembering the distinction drawn in the chapter on "Organic Evolution" between origin and guidance, let us proceed to inquire, first, how these ideas have been guided to their present development; and, secondly, how we may suppose these special variations to have originated.

To understand their development, we must understand their environment. The environment of metakineses is, as we have already seen, constituted by other metakineses. What we have now to note is that the environment of conceptual ideas, as such, is constituted by other ideas. The immediate environment of an hypothesis is other hypotheses; of a moral ideal, other moral ideals; of an æsthetic thought, other æsthetic thoughts; of a religious conception, other religious conceptions. But not only are ideas environed by ideas of their own order; they are environed by ideas of other orders. Thus a scientific hypothesis or a moral ideal may be in harmony or conflict with religious conceptions, and its fate may be thereby determined; or a religious conception may be in harmony or conflict with psychological principles, and its acceptance or rejection thereby determined. So that we may say, in general, that the environment of an idea is the system of ideas among which it is introduced.

Of course, it must be clearly understood that it is with the individual mind that we are dealing. The scientific ideas, moral ideals, æsthetic standards, religious conceptions, of a tribe, nation, or other community, are simply representative, either of the general views of the majority of the individuals, or more frequently of a majority among a cultivated minority. In any case, we have seen that metakineses are and must be an individual matter. For each individual there is a separate ideal world.

Through certain activities, notably language spoken or written, men can symbolize to each other the ideas that are taking metakinetic shape in their own minds. All-important, however, as is this power of intercommunication by means of language, it does not a whit alter the fact that the idea and its environment have to work out their relations to each other separately in each individual mind. My neighbour may symbolize, through language, his ideas in such a form that similar ideas may be called up in my mind; but it is there that they have to make good their claim for acceptance in the environment of the system of ideas among which they are introduced.

Now, what is the guiding principle of the evolution and development of ideas in the world of their metakinetic environment? Is there any principle analogous to that of elimination which we have seen to be of such high importance in organic evolution? I believe that there is. An idea is accepted or rejected according to its congruity or incongruity with the system of ideas among which it is introduced. The process has, perhaps, closer analogy with elimination than with selection, inasmuch as it would seem to proceed by the rejection of the incongruous, leaving both the congruous and the neutral. An idea or hypothesis may be accepted, at any rate provisionally, so long as it is not in contradiction to the theories and beliefs already existing in the mind.