Thus France, in the event of a new conflict with her old foe, will again find herself for quite some time left all alone to face the numerically superior enemy. Where will Russia be then?
No Poland, no combination of any group of small States will be able to take the place of Russia, for that would be a mere 15-20 millions; it will be not Russia, but only one-seventh, a sixth, or fifth part of that which Russia gave during the past War. These weak nations will only become additional trophies to the enemy, just as Roumania, Serbia and Belgium became his easy prey in the past War.
Where will Russia be then? Not the present-day Russia bleeding to death in its struggle against Bolshevism, but the future, once more powerful, Russia?...
Bolshevism, an abnormal phenomenon, is bound to come to an end—somewhat earlier, or somewhat later. No matter how much may be cut off from Russia, she will always remain an immense, great, rich, and therefore powerful, country. Too much will depend upon what this coming Russia may have to say, for any sensible statesman to refuse to reckon with that eventuality.
This question the statesmen of the West must ask of themselves clearly and plainly—not those statesmen who think no further than the following day and of the success of their fight against their political opponents—but those wise leaders of the nations who really have at heart the interests of their own countries, as well as of the entire civilized world. "Ostrich politics" may least of all be applied in dealing with that tremendous military and political factor which covers one-sixth of the land surface of the globe and is called Russia.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] See diagrams on pp. [15] and [18].
[2] See Appendixes No. [I] and [II], in which an analysis of this part of Ludendorf's Memoirs is given.
[3] See Appendixes ["Ludendorf—Samsonov"] and ["Ludendorf—Rennenkampf"] at the end of the pamphlet.
[4] How preposterous is this figure of 1,200,000 men, supposed to have been transferred by the Russians from Galicia to Warsaw, to oppose Ludendorf, may be seen from the fact that only 3 railway lines run from Galicia to Warsaw. It is not difficult to demonstrate that it is impossible to carry 1,200,000 men on 3 railway lines within 2 weeks (the offensive of the Germans against Warsaw began in the first days of October, and the retreat began two weeks later, i. e., when the Russian troops were transferred from Galicia to Warsaw).