At this same period, towards the close of 1914, the Germans were compelled by the operations of the Russian Army to increase the number of their troops on the Russian front up to 43 divisions. If the Germans were unable in the beginning of the War to win out in France where they had all their forces, allotting to the Russian front only 14 divisions and the Austrian Army, so much the less could they have won at the end of 1914, when the Russians had compelled them to have 43 divisions in the field, that is, to treble their forces on the Russian front, to the detriment of their French front.
New Opportunities for the Allies
The third great period of the world-conflict—1915—is the year of Russia's single-handed fight against Germany, Austria and Turkey. This year was hardest for Russia not only because all attention and all efforts of the three enemy powers were directed against Russia alone, but also because in 1915 Russia was less than ever before prepared for the struggle—being without arms, shells and munitions. No matter how much Ludendorf may distort the truth in his memoirs, the whole world knows that in that year the Russian positions were covered not by barbed wire entanglements, but by the naked breasts of the Russian soldiers, and German charges were repulsed not by artillery barrages but by the bayonet, by cold steel—reminding us of the times when the Mexicans, armed only with spears, fought against the rifles and cannon of the Spaniards under Fernando Cortez.
Russia's loss of Poland in 1915 is altogether a result of this situation, unprecedented in any of the wars fought by European nations. It was hard to gain victory when the shortage of arms was so great that some corps counted but 1,500 bayonets instead of 40,000, and at the same time it was impossible to complement these corps with their quota of men because these men had no rifles.
Russia had called millions to the colors, but had rifles only for one-tenth of her men. It is only too obvious that nothing could be accomplished with millions of men of whom only one in ten was armed. But in 1916, when Russia acquired rifles and artillery, Brusilov launched his memorable offensive which netted more than 200,000 prisoners. Another great offensive was in preparation for 1917, but the Revolution interfered with its realization.
However that may be, the Germans had planned to have done with Russia by confronting it with Austrian armies and with four or five additional German corps. But already in 1914 the Germans were compelled to keep 19 corps in the East to the detriment and dislocation of their plans and forces in France. (See diagrams No. 3,4.) Even during the days of the Revolution the Germans were obliged to maintain 78½ divisions on the Eastern front, in addition to 47 Austrian and 15 Turkish, altogether 140 infantry and 22 cavalry divisions, while on the Anglo-French front the enemy had at that time only 142 divisions. If we take into consideration all the Russian theatres of war, including those in Asia, the enemy kept on the Russian fronts 164 infantry divisions and 28 cavalry divisions,—altogether 192 divisions (in May, 1917) while on the Anglo-French front the enemy had in May, 1917, only 142 divisions.
THE NUMBER OF GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN DIVISIONS ON THE RUSSIAN AND OTHER ALLIED FRONTS DURING SPRING OF 1917
INFANTRY CAVALRY TOTAL ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT IN EUROPE 125 22 147 IN ASIA 15 15 162 ON OTHER ALLIED FRONTS FRENCH-BELGIAN 140 2 142 ITALIAN 36 36 SALONIKI 17 17 MESOPOTAMIAN 10 10 205 This diagram shows that in 1917—the beginning of the Russian Revolution—there were 162 German, Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian divisions on the Russian front, 147 of whom were on the Russian front in Europe. On the Anglo-French front there were at this time only 142 German divisions.
The enemy forces were thus divided as follows: on the Russian front, 44 per cent.; on the Anglo-French front, 39 per cent.; on the Italian front, 10 per cent.; on the Salonika front, 4½ per cent., and on the Mesopotamian front—about 2½ per cent. Thus, early in 1917 the Russian Army had opposing it about one-half of all the forces of the Central Powers.
It is clearer that if these Teutonic forces would be able to concentrate on the French front, it would mean an immediate breakdown of the Allies and the triumph of the Prussian militarism throughout the civilized world.
| INFANTRY | CAVALRY | TOTAL | |
| ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT | |||
| IN EUROPE | 125 | 22 | 147 |
| IN ASIA | 15 | 15 | |
| 162 | |||
| ON OTHER ALLIED FRONTS | |||
| FRENCH-BELGIAN | 140 | 2 | 142 |
| ITALIAN | 36 | 36 | |
| SALONIKI | 17 | 17 | |
| MESOPOTAMIAN | 10 | 10 | |
| 205 |