At the request of the master, the county courts permitted one slave on each plantation to hunt with a gun during the cultivation or harvesting of crops. They issued to such a slave a certificate, describing him and granting this privilege, and requested him, when he hunted, to carry it with him to prevent his arrest for being unlawfully armed. The master was financially responsible for any damage done by such a slave.[2] The courts more fully granted authority to the slaves to hunt with dogs, and were limited in such matters only by the degree of responsibility that the master would assume. Slaves were whipped not exceeding thirty lashes if they were caught hunting unlawfully.[3] The slave was not allowed to hunt at night by fire-light with a gun. If he was duly convicted, before a justice of the peace, of violating this restriction, his owner was fined fifteen dollars.[4]
B. Travel.
The travel of slaves in their immediate community was regulated by a system of passes issued by the masters or their representatives. No slave, except a domestic servant, was supposed to leave his master’s premises without a pass, explaining the cause of his absence.[5] No stage driver, captain of a steamboat, or railroad conductor could receive a slave passenger for an extended journey unless he produced a pass from a county clerk, giving instructions for such a journey and a description of the slave.[6] One could be imprisoned six months and fined five hundred dollars for violating this regulation, unless he could prove that the transportation of the slave took place without his knowledge. The slave in such instances, if he was discovered, was arrested, placed in the nearest jail, and advertised as a runaway.[7]
C. Suits for Freedom.
1. Of the Action. The proper action at law to be taken by a slave in a suit for his freedom was trespass, false imprisonment, or assault and battery.[8] Judge Catron, in the case of Harris v. Clarissa, held that a female and her children, being held in slavery, could institute joint action to establish their freedom.[9] The defendant would in such suits claim that the plaintiff was his slave. In such cases, the slave did not sue the master, the court merely tried the fact, whether the plaintiff was a slave.[10]
2. Of the Evidence. In a suit for freedom, the onus probandi rested upon the plaintiff. What evidence was admitted? How could a slave prove that he was free if there were no court records to show that the State had assented to his freedom? How could he prove that he was descended from free parents and that he was being held in false imprisonment? Judge Crabb, in the case of Vaughan v. Phebe, answered these questions by saying that “He may, perhaps, procure testimony that he, or some ancestor, was for some time in the enjoyment of freedom; that he has acted as a freeman; that he has been received as a freeman into society; and very soon will find himself under the necessity of increasing in proportion to the distance he has to travel into time past, for want of other evidence, to use hearsay; that he, or his ancestor was commonly called a freeman, or commonly reputed a freeman, or, in other words, evidence of common reputation.”
The courts of Tennessee in their consideration of suits by slaves for their freedom gave unmistakable evidence that they realized the seriousness of adding another negro voter to the body politic. Free negroes voted in Tennessee until 1834.[11] This made the matter of manumitting a slave have far reaching consequences. Judge Crabb, in Vaughan v. Phebe, pointed out very forcibly the results to the slave and society that attended the freeing of a slave.[12]
3. Of the Damages. A negro held in slavery beyond the agreed time of emancipation could maintain an action of trespass for his wages, after he had established his freedom. He could recover wages for the time the suit for freedom was pending and also the cost of the suit.[13]