A. To make a Contract. The slave could not make a legal contract except for his freedom or with his master’s consent. The slave in such contracts was regarded as the agent of the master.[30] The courts, however, would enforce a contract made by a slave with his masters for his freedom. In the case of Porter v. Blackmore, the supreme court of the state held that such a contract established a vested right to freedom, and that “no one but the State can take advantage of it, not even the owner or master, after the right is once vested. A court of chancery, if the right is once vested, will interpose to prevent its defeat.”[31]
B. To Take Property by Devise, Descent, or Purchase. The slave was regarded as personal property in Tennessee and what he owned belonged to the master.[32] He could not receive property by inheritance or donation, nor buy, sell, or dispose of anything, unless his master consented.[33] Washington Turner, a free negro, died in 1853, leaving his estate to his wife and children. The children were the issue of a slave mother. Judge McKinney, in a case involving the will of Turner, said: “It is clear that the children of the testator being slaves, with no rights of freedom, present or prospective, are incapable in law of taking any benefit under the will.”[34] A slave while in a state of inchoate freedom could lay claim to either personal or real property.[35] Judge Catron maintained that it was inconsistent with the liberal slave code of the State not to consider a slave’s rights to property in connection with a claim to freedom.[36]
C. To Be a Witness. The slave never acquired the right of being a witness against a white man.[37] The denial of this right was based on the slave’s light regard for his word, his ignorance, and racial prejudice. His paganism was also a factor.[38]
The slave gradually acquired a stronger position in cases in which the white man was not a party. By 1784, he could be a witness in cases where other slaves were being tried.[39] By 1813, he could testify against free persons of color born in slavery.[40] By 1839, his testimony was permitted in cases where persons of mixed blood were tried.[41] This increased capacity of the slave as a witness resulted from efforts to restrict his relations with free negroes and mulattoes. Illicit trade relations were difficult to prevent, especially in liquors.
D. To Be a Party in a Suit. There were only two instances in which a slave could be a party to a suit. He could sue for his freedom and for property interests which a grant of freedom involved.[42] In Stephenson v. Harrison, Judge Caruthers held that “No other suit but for freedom, in which may be embraced claim to property, can be brought by slaves, while they are such, except where rights may be endangered, which are connected with a certain grant of freedom to take effect in the future. And this being that kind of case, the slaves have a standing in court.”[43] It is observed that in such cases the court for the time being, regarded the slave as being in a state of inchoate freedom.
There was no reason why the slave needed to be a party to a suit. He owned nothing. He could not recover anything. He could be whipped for anything that he did. The master did not want to kill him. If he did not want him, he could sell him. Under such circumstances, it would have been a mere mockery for the slave to be a party to a suit.
E. To Contract Matrimony. There was no process of law involved in the marriage of slaves with each other or their separation. Their marriage with mulattoes or with free negroes was a matter of statutory regulation. In the case of Andrews v. Page, it was held that “Slaves were not married to each other without the consent of their owners, as a general rule. By the act of 1787, Ch. 6, Sec. 3, a free negro or mulatto was prohibited from intermarrying with a slave, without the consent of his or her master, had in writing.”[44] When the master for his slave agreed to a marriage with a free negro or mulatto, it was regarded by the courts as a contract.[45]
If a free negro woman was married to a slave, their children were free. The issue of a free woman of color followed the condition of their mother, and were born free. This principle was carried so far that when a female slave was to be emancipated by the concession of the master and assent of the State, but was to be held subject to service for a definite time, and a child was born to her after such emancipation but during such subjection to service, it was held that the child was freeborn.
While it cannot be said that the marriage relation between slaves was a contractual one at law, it had the sanction of an unwritten law that the state respected. In the case of Andrews v. Page, the court held that it was