We are not to forget, nor are we to suppose, that it was lost sight of by the legislature, that, under our modified system of slavery, slaves are not mere chattels, but are regarded in the two-fold character of persons and property; that is, as persons they are considered by our laws as accountable moral agents, possessed of volition and locomotion, and that certain rights have been conferred upon them by positive law and judicial determination, and other privileges and indulgences have been conceded to them by the universal consent of their owners. By uniform and universal usage, they are constituted the agents of their owners, and are sent on their business without written authority; and in like manner they are sent to perform those neighborly good offices common in every community. They are not at all times in the service of their owners, and are allowed by universal sufferance, at night, on Sundays, holidays, and other occasions, to go abroad, to attend church, to visit those to whom they are related by nature, though the relation may not be recognized by municipal law; and to exercise other innocent enjoyments without its ever entering the mind of any good citizen to demand written authority of them. The simple truth is, such indulgences have been so long and so uniformly tolerated that public sentiment upon the subject has acquired almost the force of positive law.[177]
FOOTNOTES
[1] State v. Hale, 2 Hawks, 585 (1823).
[2] Meigs and Cooper’s Code of 1858, Secs. 2603-9.
[3] M. & C, Secs. 2610-11.
[4] Ibid., Secs. 2612-13.
[5] Ibid., Sec. 2603.
[6] Acts of 1833. Ch. 3. Sec. 1.
[7] M. & C, Secs. 2666-68.
[8] Stewart v. Miller, 1 Meigs, 174 (1838).