The 31st July brought the Battalion no excitements. Leaving camp soon after midnight they crossed the Belgian frontier and moved to St. Jan Ter Beezen, just west of Poperinghe. The flickers and rumble of the greatest bombardment yet known in war accompanied them through the night. The rain descended and the floods came for the next three days. Again, as in the days of Loos and the Somme, the first expectations and the eager hopes were disappointed. Success had been only partial; the weather was impossible, operations were postponed. Next day the sodden men found themselves in dripping tents, just pitched, a stage nearer the line at Dambre Farm, in the low country west of Ypres. On the 5th the battlefield was reached. All through the afternoon at five minutes' interval the platoons moved up. Heavy shells followed them all the way. At dusk the relief of the 188th Brigade in the reserve lines south of St. Julien was completed. Water stood everywhere, the trenches were blotted out, the pill-boxes themselves were flooded. The shelling was incessant, and no sleep was possible that night. On the night of the 6th-7th the 1st/4th Oxfords were relieved, and 24 hours were spent on either side of St. Julien through which runs the Steenbeck, foulest of streams. Next night, amidst violent thunder, the Battalion crawled back to Dambre Camp. The four days had cost them 11 killed and 31 wounded, which might well have been increased but for the steady discipline prevailing among all ranks.
Next week the attack, whose date was yet unknown, was sedulously practised in all its details. A large scale model of the ground was inspected by all officers and N.C.O.'s at Divisional Headquarters. On the 15th the time for action had arrived. The march to the battle was slow and deliberate. The men halted at midday at the camp of Reigersberg, ate and slept. Then ate again a last hot meal before setting out on their final journey through the darkness. All the Companies were in position by 3.30 a.m. on the 16th. Then followed a period of anxious inactivity, until at 4.45 the British barrage burst forth in its awful salute to the dawn. Men began to advance against the enemy on the whole front of 25 miles; the second act of the great struggle had begun.
The attack was, on the whole, a complete failure, though on the left the French made progress through the swamps towards Houthulst Forest, and the 23rd Division took Langemarck. In the centre, where our Division was engaged, progress was infinitesimal. The enemy troops, hidden in their deep and inconspicuous labyrinth of defence, were fresh and fought stoutly. Our attack was based on the support of tanks, which, owing to the condition of the ground, could not come into action. The forces alloted were far too weak to approach the ambitious objectives which had been assigned to them: and were fortunate if they succeeded in winning a few hundred yards after a long and desperate struggle which left them crippled. Our Battalion had a hard and disspiriting task. Assigned as Reserve to the Brigade it had been intended to sweep through the assaulting Battalions to the final objective. Actually their rôle was reduced to hanging about under violent shelling, almost stationary, turning now to right, now to left, to fill up gaps in the line, or to ward off threatened counter-attacks, always waiting for an order to advance which never came.
Although I have avoided criticism as far as possible in this narrative, I cannot refrain from saying, after a careful study of the documents available, that the staff work of the 5th Army (General Gough) was thoroughly bad as far as our Division was concerned. Time after time units were set impossible tasks, with inadequate support from artillery and tanks, and with ludicrously small reserves. This opinion is thoroughly shared by others more competent to pass judgment than myself.
The order of battle for the Brigade was as follows:—Starting from the line of the Steenbeek the three Battalions, covering a frontage of about 1,200 yards, were to take the fortified line of the Langemarck road from the crossroads at Winnipeg to those just west of Keerselare. This accomplished, their assault was to take them beyond the Pink and Blue lines to an outpost position along the farms of Flora Hubner and Stroppe. The 5th Gloucesters on the right joined the Ulster Division, the Bucks Battalion was in the centre, and on the left the 4th Oxfords touched the 12th Division. It will thus be seen that the Brigade, unsupported, was expected to advance about a mile through the mud, everywhere ankle-deep, taking on its way three regularly-organised positions, to say nothing of the intermediate strong points with which the ground bristled. The enemy was at his strongest, well-prepared and expectant. The 7th Bavarian Regiment, which faced us, had just come into line; it was part of a good Division, the 5th Bavarian. His barrage descended only three minutes after our own had begun. It is not surprising that, as a result, no impression was made even on the line of the Langemarck road, except at one point round Springfield. The fight swayed about round the pill-boxes, disused gun-pits and fortified farms which studded the countryside. Each one of these had to be taken separately; the pill-boxes in particular had to be rushed by bombers, who crept up and threw their bombs through the loopholes, which meanwhile were silenced by continuous machine-gun fire. One of these structures, entirely surrounded by water except for a narrow causeway, successfully defied all attempts at capture.
Meanwhile, our four Companies had varied experiences just behind this all-day battle. A Company on the right, advancing over the Steenbeek at zero, caught the full blast of the barrage. Captain Tripp (3rd East Surreys), who was in command, was immediately killed, and the only other officer, 2nd Lieut. Brooke, wounded. 2nd Lieut. Buck was then sent from Headquarters to take command. During the remainder of the day the Company, harassed continuously by shells and rifle fire (for the enemy held positions within 300 yards of them), reduced in strength by almost a half, succeeded in maintaining touch with the Ulsters and the Gloucesters. Twice the enemy, pushing forward small parties, tried to find a gap, but was arrested at once. The line remained, curving in an arc east of St. Julien, about 200 yards beyond the starting point. B Company also experienced great difficulty in making their way through the barrage. Captain Norrish, who was in command, walked up and down looking for a gap. After a while he brought them through by the north-east corner of St. Julien. Thence, turning right-handed in small parties, they dug in behind A Company and the Gloucesters. For the remainder of the day they remained in support to the latter, who were vainly endeavouring to force their way forward to the Langemarck road. This Company seems to have lost about 40 men during the day. To C Company fell such small share of actual fighting as came the way of the Battalion. The Bucks, on moving forward, were held up by a large strong point at Hillock Farm, which resisted obstinately with machine guns. Two platoons of C Company, creeping up from the north-west, played their Lewis guns upon the loopholes. The farm was encircled and taken, 50 of the garrison were killed and the remainder captured. This was about 7 a.m. During the next three hours the Bucks thrust slowly forward, losing heavily all the way. By 10.30 they had gained a precarious footing in the Green line on a front of about 200 yards round Springfield. Their position was very dangerous, as both their flanks were in the air. The Oxfords, on their left, had been completely hung up, and were barely beyond our front line. Two platoons of C Company pushed up northwards into the gap at 11.30, but found only small parties of the enemy, who enfiladed them at close range from some disused gun-pits 200 yards west of the Poelcapelle road. These snipers caused constant casualties, and when Captain Holmes was hit at noon all the officers had been put out of action. Under the leadership of Sergt.-Major Heath they cleared the gun-pits and extracted six prisoners, the only trophies of the day; there they remained until relief, losing at least 50 men. C.S.-M. Heath obtained the M.C. D Company, contrary to their experience at Ronssoy, had the easiest time of the four. Held back on the western bank of the Steenbeek by the congestion at the bridges until 5.15 a.m., they crossed when the barrage, always lighter on our left, had greatly slackened and suffered only slight loss. They dug in near the eastern bank, and remained all day there in support of the Bucks. At noon one platoon moved forward to the right, and securing the Bucks' right flank, kept in connection with the posts of A Company. The losses of this company were about 30 men. In all the casualties of the Battalion were 35 killed (including Captain Tripp), and 138 wounded and missing (including Captains Winslow and Holmes and 2nd Lieuts. Brooke, Oldridge and Wood). This amounted to about a third of the fighting strength. The remainder of the Brigade suffered more heavily, especially the Bucks, who had clung for hours with splendid gallantry to the exposed and practically untenable position round Springfield.
The Battalion next day was relieved by Companies at dawn and dusk, and reassembled at Dambre Camp. The respite was short, for before many days the Division was called again to make a fresh attempt at the same spot. Although no general attack was found practicable until the 20th September, it was apparently deemed essential first to gain a footing on the low ridge of Gravenstal, which, though it rose only 60 feet above the Steenbeek Valley, dominated the country as far as Ypres, and gave the enemy eyes to see our preparations. The next attack was fixed for 27th August; this time it was the turn of the 143rd and 144th Brigades to attack, while we remained in Divisional Reserve. The front and the objectives were almost exactly the same. On the left was the 11th Division, on the right the 61st, our second line. It was the first time that these two had come together on the battlefield, and the occasion was not fortunate, for both were unable to make headway and lost severely. The plan of attack showed great lack of imagination, and shook general confidence in the staff of the 5th Army. The lessons of the 16th seemed to have been entirely thrown away. The same impossible advance was expected. The ground was far worse than before. The water lay knee-deep in the valley. As the men struggled forward they could be seen pulling one another out of the glutinous mud in which they had sunk to the waist. The tanks, promised as before, were unable to perform. Finally, the attack started at the singular hour of 1.55 p.m., which rendered concealment of all the final preparations impossible, and gave the German machine gunners deadly opportunities for dealing with the reserves who poured up in the afternoon along the crowded tracks. The Battalion arrived at its assembly place on the road running through St. Julien about 3.30 p.m., and, as before, waited on events. Towards dusk it became known that the Warwicks' attack had completely failed, while further north the 7th and 8th Worcesters succeeded after four hours' fighting in seizing the Green line from Springfield as far as the Keerselare cross roads. At 8 p.m. all hope of a further advance in the Warwick area had gone, and the Battalion was ordered to relieve the shattered Brigade, one Company taking the place of each Battalion. There was naturally much difficulty in taking over, and next morning it was discovered that three platoons of the 8th Warwicks, whose position was unknown to their C.O., were still lying unrelieved round Border Farm. Meanwhile, on the evening of the 27th, confused fighting still went on north of Springfield, where the 1st/4th Oxfords had been brought up to try by exploiting the success already gained to turn the Spot Farm-Winnipeg portion of the Green line. No further ground, however, was secured; the men were at the limits of their endurance, and by next morning it was clear that everything had combined to render a further attack impossible. The day was therefore, passed quietly for the exhausted combatants; in front the stretcher-bearers bravely and indefatigably picked up the wounded, who had lain out all night in the liquid mud. That night two companies of the 2nd/10th London relieved us. Thus half a Battalion held defensively the whole fighting front of a Brigade. We returned again to Dambre Camp, which the enemy shelled viciously with a naval gun. The Battalion may be considered fortunate in losing only 11 killed (including Captain Norrish, 10th Middlesex), and 51 wounded (including Captain Shaw, 4th Northants).
St. Jan Ter Beezen now reharboured the Battalion, which was built up again in strength by a succession of curious little drafts of 6 and 11. The usual training, increasing in intensity as the men recovered from the fatigue of battle, was carried on through a spell of close and thundery weather. The nights were more than once disturbed by a shower of bombs. On 16th September a train journey removed us far from the front to Audenfort, near Calais, to occupy the farms and barns of several scattered hamlets. The attitude of the population, as sometimes happened in the back areas, was unfriendly. The reason, doubtless, is that the distance from the realities of war is apt to make the inhabitants less accommodating and the troops less well-disciplined. In this case, however, excellent relations were established in a few days. The training during the ensuing ten days was mainly confined to musketry, and A Company had the satisfaction of beating all the other companies of the Division in a field practice fired under the eyes of the G.O.C.