Woman and Womanhood: A Search for Principles

by C. W. Saleeby

Now what one must here reckon with is the existence of individual cases,—much commoner doubtless in the imagination of critics than in reality, but nevertheless worthy of study—where a man may gain a woman's love of the real kind and may return it, and yet may be unfit for parenthood. The converse case is equally likely, but here we are concerned especially with the interests of the woman. She is, shall we say, a nurse in a sanatorium for consumptives or, to suppose a case more critical and complicated still, she may herself be a patient in such a sanatorium. There she meets another patient with whom she falls in love. Now these two may be well fitted to make each other happy for so long as fate permits, but if the interests of the future are to be considered they should not become parents. I must not be taken as here assenting to the old view, dating from a time when nothing was known of the disease, which regards consumption as hereditary. It is evident that quite apart from that question the couple of whom we are thinking should not become parents. It is possible that the disease may be completely cured, and the situation will then be altered. But only too often the patient's life will be much shortened and children will be left fatherless; they also in certain circumstances will run a grave risk of being infected by living with consumptive parents. If in the case we are supposing the woman be also consumptive, it is extremely probable that motherhood on her part would aggravate and hasten the course of the disease, it being well-known that pregnancy has an extremely unfavourable influence on consumption in the majority of cases.

Many other parallel cases may be imagined. Woman's love, based perhaps mainly upon the maternal instinct of tenderness, may be called forth by a man who suffers from, shall we say, hæmophilia or the bleeding disease. He may be in every way the best of men, worthy to make any woman happy; but if he becomes the father of a son, it will probably be to inflict great cruelty upon his child.

What, in a word, are we to say of such cases as these? There is here a real opposition, as it would appear, between the interests of the present and the interests of the future. But the answer is that, just because, and just in so far as, human beings are provident and responsible and worthy of the name of human beings, the opposition can be practically solved. Not for anything must we betray the cause of the unborn, but marriage does not necessarily involve parenthood, and the right course—the profoundly right and deeply moral course—in such cases as these, is marriage without parenthood.

On every hand in the civilized world we now see childless marriages, the number of which incessantly increases; they are an ominous symptom of excessive luxury and other factors of decadence, if history is to be trusted. But it is not permissible for us, without special knowledge, to condemn individuals, whatever we may think of the phenomenon as a whole. Yet convention and prejudice are curious things, and people who are themselves married and deliberately childless, others of both sexes who are unmarried, people who have never raised their voices against themselves or their friends who, though married, are childless, because they have little courage or because they permit compliance with fashion's demands to stifle the best parts of their nature—such people, I say, will actually be found to protest, with the sort of canting righteousness which does its best to smirch the Right, against this doctrine, Marry, but do not have children, as the rule of life in the cases under discussion. Nevertheless, this is the moral doctrine; this is the right fruit of knowledge, and knowledge will more and more be applied to this high end, the service alike of the present and the future. We must not allow our minds to be bullied out of just reasoning because the possibility of marriage without parenthood is often abused. All forms of knowledge, like all other forms of power, may be used or may be abused. Knowledge has no moral sign attached to it, but neither has it any immoral sign attached to it. The power to control parenthood is neither good nor evil, but like any other power may serve either good or evil. Dynamite may cause an explosion which buries a hundred men in a living grave, or it may blast the rock which buries them and set them free. The man of science is false to his creed and his cause if he declares that there is any order of knowledge or any kind of power which were better unknown or unavailable. For many years past we have been told that the power to control parenthood is wicked, flying in the face of providence, interfering with the order of Nature—as if every act worthy of the human name were not an interference with the order of Nature, as Nature is conceived by fools; and even to-day the churches, violently differing from each other in the region of incomprehensibles, are at least agreed in anathematizing the knowledge and the power to control parenthood. The reply to them is the demonstration, here made, of the fact that this knowledge may be used for no less splendid a purpose than to make possible the happiness and mutual ennoblement of individual lives in cases where otherwise such a consummation would have been impossible without betrayal of the life of this world to come.

There is another class of cases to which convenient reference may here be made. The solution to be found in childless marriage, for many cases, does not apply to those in which there is present disease due to living organisms, microbes or protozoa which, by the mere act of drinking from an infected cup, by kissing and so forth, may be passed from the sick to the sound. So far as these modes of infection are concerned, such a supposed case as that of the nurse and the consumptive patient who fall in love with each other comes into this category. But infection of that kind is preventable. In the case, however, of the terrible diseases to which reference has been made in a previous chapter, we must clearly understand that it is not only the future which is in danger, and that therefore the solution of childless marriage does not apply. Here the danger is irremovable from the physical essentia of the marriage itself, and in such a case, no matter how high the personal qualities of the man who may, for instance, have been infected by accident in the course of his duty as a doctor, even childless marriage other than the mariage blanc must be, at any rate, postponed until the disease has been cured.

It is to be hoped that the reader will not regard these last two points, which have had to be dealt with at some length, as irrelevant. They are not strictly part of the general proposition that a girl should marry a man for his personal qualities, but they are surely necessary as practical comments upon that proposition as it will work out in real life. We may now return to our main contention.

In our quotation from Herbert Spencer we may notice the significant assertion that amongst intellectual attractions it is natural faculty, quickness, wit and insight, rather than acquired knowledge, that a man admires in a woman. In considering that point the somewhat hazardous assertion was ventured upon that the woman rates intellectual attractions in the man higher than he does in her. One has indeed heard it stated that a man marries for beauty and a woman for brains. A statement so brief cannot be accurate in such a case. But we may insist upon the contrast between acquired knowledge and natural faculty. Spencer was no doubt right in believing that man values the natural faculty rather than the acquired knowledge. A woman no doubt does so too. If she admires a man for being an encyclopædia, it is only, one hopes, because she admires the natural qualities of studiousness, perseverance and memory which his knowledge involves. Nor would she be long in finding out whether his knowledge is digested, and the capacity to digest it, remember, is a natural faculty.

The reader who remembers our principle that the individual exists for the future will not fail to see what we are driving at. Directly we study in any critical way the causes of attraction among the sexes, we see that under healthy conditions, unvitiated by convention or money, it is always the inborn rather than the acquired that counts. If Spencer had cared to pursue his point half a century ago, he had the key to it in his hands. Youth prefers the natural to the acquired qualities.

Nature, greatest of match-makers, has so constructed youth because she is a Eugenist, and because she knows that it is the natural qualities and not the acquired ones which are transmitted to offspring.

And now it may be shown that this fact wholly consorts with our contention that there is no antinomy between the happiness of the individual and the happiness of the race in the marriage choice. For the race it is only the natural qualities of its future parents that matter, for only these are transmissible. From the strictly eugenic point of view, therefore, the girl should be counselled to choose her mate, not merely on the ground of his personal qualities but, more strictly still, on the ground of those personal qualities which are natural and not acquired. And my last point is that these qualities, which are alone of lasting consequence to the race, alone will be of lasting consequence to her during her married life. Veneers, acquirements, technical facilities, knowledge of languages, encyclopædic information, elegance of speech and even of conventional manners—all the things which, in our rough classification, we may call acquired, may attract or please or impress her for a time, but when the ultimate reckoning is made she will find that they are less than the dust in the balance. I do not know how and where to find for my words the emphasis with which it would be so easy to endow them if, instead of addressing an unseen and strange audience, one were counselling one's own daughter. I should say to her, for instance, "My dear, be not deceived. He dresses elegantly, I know, and makes himself quite nice to look at. Yet it is not his clothes that you will have to live with, but himself; and the question is what do his clothes mean? It is his nature that you will have to live with. What fact of his nature do they stand for? Is it that he is vain and selfish, preferring to spend his money upon himself and upon the exterior of his person rather than upon others and upon the adornment of his mind; or is it that he has fine natural taste, a sense of beauty and harmony and quiet dignity in external things?" The answer to these questions involves his wife's happiness. How strange that though no girl will marry a man because she is attracted by the elegance of his false teeth, yet she will often be deceived into admiring other things which are just as much acquired and just as little likely to afford her permanent satisfaction as the products of his dentist's work-room! If only she realized that these other things, though nice to look at, are no more himself than a well-fitting dental plate.