With this answer the messengers returned to their comrades, and the Hellenes declared themselves ready to remain in the service of Cyrus, on condition that he would increase their pay. To this he readily consented, and promised that instead of receiving every month one daric as before,[10] the private soldiers should in future have a daric and a half. In like proportion, the captains were to have three darics instead of two, and the generals six darics instead of four.
The Hellenes were in the position of a man whose path lies through a bog. After he has advanced some little way, he begins to consider whether it would not be better to turn back, but finding that this is just as difficult as to go forward, he thinks it a pity to waste the effort he has already made, and decides to continue.
So to the Hellenes it seemed that to return promised to be no less dangerous than to advance. The more clear-sighted were by this time perfectly aware that whatever Cyrus might say, or refrain from saying, his ultimate design was to proclaim war against the Great King. But the great mass of the soldiers, although they knew in their hearts that this was his real intention, preferred not to think too much about it, and persisted in hoping that after all it might turn out to be something else.
X
FROM TARSUS TO MYRIANDUS
After twenty days’ halt at Tarsus, the army again set out on its march, and in five days came to the last city in Cilicia. The next province through which they would have to pass was that of Syria, and here the entrance was even more carefully guarded than had been the approach to Cilicia.
Between the two provinces were two fortresses, called the Gates of Cilicia and Syria. They were at about six hundred yards apart, and stood one behind the other on each side of a little river which flowed from the mountains into the sea, and formed the boundary between the two provinces. The mountains at this place approached so close to the sea that the walls of the fortresses stretched the whole distance, and the only passage was through gates which opened to admit friends, but remained fast shut when enemies approached. The fortresses were quite impregnable, if defended, and it was said that Abrocamas had taken the field against Cyrus with 300,000 men, reinforced moreover by 400 Hellenes who were in the service of the Great King.
But Cyrus had long ago foreseen this difficulty as he had foreseen that of entering Cilicia, and had provided against it in the same way. He had desired the fleet to follow him from Tarsus, and had arranged that it should land two divisions of troops on the coast of Syria, one in the space between the river and the Syrian fortress, the other on the further side of it, so that the fortresses might be attacked on both sides at the same time.
As before however, it proved unnecessary to carry out the plan. For when Abrocamas heard that Cyrus had made his way through Cilicia, and found moreover that his Hellenes were leaving him to join their countrymen, he turned and fled, never stopping until the waters of the Euphrates were rolling behind him. The only harm that he did to Cyrus was to burn the ferry-boats employed for crossing the Euphrates, after making use of them himself.
The cowardly satrap remembered the saying that ‘discretion is the better part of valour,’ and following the example of the Cilician prince, he took care so to manage matters, that in the quarrel between the two brothers, he should have done something to help both sides. If the Great King should conquer, he could urge that he had burnt the boats and guarded the walls for a time. If, on the other hand, Cyrus should prevail, he could say that he had given way at his approach, and had yielded him free passage. He afterwards carried out this policy by bringing an army to the aid of the Great King five days after the decisive battle between the two brothers had been fought, with a plausible excuse for not having been able to arrive sooner.