The court of inquiry showed plainly that the reports made by the commanding officers of the National Guard, and the charges appearing in the press concerning the demoralization and untrustworthiness of the troops were utterly false; that the rank and file, with the exception of two companies mentioned elsewhere,[4] “were at all times under good discipline, and behaved with becoming courage and loyalty.” The court further found that certain officers greatly magnified the reports concerning the physical debility of the men. The court, in summing up, says: “There were men in the ranks, plenty and willing to retrieve the day, when at three o’clock, after standing patiently in the sun for three hours, they received their first orders, which were to move off and abandon the attempt to take the depot.” Thus the rank and file were finally vindicated after being for some time the object for obloquy by the public and press.
[4] One of these companies was a Sacramento company whose members were mostly employed by the railroad and therefor in sympathy with the strikers, in fact some of them were strikers. The other company was a company of the Third Regiment. Concerning this latter company, there are many extenuating circumstances. Had the officers remained with their company there is no doubt but what it would have been as reliable as any other.
The question, who was to blame for the failure on the Fourth, we would gladly leave at this place unanswered were it not for the fact that an implication is worse than an assertion. So we again refer to the report of the court of inquiry. Here it is shown that, on that memorable occasion, “General Sheehan refused to obey orders, directly communicated to him by Major General Dimond, to effect an entrance into the depot by force, and to fire upon the mob if they refused to give way”; it was further shown, that when the officer, upon whom the command of the Second Brigade had devolved, received distinct orders from Major General Dimond to clear the depot, by force if necessary, he left his command and urged the commanding General not to compel him to obey the order, as his men were demoralized and could not be relied upon. It was upon this representation that an armistice was entered into between the United States marshal and the strikers. Here we have the case in a nutshell. No orders were given to the troops to advance at any time that afternoon against the strikers. A spirit of hesitation prevailed amongst the commanding officers. When decisive action should have been taken questions of constitutional law were debated by them at length. Instead of an officer executing the commands transmitted to him by a superior officer he would desire to know where his superior officer received authority to give such an order. Just think of it, men who have been occupying high places in the National Guard for years, questioning at the time for action the authority of their superior officers and preventing decisive action by misrepresenting the condition and maligning the characters of their men. This then was the cause of the failure of the operations on the Fourth, and well has it been called the “Battle of Sheehan & Co’s Bluff.”
The garbled manner in which the occurrences of the Fourth were presented to the public by the press was disgusting to the last degree. From their accounts one would think that the men could fire or use the bayonet at will, instead of being a disciplined body under superior officers, subject to their commands in the minutest particular, and had no option but to obey orders, when they received them. The inefficiency of the National Guard was the subject of editorials; and it seemed to be a great disappointment to the press that the depot on the Fourth was not a scene of frightful carnage. Had the order come to fire the men would most certainly have fired, the result would have been a slaughter, and then in the columns of every newspaper in the country we would be branded as red-handed, bloodthirsty murderers. The newspapers even went so far as to cast reflections on the loyalty of the Guard; this to men who left their peaceful callings at the call to arms, left their homes, severed every attachment, every business connection, left weeping parents, wives, brothers and sisters, traveled by night, marched by day, and stood under a broiling sun for hours, ready to do the bidding of their superiors, and then to have their loyalty brought into question, this was too much. One enterprising Sacramento paper came out with the disquieting information “That it was rumored the strikers were going to use dynamite, but, with discretion,” that was comforting, they would use dynamite “with discretion.” The brainy reporter then, to seek a confirmation or denial of the rumor, called upon Mr. Knox, the leader of the strikers, and asked him if they were going to use dynamite, with discretion; of course he said yes. This is a fair sample of some of the ridiculous stuff published by the papers. The general tone of what did seem reliable and probable brought us to the conclusion that we had come to stay awhile, and that we would soon have plenty of work.
We had now settled down to the regular routine of military camp life. The mornings were devoted to guard mount, company drills, and battalion drills in the extended order.[5] The men in these drills acquitted themselves with a dash and celerity of movement that would do credit to regular troops. The face of grim-visaged war was partly shown to the people of Sacramento as the battalions of the First Regiment charged across the Capitol grounds, amid wild yells and the rapid reports of the Gatling gun from the far off corner of the grounds. They tore through the plowed ground, through water, down deep gulleys, up again on the other side, and under the blazing sun, continued the charge through the brush, until recalled by the whistle of the commander. In the afternoon we had dress parade. Crowds were drawn to the camp to witness these imposing ceremonies.
[5] To illustrate the last-named drill photos have been introduced, taken during the last camp at Santa Cruz, showing the line, firing by squad, section, company, and the rapid fire by the entire battalion.
A line of sentries, with loaded pieces, was posted round the entire camp day and night. Each day the company furnished a detail for guard duty. The personnel of these details were as follows: Thursday, July 5th, Lieutenant E. C. Lundquist, Corporal J. N. Wilson, privates J. Gilkyson, W. J. Flanagan, A. H. Frech, A. Fetz, H. G. Gille, A. C. Gehret, P. J. Kennedy. Friday, July 6th, Sergeant B. B. Sturdivant, privates Wm. De Los Murphy, A. Heeth, Jr., G. H. Heizman, J. S. Keane, H. J. Lang, S. Wise, W. S. McKaig. Saturday, July 7th, Captain I. B. Cook, Corporal B. E. Burdick, Corporal E. R. Burtis, W. D. O’Brien, W. L. Overstreet, C. Perry, H. F. Powelson, R. L. Radke. Sunday, July 8th, privates G. H. Radke, H. Sullivan, E. M. Stealey, F. Shula, F. J. Sindler, W. H. Tooker. Monday, July 9th, Lieutenant George Filmer, privates Wm. Unger, R. E. Wilson, R. J. Williams, H. C. Warren, J. R. Wear, L. Zimmerman. Tuesday, July 10th, privates H. H. Adams, P. L. Bannan, F. Baumgartner, G. L. Claussenius, M. Claussenius.
WILLIAM UNGER,
AS HE APPEARED WHILE IN THE HAWAIIAN GUARD.
