Abolition a Sedition, by a Northern Man

by Calvin Colton

But as it happens, this Society is a nondescript organization, because it is an unlawful one. It has no territorial jurisdiction, and no political relations, apart from its own constituent elements; it is a parvenu and stranger among recognised republics and nations—a mere pirate, a brigand, that has broken loose from law, and invaded, from inaccessible ambushes, the peace of whole communities, putting in peril the lives of their citizens, and their institutions. It cannot, therefore, be approached by the injured parties, under that lex talionis of nations, which is customarily resorted to, when their honor has been insulted, their rights violated, or their interests impaired, by a foreign foe. This Society protects itself under the shield of that Government, of the laws of which its very existence is a violation. That Government, therefore, is responsible for its action, and the injured parties have a claim upon it for indemnification and redress of the evils which they suffer. In existing circumstances, this is the only medium by which a remedy can be obtained. Nevertheless, the law of nations has been violated by foreign interference in the domestic condition of the slaveholding States—an interference, which, in any other case, would be regarded as a just occasion for retaliation by a resort to arms.

In the discussion of this point of the subject, we have nothing to do with the rights of the slave in relation to the authorities by which he is held in bondage, any more than with those of the serfs of Poland, or of Hungary, or of Prussia, in case the sympathies of this Society should happen to take that direction, and make war on the peace and social institutions of those countries. The two cases are precisely parallel, and one is as justifiable as the other, by the law of nations, and of human society as it exists. The authorities of those countries would fairly hold the Government of the United States responsible for such an invasion, in the same manner, as we are bound by treaty with the British Government to maintain our obligations of neutrality on the Canadian frontier, and to prevent our citizens from invading the rights, and destroying the lives of British subjects in their own territory. Even though it could be shown, that the Canadians are oppressed, and deprived of their just rights, still it would be no justification or apology for the interference of our citizens. The same principle precisely applies to the action of the American Anti-Slavery Society on the Southern States.

But this Society is even more criminal than these invaders of Canada, because it has first violated the laws of the United States by the erection of a systematic and unlawful polity, an unconstitutional and powerful machinery, the plans and scope of which, if not abandoned or suppressed, are adequate to protract, perpetuate, and forever to augment the illegal and destructive powers they have set in operation, till they shall upset the Government, and desolate the South; whereas the invasion of Canada is nothing more than the mad enterprise of a few deluded individuals. Had they followed the example of the American Anti-Slavery Society,—which, doubtless, they had an equal right to do—and set up a like political organization, under like immunities, and with like strength of preparation, they would inevitably have involved this country in a war with Great Britain. What sufferance, therefore, has been practised towards this Society! And what protracted injuries have the Southern States been compelled to endure!

As remarked in the previous chapter, it is the perfectly anomalous character of this enterprise, which has so long embarrassed the public mind. All not engaged in it, have felt it to be wrong; the wide spread indignation, and the popular outbreaks it has occasioned in rebuke of its designs and operations, show that it involves some great and vitally important principle in our social fabric; but its distinct and definite character, and its exact political position and relations, have not heretofore been evolved and so exhibited, as to enable the public to see it clearly, and to know how to treat it. It was the suddenness and novelty of the movement, as a grand and unlawful political transaction, that astounded the public mind, and threw it from the balance of its wonted composure; but the agitation and disturbance it occasioned are prima facie evidence of its aberration from right principles—of its criminality. That cannot be regarded, by sober minds, other than a highly responsible operation in society, which breaks its peace, and puts in peril its political existence; and we dare to aver, that the common impression of its criminality cannot be without good reason. Even if no law had been violated, other than a common and implied obligation of all good citizens to keep the peace, and sustain the tranquil operation of our Constitution and laws, that is enough to authorize a verdict of guilty against this Society on the general charge of a public nuisance. But in all points of view we find there is recognised and written law for the case, and the common feeling of the public mind is honored and sustained by the investigation. We might fairly presume it impossible for this feeling to be wrong, as it springs up spontaneously in the bosom of a community where slavery is not only disapproved, but abhorred.

It is morally certain, therefore, that it is not a feeling of complacency in slavery, nor any desire, nor even willingness, to see it perpetuated, that has arrayed itself so generally in the North against the Abolition movement. But it is a conviction, that the supreme law of the land has been invaded, and the certain knowledge, that the public peace has been disturbed, and the stability and permanence of our social and political institutions put in peril. It is a correct view of the nature of our political fabric, which leads the public mind, in such an exigency, to the conclusion, that the people of one State have no right to interfere with the domestic condition of another, unless that right has been specified and conferred in the Federal compact; and that even then, it can be employed only in general concert by a representation of all the States in Congress assembled. The people know, as they are bound to know, so long as they claim the privilege of self-government, that the rights of the several States, not transferred or prohibited by the general Constitution, are sacred in their own keeping, and ought to be sacred from foreign interference and invasion. And although they may not have discovered, and as would appear, have not, as a body, that the organization of the American Anti-Slavery is an open and flagrant violation of law, yet they have felt and been convinced, that its transactions are of this character. Hence the public feeling of remonstrance and indignation, that has been manifested. It is not unprovoked and wanton; it is not an opposition to the principle of Abolition in itself considered, for all the early and abiding prejudices of the North are on that side; it is not persecution, however such a clamour may be raised, for there is no adequate moral cause; but it is an attachment to the existing, and long tried, institutions of the country, which, though they may not be perfect, are yet deemed too valuable to be suddenly and ruthlessly broken down by a faction—by an organized sedition. This feeling, therefore, is worthy of some respect—nay, of the greatest respect—for it proves to be based on sound Constitutional principles. We hold it to be impossible, that a lawful enterprise could produce so great an excitement, under a Constitution and Government so good, and so well approved, as ours.

But, having disposed of this subject, as a violation of the law of nations, which involves the highest criminality, because it is liable to work mischief on the largest scale, and of the deepest die, let us consider it as a violation of the Federal Compact, in an Article not yet introduced: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” This is the Tenth Article of the Constitution of the United States; and although it involves precisely the same principle of international law, as that we have just been considering, it presents itself here in the character and with the sanction of a corporate element of our own political fabric. It draws the line, in black and white, between the powers of the nation and those of the States respectively. It leaves the States in absolute and uncontrolled possession of all the sovereign powers, customarily asserted and employed by sovereign States, which are not delegated or prohibited in the general Constitution; and one of those powers is a sovereign right of legislation and control over the institution of slavery. Another, of course, is the common and national right, universally recognized, of claiming the unrestricted scope and benefit of the law of noninterference in regard to this matter. This Article of the Federal Constitution places every State precisely on the footing, and in the position, of nations entirely independent of each other, in all particulars not surrendered or prohibited by this instrument. Its language is, that all other powers—“the powers not delegated, &c. are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Whatever may have been intended by this alternative of “the people,” it cannot be construed to qualify or restrict the object of our present remarks. We suppose it points to the principle of general sovereignty, as appears to be recognized in the Ninth Article, as follows: “The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people;” that is—if we may be allowed the privilege of interpretation here—those general rights of sovereignty, which belong to all nations, acting in their Constitutional modes, authorizing measures adapted to unforeseen exigencies. Certainly, this rule cannot be construed to authorize a minority, or a faction, to do what they please, or to depart from the constituted forms of law. And that is all the bar we have any occasion, for our present purpose, to introduce, whatever other interpretation may be given to it.

The sovereignty of the States, in and over their own respective jurisdictions, in all that is not taken out of their hands by the National Constitution, is recognized and settled by the Tenth Article; and the power to claim the privilege of noninterference from foreign quarters, as to their domestic condition, is a part of that sovereignty. Consequently, if the people, or any association of people, in one State, should interfere with the domestic concerns of another, they are guilty of sedition in and against the Republic; and on the principles of international law, if it be a seriously disturbing movement—of which the injured party is constituted judge—they have made war upon that State, and furnished a just occasion of resort to arms, if remedy and redress can be obtained in no other way. We speak not the language of advice, but of the law simply—of recognized and established principles of civilized and political society;—and so far as the question of sedition is concerned, we speak of the supreme law of this land. In the condition and relations of the members of our Confederacy, the remedy for such interference is doubtless to be sought through the medium, and by the action, of the General Government. If that Government should prove incompetent, or be unwilling, to perform the duty claimed by the injured party, and devolving upon it in such an exigency, the natural consequence would be a dissolution of the Union, and a probable resort to arms. And this is the result to which our country is now imminently exposed by the seditious and criminal interferences of the American Anti-Slavery Society, with the domestic condition of the slave-holding States. They have no more right to meddle with Southern slavery, than with that of the Irish peasantry, or of the miserable beings immured in British Manufactories, or of Hungarian, or Polish, or Russian boors, which, in each of these instances, is far more worthy of commiseration and relief, than the slavery of the Southern States, and calls louder for the offices of humanity, if any such interferences would be tolerated.

But the case is even stronger than has yet been stated. The General Government itself cannot interfere in this matter, except to keep the peace, and prevent interference; and this they are bound to do. The Federal Constitution has recognized the validity of slave property, and established a law to maintain and defend it, throughout the jurisdiction of the United States, as follows: “No person held to service, or labor, in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping to another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service, or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such labor or service may be due.” Art. IV, Sect. II, Clause 3d. The Tenth Article of the Constitution cuts off all interference of the General Government, in the matter of slavery, as it exists in any of the States. Next, it debars interference to all the States, in relation to each other. Much more does it debar such interference to private citizens, or to any combinations of citizens, in any State, or States, with the slavery of other States. For, surely, that right of property, which the public authorities may not infringe, may not be infringed by those who are not invested with authority. Neither can a private citizen, or any combinations of citizens, lawfully disturb or weaken the possession of property, which is sanctioned and upheld by the laws of the land.

Moreover, the General Government is bound by an express law of the Federal Constitution to protect and defend this species of property against invasion, conspiracy, insurrection, and violence: “The United States shall protect every State in this Union against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive, when the legislature cannot be convened, against domestic violence.” Of course, this is a general and comprehensive rule for all possible exigencies of the kind; but it is generally understood—the last clause, particularly, respecting “domestic violence”—to have been enacted in anticipation of servile insurrections, and such other disturbances as are liable to occur under a system of slavery. Any how, the rule applies to these cases, and comprehends them; and that is enough. The General Government is bound to keep the peace under its own laws; and whenever the slave-holding States shall have occasion for its services, in consequence of “domestic violence,” or of “invasion,” they have a right to demand them, under this law of the Constitution; and they would no doubt be promptly afforded.