[CHAPTER III.]
THE SEDITIOUS CHARACTER OF THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY OF 1838.
If the showing already made, in regard to the seditious organization of the American Anti-slavery Society, be a fair one, its action as such becomes a conspiracy in the Republic, so far as it militates against its political fabric. It is no more than fair to notice, that in the first article of the Constitution of this Society, it is assumed, that “slavery is contrary to the principles of our republican form of government.” This is a very material point, vital, fundamental, so far as it relates to the question now in hand. The truth of this assumption would justify the cause, in which this Society are engaged, so long as it should be sustained in a Constitutional way; though it cannot justify an independent political organization in the Republic for such an object. We have already pointed out, as we trust clearly, the only Constitutional modes of political action for reform, or any other purposes, under the Government; and shown that this Society is unconstitutional. The truth of this assumption, therefore, would not justify its mode of action, and it would still be open to the charge of sedition. But, let us see, whether this assumption be true.
“Slavery is contrary to the principles of our republican form of government.” If they mean to say, it is contrary to the principles of the free States, as recognised and established for their own separate jurisdictions, it is true. But it was quite unnecessary to say it, as all the world knew it before. If they mean to say it is contrary to the principles of a republican form of government in the abstract, as a theory, it may be true, or it may be false, and depends entirely upon the character of the theory that is set up. This is a question, which cannot easily be settled, because it is a matter of opinion, not of fact. The people of the South would be on one side, and those of the North on the other; and we ourself, be it known, should be on the side of the North. If the question be as to the common opinion, prevalent among mankind, of the principles of a republican form of government, this Society is doubtless right on that ground. But we apprehend, indeed we know, and every body knows, that it is not a question of opinion, but of fact, that is involved in this assumption. Did the Society mean to say, that “slavery is contrary to the principles” of the Slave-holding States? Manifestly not. What, then, did they mean? Contrary to the principles of the Government of the United States, undoubtedly. “Slavery is contrary to the principles of our Republican form of Government.” We say, then, that as a fact, this is false; and we need travel no further to prove it, than from the Preamble of the Constitution of this Society, in which this assertion is made, to the second Article, where we find this clause: “While it (the Society) admits, that each State, in which slavery exists, has the exclusive right, by the Constitution of the United States, to legislate in regard to its Abolition in said State,” &c. As this is a candid recognition of that part, and of those “principles of our Republican form of Government,” which we shall have occasion in another place to introduce in form, it is superfluous to quote the passages here, inasmuch as this Society, by its own confession, has done the work for us, and against itself. It is a simple question of fact; and that fact recognized, in express terms, by the Society, in the second article of its own Constitution, the assumption of the Preamble, in regard to this point, is proved to be false. Slavery, therefore, is not contrary to the principles of our Republican form of Government; and the Constitution of the United States, (Art. II. Sec. 2d. Clause 3d.) which we shall hereafter consider, recognises the validity of property in the Slave, and engages to defend it throughout the Union; and it is well known, that, by the force of this law, runaway Slaves are habitually recovered. It will be understood, that we are not discussing the propriety of this law, but the fact. It is a “principle of our Republican form of Government;” and as would seem, a potent and paramount one.
All the other principles of the American Anti-Slavery Society will avail nothing, politically considered, so long as they are false in this. They have hazarded their whole cause, in an open and seditious conflict with the Government of the United States, on a false assumption as to fact!
We shall now proceed to a consideration of the seditious character of the Annual Report of this Society, of 1838. This Society must now be viewed, as we have proved it to be, in the light of a grand and independent political organization, set up in the Republic, and at war with it—as an unconstitutional and self-erected corporation. Any political action it may assume, therefore, whether for or against the Republic, is unconstitutional. The Government wants not its help—certainly it has never asked for it—much less can it tolerate a conspiracy. What may be lawful for a private citizen to do, is unlawful for this Society as a political organization of its specific character. What may be lawful for popular assemblies, or associations, acting in the modes prescribed by the Constitution, for political ends, of whatever nature, is unlawful for this Society, because it is a body unknown to the Constitution and laws of the land. It is a State within the State, that has asked no leave to be, that is prohibited by law, acting under a State machinery, disturbing the peace of the State, and threatening its overthrow.
The Annual Report of this Society of 1838, is a document of a remarkable character, when viewed in this light. It is almost exclusively political. It seems true enough, as its own language declares, that “abolitionism must have much to do with politics.” It discusses all the affairs of the nation, and of the States, in relation to this great and portentous subject, as must be confessed with no inconsiderable ability, and with a boldness which might astound any one who looks at the position which this Society occupies, and the sweep of its influence; and more especially, when we consider the decorum, and the gravity, and the solemnity which, one would think, ought to characterize such a document, emanating from so great a body, on such an occasion, and so exciting a theme, when every opportunity for reflexion had been afforded, and when there could be little apology for violence of language, or uncourteous demeanor, towards public men, and the public authorities. Even if the existence and action of this Society had been constitutional and lawful, as it was no doubt thought to be by its members, still there was something in the elevation and responsibility of its position before the public, on account of which the ordinary proprieties, which might seem to be reasonably incumbent on all such bodies, had strong claims to be respected. In all seriousness, we do not think the time has come—certainly we hope not—when the political violence and rancour of newspaper columns, can be regarded as becoming in such a document. Could it easily be believed, by those who have not read this Report—a document occupying one hundred and fifty-two crowded octavo pages, the major part of which breathes the same spirit—that all public men, from the President of the United States downwards, including Senators, Governors, Ministers to foreign nations, Magistrates, and officers of every grade, of the States and Nation, who may have manifested any symptoms of opposition to Abolitionism, or whose public acts have been unfavorable to it, are treated as if —— but we will not trust ourselves to describe it, lest we fall into the same excess of rudeness.
Freedom of speech, and of the press, in treating of public men and public measures, is undoubtedly guaranteed by the Constitutional law of this land; and if this Report had emanated from an authorised and constitutional body, no legal exception could have been taken to its character or terms, however it might seem to be indecorous and undignified, not to say inflammatory and incendiary. In point of dignity, as being the public and solemn act of such a body, we think there could be but one opinion of its character. As if the genius that presided over its composition were not prolific enough in nerve astounding artillery, it seems to have taken out a license to cater from the widest range of Newspaper authorities, and ex parte statements and reports, for its facts and arguments, and for its delicious treat of suavity and kindness.
But there is yet a more portentous aspect of this Report, that remains to be considered. We allude to its treatment of the decisions of the highest Legislative Assembly of the Nation: the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.
It is well known, that the disposal made in Congress of petitions on the subject of Abolition, has not been agreeable to the members of this Society, although it might be difficult to see how it could have been done very differently, so long as the majority of both Houses were opposed to the object; unless it be claimed as a right to occupy the whole time of the National Legislature, in reading and discussing these petitions, to the neglect of all other business, which would seem to be very unreasonable. No new idea could be presented; the mind of Congress was made up; and it would seem to be factious to demand a separate consideration of every petition on this subject, without any prospect or hope of a different result. So far from involving a denial of the right of petition, any other course would have been a manifest violation of public duty, in neglecting the ordinary and other affairs of legislation. The wishes of these petitioners being known, the design of the Constitution in regard to such a matter was answered; and so long as they were known to be a very small minority of the nation, and the great majority opposed, no action on the subject, in the way of legislation, could be expected. It would be altogether unreasonable, and “contrary to the principles of our republican form of Government.” Moreover, the great majority of both houses of Congress considered it, not only disturbing, but unconstitutional, either for them, as a branch of the Government, or for the people, not citizens of the Slave States, to meddle with the subject, with a view to legislation, as these petitions requested. Of course, no farther action could be expected, in that quarter, till the use of the elective franchise might carry into Congress a set of men of a different opinion.