Germany, The Next Republic?

by Carl W. Ackerman

And then the note which Mr. Gerard handed von Jagow concluded with these words:

"It (The United States) confidently expects therefore that the Imperial German Government will disavow the acts of which the United States complains, that they will make reparation as far as reparation is possible for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare, for which the Imperial German Government in the past so wisely and so firmly contended. The Government and people of the United States look to the Imperial German Government for just, prompt and enlightened action in this vital matter. . . . Expressions of regret and offers of reparation in the case of neutral ships sunk by mistake, while they may satisfy international obligations if no loss of life results, cannot justify or excuse a practice, the natural necessary effect of which is to subject neutral nations or neutral persons to new and immeasurable risks. The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word, or any act, necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens, and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

Never in history had a neutral nation indicted another as the United States did Germany in its first Lusitania note without immediately going to war. Because the Foreign Office feared the reaction it might have upon the people, the newspapers were not permitted to publish the text until the press bureaus of the Navy and the Foreign Office had mobilised the editorial writers and planned a publicity campaign to follow the note's publication. But the Navy and Foreign Office could not agree on what should be done. The Navy wanted to ignore Wilson. Naval officers laughed at President Wilson's impertinence and, when the Foreign Office sent to the Admiralty for all data in possession of the Navy Department regarding the sinking of the Lusitania the Navy refused to acknowledge the request.

During this time I was in constant touch with the Foreign Office and the American Embassy. Frequently I went to the Navy Department but was always told they had nothing to say. When it appeared, however, that there might he a break in diplomatic relations over the Lusitania the Kaiser called the Chancellor to Great Headquarters for a conference. Meanwhile Germany delayed her reply to the American note because the Navy and Foreign Office were still at loggerheads. On the 31st of May von Jagow permitted me to quote him in an interview saying:

"America can hardly expect us to give up any means at our disposal to fight our enemy. It is a principle with us to defend ourselves in every possible way. I am sure that Americans will be reasonable enough to believe that our two countries cannot discuss the Lusitania matter until both have the same basis of facts."

The American people were demanding an answer from Germany and because the two branches of the Government could not agree on what should be said von Jagow had to do something to gain time. Germany, therefore, submitted in her reply of the 28th of May certain facts about the Lusitania for the consideration of the American Government saying that Germany reserved final statements of its position with regard "to the demands made in connection with the sinking of the Lusitania until a reply was received from the American Government." After the note was despatched the chasm between the Navy and Foreign Office was wider than ever. Ambassador Gerard, who went to the Foreign Office daily, to try to convince the officials that they were antagonising the whole world by their attitude on the Lusitania question, returned to the Embassy one day after a conference with Zimmermann and began to prepare a scrap book of cartoons and clippings from American newspapers. Two secretaries were put to work pasting the comments, interviews, editorials and cartoons reflecting American opinion in the scrap book. Although the German Foreign Office had a big press department its efforts were devoted more to furnishing the outside world with German views than with collecting outside opinions for the information of the German Government. Believing that this information would be of immeasurable benefit to the German diplomats in sounding the depths of public sentiment in America, Gerard delivered the book to von Jagow personally.

In the meantime numerous conferences were held at Great Headquarters. Financiers, business men and diplomats who wanted to keep peace with America sided with the Foreign Office. Every anti-American influence in the Central Powers joined forces with the Navy. The Lusitania note was printed and the public discussion which resulted was greater than that which followed the first declarations of war in August, 1914. The people, who before had accepted everything their Government said, began to think for themselves. One heard almost as much criticism as praise of the Lusitania incident. For the first time the quarrel, which had been nourished between the Foreign Office and the Admiralty, became nation-wide and forces throughout Germany lined up with one side or the other. But the Navy Department was the cleverer of the two. The press bureau sent out inspired stories that the submarines were causing England a loss of a million dollars a week. They said that every week the Admiralty was launching two U-boats. It was stated that reliable reports to Admiral von Tirpitz proved the high toll taken by the submarines in two weeks had struck terror to the hearts of English ship-owners. The newspapers printed under great headlines: "Toll of Our Tireless U-Boats," the names and tonnage of ships lost. The press bureau pointed to the rise in food prices in Great Britain and France. The public was made to feel a personal pride in submarine exploits. And at the same time the Navy editorial writers brought up the old issue of American arms and ammunition to further embitter the people.

Thus the first note which President Wilson wrote in the Lusitania case not only brought the quarrel between the Navy and Foreign Office to a climax but it gave the German people the first opportunity they had had seriously to discuss questions of policy and right.

In the Rhine Valley, where the ammunition interests dominated every phase of life, the Navy found its staunchest supporters. In educational circles, in shipping centres, such as Hamburg and Bremen, in the financial districts of Frankfort and Berlin, the Foreign Office received its support. Press and Reichstag were divided. Supporting the Foreign Office were the Lokal Anzeiger, the Berliner Tageblatt, the Cologne Gazette, the Frankforter Zeitung, the Hamburger Fremdemblatt, and the Vorwärts.

The Navy had the support of Count Reventlow, Naval Critic of the Deutsche Tageszeitung, the Täglische Rundscha, the Vossische Zeitung, the Morgen Post, the B. Z. Am Mittag, the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, the Rheinische Westfälische Zeitung, and the leading Catholic organ, the Koelnische Volks-Zeitung.