Germany, The Next Republic?

by Carl W. Ackerman

"Mr. Gerard has been accused of not being forceful enough in dealing with the Berlin Foreign Office. In Berlin he has been criticised for just the opposite. It has been stated frequently that he was too aggressive. The Ambassador's position was that he must carry out Mr. Wilson's ideas. So he tried for days and weeks to impress officials with the seriousness of the situation. At the critical point in the negotiations various unofficial diplomats began to arrive and they seriously interfered with negotiations. One of these was a politician who through his credentials from Mr. Bryan met many high officials, and informed them that President Wilson was writing his notes for 'home consumption.' Mr. Gerard, however, appealed to Washington to know what was meant by the moves of this American with authority from Mr. Bryan. This was the beginning of the reason for Secretary Bryan's resigning.

"Secretary Bryan had informed also former Ambassador Dumba that the United States would never take any position against Germany even though it was hinted so in the Lusitania note. Dumba telegraphed this to Vienna and Berlin was informed immediately. Because of Mr. Gerard's personal friendship and personal association with Secretary of State von Jagow and Under Secretary of State Zimmermann, he was acquainted with Secretary Bryan's move. He telegraphed to President Wilson and the result was the resignation of Mr. Bryan."

In December, the Ancona was torpedoed and it was officially explained that the act was that of an Austrian submarine commander. Wilson's note to Vienna brought about a near rupture between Austria-Hungary and Germany because Austria and Hungary at that time were much opposed to Germany's submarine methods. Although the submarines operating in the Mediterranean were flying the Austrian flag, they were German submarines, and members of the crews were German. Throughout the life of the Emperor Franz Josef the Dual Monarchy was ruled, not from Vienna, but from Budapest by Count Stefan Tisza, the Hungarian Premier. I was in Budapest at the time and one evening saw Count Tisza at his palace, which stands on the rocky cliff opposite the main part of Budapest, and which overlooks the valley of the Danube for many miles. Tisza, as well as all Hungarians, is pro-American before he is pro-German.

"To think of trouble between Austria-Hungary and the United States is sheer nonsense," he said in his quiet but forceful manner. "I must confess, however, that we were greatly surprised to get the American note. It is far from our intention to get into any quarrel with America. Perhaps I should not say quarrel, because I know it would not be that, but of course matters do not depend upon us entirely. There is no reason for any trouble over the Ancona question. It must be settled satisfactorily," he said emphatically, "not only from the standpoint of the United States, but from our standpoint."

The Ancona crisis brought the Foreign Office new and unexpected support. Hungary was opposed to a dispute with America. In the first place, Hungarians are more of a liberty loving people than the Germans, and public opinion in Hungary rules the country. While there is a strong Government press, which is loyal to the Tisza party, there is an equally powerful opposition press which follows the leadership of Count Albert Apponyi and Count Julius Andrassy, the two most popular men in Hungarian public life. Apponyi told me on one occasion that while the Government was controlled by Tisza a great majority of the people sided with the opposition. He added that the constant antagonism of the Liberals and Democrats kept the Government within bounds.

Hungarians resented the stain upon their honour of the Ancona incident and they were on the verge of compelling Berlin to assume responsibility for the sinking and adjust the matter. But Berlin feared that if the _Ancona_ crime was accredited to the real murderers it would bring about another, and perhaps a fatal crisis with the United States. So Vienna assumed responsibility and promised to punish the submarine commander who torpedoed the ship.

This opposition from Hungary embittered the German Navy but it was helpless. The growing fear of the effects which President Wilson's notes were having upon Americans and upon the outside neutral world caused opposition to von Tirpitz to gain more force. In desperation von Tirpitz and his followers extended the anti-American propaganda and began personal attacks upon von Bethmann-Hollweg.

Bitterness between these two men became so great that neither of them would go to the Great Headquarters to confer with the Kaiser if the other was there. The personal opposition reached the point where the Kaiser could not keep both men in his cabinet. Von Tirpitz, who thought he was the hero of the German people because of the submarine policy, believed he had so much power that he could shake the hold which the Kaiser had upon the people and frighten the Emperor into the belief that unless he supported him against the Chancellor and the United States, the people would overthrow the Hohenzollern dynasty. But von Tirpitz had made a good many personal enemies especially among financiers and business men. So the Kaiser, instead of ousting the Chancellor, asked von Tirpitz to resign and appointed Admiral von Capelle, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and a friend of the Chancellor, as von Tirpitz' successor. Admiral von Mueller, Chief of the Naval Cabinet, who was always at Great Headquarters as the Kaiser's personal adviser on naval affairs, was opposed to von Tirpitz and exposed him at the Great Headquarters conferences by saying that von Tirpitz had falsified the Navy's figures as to the number of submarines available for a blockade of England. Von Capelle supported von Mueller and when the friends of von Tirpitz in the Reichstag demanded an explanation for the ousting of their idol, both the Chancellor and von Capelle explained that Germany could not continue submarine warfare which von Tirpitz had started, because of the lack of the necessary submarines.

This was the first big victory of the Foreign Office. The democratic forces in Germany which had been fighting von Tirpitz for over a year were jubilant. Every one in Germany who realised that not until the hold of the military party upon the Kaiser and the Government was dislodged, would the Government be able to make peace now breathed sighs of relief and began to make plans for the adjustment of all differences with the United States and for a peace without annexation. Von Tirpitz had had the support of all the forces in Germany which looked forward to the annexation of Belgium and the richest portions of Northern France. Von Tirpitz was supported by the men who wanted the eastern border of Germany extended far into Poland and Lithuania.

Even Americans were delighted. Washington for the first time began to see that eleven months of patience was bearing fruit. But this period of exaltation was not destined to last very long. While the Chancellor had cleaned house in the Navy Department at Berlin he had overlooked Kiel. There were admirals and officers in charge there who were making preparations for the Navy. They were the men who talked to the submarine commanders before they started out on their lawless sea voyages.