The German Government was in this position: If the Allies accepted Germany's proposal it would enable the Government to unite all factions in Germany by making a peace which would satisfy the political parties as well as the people. If the Allies refused, the German Government calculated that the refusal would be so bitter that it would unite the German people political organisations and enable the Government to continue the war in any way it saw fit.
Nothing which had happened during the year so solidified the German nation as the Allies' replies to Berlin and to President Wilson. It proved to the German people that their Government was waging a defensive war because the Allies demanded annexation, compensation and guarantees, all of which meant a change in the map of Europe from what it was at the beginning of the war. The interests which had been demanding a submarine warfare saw their opportunity had come. They knew that as a result of the Allies' notes the public would sanction an unrestricted sea warfare against the whole world if that was necessary.
From December 12th until after Christmas, discussions of peace filled the German newspapers. By January 1st all possibilities of peace had disappeared. The Government and the public realised that the war would go on and that preparations would have to be made at once for the biggest campaign in the history of the world in 1917.
Throughout the peace discussions one thing was evident to all Americans. Opposition to American intervention in any peace discussion was so great that the United States would not be able to take any leading part without being faced by the animosity of a great section of Germany. When it was stated in the press that Joseph O. Grew, the American Charge d'Affaires, had received the German note and transmitted it to his Government, public indignation was so great that the Government had to inform all of the German newspapers to explain that Germany had not asked the United States to make peace; that Germany had in fact not asked any neutrals to make peace but had only handed these neutrals the German note in order to get it officially before the Allies. At this time the defiant attitude of the whole nation was well expressed in an editorial in the Morgen Post saying: "If Germany's hand is refused her fist will soon be felt with increased force."
II
The Conferences at Pless
As early as September, 1916, Ambassador Gerard reported to the State Department that the forces demanding an unrestricted submarine campaign were gaining such strength in Germany that the Government would not be able to maintain its position very long. Gerard saw that not only the political difficulties but the scarcity of food and the anti-American campaign of hate were making such headway that unless peace were made there would be nothing to prevent a rupture with the United States. The latter part of December when Gerard returned from the United States after conferences with President Wilson he began to study the submarine situation.
He saw that only the most desperate resistance on the part of the Chancellor would be able to stem the tide of hate and keep America out of the war. On January 7th the American Chamber of Commerce and Trade in Berlin gave a dinner to Ambassador Gerard and invited the Chancellor, Dr. Helfferich, Dr. Solf, Minister of Foreign Affairs Zimmermann, prominent German bankers and business men, leading editors and all others who a few months before during the Sussex crisis had combined in maintaining friendly relations. At this banquet Gerard made the statement, "As long as such men as Generals von Hindenburg and Ludendorf, as long as Admirals von Capelle, von Holtzendorff and von Mueller headed the Navy Department, and the Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg directed the political affairs there would be no trouble with the United States." Gerard was severely criticised abroad not only for this statement but for a further remark "That the relations between Germany and the United States had never been better than they were to-day." Gerard saw before he had been in Berlin a week that Germany was desperate, that conditions were getting worse and that with no possibilities of peace Germany would probably renew the von Tirpitz submarine warfare. He chose desperate means himself at this banquet to appeal to the democratic forces in Germany to side with the Chancellor when the question of a ruthless submarine warfare again came up.
The German Government, however, had planned its moves months in advance. Just as every great offensive on the battlefields is planned, even to the finest details, six months before operations begin, so are the big moves on the political chessboard of Europe.
There are very few men in public life in Germany who have the courage of their convictions to resign if their policies are overruled. Von Jagow, who was Secretary of State from the beginning of the war until December, 1916, was one of these "few." Because von Jagow had to sign all of the foolish, explanatory and excusing notes which the German Government sent to the United States he was considered abroad as being weak and incapable. But when he realised early in November that the Government was determined to renew the submarine warfare unless peace was made von Jagow was the only man in German public life who would not remain an official of the Government and bring about a break with America. Zimmermann, however, was a different type of official. Zimmermann, like the Chancellor, is ambitious, bigoted, cold-blooded and an intriguer of the first calibre. As long as he was Under Secretary of State he fought von Jagow and tried repeatedly to oust him. So it was not surprising to Americans when they heard that Zimmermann had succeeded von Jagow.