The next day came the terrible experience of Sabine Cross Roads or Mansfield as it is sometimes called, where the battery met with disaster for the first time.
On that day, April 8, the battery started in the advance—with the 1st Brigade, under Colonel Lucas, and a Brigade of the 4th division of the 13th Army Corps, Colonel Landram commanding, which had been sent forward during the night. Following this came the 4th Brigade Cavalry, Colonel Dudley in command, and then the 5th Brigade, under Colonel Robinson, in charge of the long wagon train and the artillery which was not in the front. By noon an advance had been made of about ten miles, the enemy contesting every foot of the way. The woods on each side of the road were very dense, which made it difficult to move in line and the marching was tedious and tiring to the men. Almost no water was to be found. At this time General Ransom arrived with the 2d Brigade of the 13th Army Corps to relieve the 1st Brigade of its duty.
About four miles from Mansfield the road ran through a clearing in front of a hill of considerable height where the timber was not quite so thick as it had been elsewhere. This point was chosen as the scene of the engagement. A description of the arrangement of troops may be taken from Colonel Lee's report:[[14]]
"Two regiments of the 4th Brigade Cavalry, Colonel Dudley, were placed on the flank, deployed in the woods. The Second Illinois Cavalry formed a half mile in rear of the first line. Nims' Battery was placed in position at the crest of the hill, in and to the right and left of the road. A section of the Sixth Missouri Howitzer was placed at its left. A brigade of infantry was placed in the front, one regiment to the left of Nims' Battery, the others to the right. A second brigade was placed on our right flank, facing the enemy who appeared in that direction. The First Brigade Cavalry, Col. T. J. Lucas commanding, was placed on the extreme right of the line and fought dismounted. With this brigade was a section of the 6th Missouri Howitzer Battery and a section of Rawles' Battery. The Third Brigade was in the rear escorting the train which was halted a mile and a half from our front."
About 1 P. M. General Banks and his staff arrived and General Lee reported to him the arrangements of his troops and the apparent position and strength of the enemy and his opinion that the army must either fall back or be reinforced by infantry. General Banks gave orders that the position should be maintained and at the same time sent to General Franklin to hurry forward the infantry.
About 4.30 the enemy, made a general attack in front and right flank, driving infantry and cavalry back to the line where the battery was stationed. The guns of the battery were being fired as rapidly as possible with double charges of canister, and although many of the men were recruits, having had no experience under fire, every one of them stood up to his work as bravely as the veterans.
When, however, the infantry support failed (except for the 23d Wisconsin and 19th Kentucky), orders were given to retire in order that the guns might not fall into the hands of the enemy. Three of the guns had to be left on the field as the horses had been killed. At the foot of the hill a stand was made, but the rout had become so general that the battery could not maintain its position and was almost surrounded by the enemy. Orders were therefore given to retreat.
About a mile from the battlefield was the wagon train of the cavalry division, which had become blocked in the ruts and mud and entirely obstructed the narrow road.
The road was so obstructed at this point and the rush of retreating forces so great that it became necessary to abandon the remaining three guns, together with caissons, baggage-wagons, battery wagon and forges.
To account for the position of the cavalry train we quote from the report[[15]] of Col. John G. Chandler, acting chief quarter-master.