L. Aemilius M.F. Paulus, || C. Claudius C.F. Marcellus. || (B.C. 50 = a.u. 704.)
(BOOK 40, BOISSEVAIN.)
[B.C. 54 (a.u. 700)]
[-1-] These were the occurrences in Rome while the city was passing through its seven hundredth year. In Gaul Caesar during the year of those same consuls, Lucius Domitius and Appius Claudius, among other undertakings constructed ships of a style halfway between his own swift vessels and the native ships of burden, endeavoring to make them as light as possible and yet entirely seaworthy, and he left them on dry land to avoid injury. When the weather became fit for sailing, he crossed over again to Britain, giving as his excuse that the people of that country, thinking that he would never cross to them again because he had once retired empty-handed, had not sent all the hostages they had promised; the truth of the matter was that he vehemently coveted the island, so that he would have certainly found some other pretext, if this had not been in existence. He came to land at the same place as before, no one daring to oppose him because of the number of his ships and his approaching the shore at all points at once; thus he got possession of the harbor immediately. [-2-] The barbarians for the reasons specified had not been able to hinder his approach and being far more afraid than before, because he had come with a larger army, carried away all their most valued possessions into the most woody and overgrown portions of the neighboring country. After they had put them in safety by cutting down the surrounding wood and piling more upon it row after row until the whole looked like an entrenched camp, they proceeded to annoy Roman foraging parties. Indeed, in one battle after being defeated on open ground they drew the invaders toward that spot in pursuit, and killed many of them. Soon after, as storm had once more damaged the ships, the Britons sent for allies and set out against their naval arsenal itself, with Casuvellaunus, regarded as the foremost of the chiefs in the island, at their head. The Romans upon meeting them were at first thrown into confusion by the attack of their chariots, but later opened ranks, and by letting them pass through and striking the occupants obliquely as they drove by, made the battle equal. [-3-] For the time being both parties remained where they were. At another meeting the barbarians proved superior to the infantry, but were damaged by the cavalry and withdrew to the Thames, where they encamped after planting stakes across the ford, some visible and some under water. But Caesar by a powerful assault forced them to leave the palisade and later on by siege drove them from the fort, and others repulsed a party of theirs that attacked the harbor. They then became terrified and made terms, giving hostages and being rated for a yearly tribute.
[-4-] Under these circumstances Caesar departed entirely from the island and left no body of troops behind in it. He believed that such a force would be in danger while passing the winter on a foreign shore and that it might be inconvenient for him to absent himself from Gaul for any considerable period: hence he was satisfied with his present achievements, in the fear that if he reached for more, he might be deprived of these. It seemed that in this he had done rightly, as was, indeed, proved by what took place. For when he had gone to Italy, intending to winter there, the Gauls, though each separate nation contained many garrisons, still planned resistance and some of them openly revolted. So if this had happened while he was staying in Britain to finish the winter season, all the hither regions would have been a scene of confusion indeed.
[-5-] This war was begun by the Eburones, under Ambiorix as chief. They said the disturbance was due to their being oppressed by the presence of the Romans, who were commanded by Sabinus and Lucius Cotta, lieutenants. As a matter of fact they despised the garrison, thinking they would not prove competent to defend themselves and expecting that Caesar would not speedily head an expedition against their tribe. They accordingly came upon the soldiers unawares, expecting to take the camp without striking a blow, and, when they failed of this, had recourse to deceit. Ambiorix after setting ambuscades in the most suitable spots came to the Romans for a parley and represented that he had taken part in the war against his will and was himself sorry. But against the others he advised them be on their guard, for his compatriots would not obey him and were intending to attack the garrison at night. Consequently he made the suggestion to them that they should abandon Eburonia, because they would be in danger, if they stayed, and pass on as quickly as possible to where some of their comrades were wintering near by.[-6-] The Romans were persuaded by this disclosure, especially as he had received many favors from Caesar and seemed in this to be repaying him in kindness. They packed up their belongings with zeal just after nightfall and later[59] started out, but fell into the ambush set and suffered a terrible reverse. Cotta with many others perished immediately: Sabinus was sent for by Ambiorix under the pretext of saving him, for the Gallic leader was not on the ground and even then seemed faithful to him personally; on his arrival, however, Ambiorix seized him, stripped him of his arms and clothing, and then struck him down with his javelin, uttering boasts over him, one to this effect: "How can such creatures as you are have the idea of ruling a nation of our strength?" This was the fate that these men suffered. The rest managed to break through to the fortress from which they had set out, but when the barbarians assailed that, too, and they could neither repel them nor escape, they killed one another.
[-7-] After this event some other of the neighboring tribes revolted, among them the Nervii, though Quintus Cicero, a brother of Marcus Cicero and lieutenant of Caesar, was wintering in their territory. Ambiorix added them to his force and began a conflict with Cicero. The contest was close, and after capturing some prisoners alive the chieftain tried to deceive him likewise, but being unable to do so resorted to siege. Before long by means of his large force and the experience which he had gained from the campaign that he made with the Romans, together with some detailed information that he obtained from the captives, he managed to enclose him with a palisade and ditch. There were battles, as natural in such operations,—many of them,—and far larger numbers of barbarians perished, because there were more of them. They, however, by reason of their abundant army were never in sight of destruction, whereas the Romans, not being many in the first place, kept continually growing fewer and were encompassed without difficulty. [-8-] They were unable to treat their wounds with success through lack of the necessary applications, and did not have a large supply of food, because they had been besieged unexpectedly. No one came to their aid, though many were wintering at no great distance, for the barbarians guarded the roads with care and all who were sent out they caught and slaughtered before the eyes of their friends. As they were therefore in danger of being captured, a Nervian who was friendly to them as the result of kindness shown and at this time was besieged with Cicero, presented them with a slave of his to send as a messenger through the lines. Because of his dress and his native speech he would be able to associate with the enemy as one of their number, without attracting notice, and after that he could depart. [-9-] In this way Caesar learned of what was taking place (he had not yet gone to Italy but was still on the way), and, turning back, took with him the soldiers in the winter establishments through which he passed, and pressed rapidly on. Meanwhile being afraid that Cicero in despair of assistance might suffer disaster or capitulate, he sent forward a horseman. He did not trust the servant of the Nervian, in spite of having received an actual proof of his good will: he was afraid that he might pity his countrymen and work him some great evil. So he sent a horseman of the allies who knew their dialect and had dressed himself in their garb. And in order that even he might not voluntarily or involuntarily reveal the secret he gave him no verbal message and wrote to Cicero in Greek all the injunctions that he wished to give, in order that even if the letter should be captured, it might still be incomprehensible to the barbarians and afford them no information. He had also the custom as a usual thing, when he was sending a secret order to any one, to write constantly the fourth letter beyond, instead of the proper one, so that the writing might be unintelligible to most persons. The horseman reached the camp of the Romans, but not being able to come close up to it he fastened the letter to a small javelin and hurled it into the enemy's ranks, fixing it purposely in a tower.[-10-] Thus Cicero, on learning of the advent of Caesar, took courage and held out more stubbornly. The barbarians for a long time knew nothing of the assistance he was bringing; he journeyed by night, lying by day in most obscure places, so as to fall upon them as far as possible unawares. At last from the unnatural cheerfulness of the besieged they suspected it and sent out scouts. Learning from them that Caesar was at last drawing near they set out against him, thinking to attack him while off his guard. He received advance information of this movement and remained where he was that night, but just before dawn took up a strong position. There he encamped apparently with the utmost haste, for the purpose of appearing to have only a few followers, to have suffered from the journey, to fear their onset, and by this plan to draw them to the higher ground. And so it proved. Their contempt for him led them to charge up hill, and they met with such a severe defeat that they committed not another warlike act.
[-11-] In this way both they and all the rest were at that time subdued; they did not, however, feel kindly toward the Romans. The Treveri, indeed, when Caesar sent for the principal men[60] of each tribe and punished them, through fear that they, too, might be called upon to pay the penalty assumed again a hostile attitude, lending an attentive ear to the persuasions of Indutiomarus. They led some others who feared the same treatment to revolt and headed an expedition against Titus Labienus, who was among the Remi, but were annihilated in an unexpected sally made by the Romans.
[-12-] This was what took place in Gaul, and Caesar wintered there so as to be able to keep strict control of affairs. Crassus, desiring for his part to accomplish something that would confer some glory and profit upon him, made a campaign against the Parthians, since after consideration he saw no such opportunity in Syria, where the people were quiet and the officers who had formerly warred against the Romans were by reason of their impotency causing no disturbance. He had no complaint to bring against the Parthians nor had war been decreed, but he heard that they were exceeding wealthy and expected that Orodes would be easy to capture, because but newly established. Therefore he crossed the Euphrates and proceeded to traverse a considerable portion of Mesopotamia, devastating and ravaging the country. As his crossing was unexpected by the barbarians no strong guard had been placed at that point. Silaces, then governor of that region, was quickly defeated near Ichnai, a fortress so named, after contending with a few horsemen. He was wounded and retired to report personally to the king the Romans' invasion:[-13-] Crassus quickly got possession of the garrisons and especially the Greek cities, among them one named Nicephorium. Many of the Macedonians and of the rest that fought for the Parthians were Greek colonists, oppressed by violence, and not unwillingly transferred their allegiance to the Romans, who, they strongly hoped, would be favorable to the Greeks. The inhabitants of Zenodotium, pretending a willingness to revolt, sent for some of the invaders, but when they were within the town cut them off and killed them, for which act they were driven from their homes. Outside of this Crassus for the time being neither inflicted nor received any serious harm. He certainly would have subdued the other regions beyond the Tigris, if he had followed up the advantage from his own attack and the barbarians' panic equally in all respects, and had he wintered furthermore where he was, keeping a sharp lookout on their behavior. As it turned out, he captured only what he could seize by sudden assault and paid no heed to the rest nor to the people themselves, but wearied by his stay in Mesopotamia and longing for the indolence of Syria he afforded the Parthians time to prepare themselves and to injure the soldiers left behind in their country.
[-14-]This was the beginning that the Romans made of war against them. They dwell beyond the Tigris, possessing for the most part forts and garrisons, but also a few cities, among them Ctesiphon, in which there is a palace. Their stock was very likely in existence among the original barbarians and they had this same name even under the Persian rule. But at that time they inhabited only a small portion of the country and had not obtained any transmontane sovereignty. When the Persian kingdom had been destroyed and that of the Macedonians had reached its prime, and then the successors of Alexander had quarreled one with another, cutting off separate portions for their own and setting up individual monarchies, this land then first attained prominence under a certain Arsaces from whom their succeeding rulers have received the title of Arsacidae. By good fortune they acquired all the neighboring territory, kept control of Mesopotamia by means of satrapies, and finally advanced to so great glory and power as to fight against the Romans at that period and to be considered worthy antagonists up to present time.[61] They are really formidable in warfare and possess the greater reputation, in spite of never having gained anything from the Romans and having parted with certain portions of their own domain, because they have not yet been enslaved, but even now carry wars against us to the end, whenever they get into conflicts. [-15-] About their race and their country and the peculiarities of their customs many persons have spoken, and I have no intention of compiling an account. But it is fair to mention in what follows their equipment of arms, and the way they handle a war: the examination of these details properly concerns the present narrative, since it here needs to introduce them. The Parthians make no use of a shield, but their forces consist of mounted archers and pike-bearers, mostly in full armor. Their infantry is small, made up of the weaker persons; hence it may be said they are all archers. They practice from boyhood, and the sky and the country coöperate with them for two good ends. The latter, being for the most part level, is excellent for raising horses and very suitable for riding over with horses. Therefore even in war the people lead about whole droves so that they can use some horses at one place and others at another, can ride up suddenly from a distance and also retire to a distance speedily. The sky above them, too, which is very dry and contains not the least moisture, affords them perfect opportunity for archery, except in the winter. For that reason they make no campaigns in any direction during the winter season. But the rest of the year they are almost invincible in their own country and in any that has similar characteristics. By long custom they can endure the sun, which is very scorching, and they have discovered many remedies for the scantiness and difficulty of a supply of drink,—a fact which is a help to them in repelling without difficulty the invaders of their land. Outside of this district and beyond the Euphrates they have once or twice exercised some sway by battles and sudden incursions, but to fight with any nation continuously, without stopping, is not in their power, when they encounter an entirely different condition of land and sky and have no supplies of either food or pay.