[-23-] This was the course of events in the days of Claudius and Norbanus: the following year the Romans accomplished nothing worthy of note in Syria. Antony arrived in Italy and returned again to the province, consuming the entire season: and Sosius, because he would be advancing his master's interests and not his own, and furthermore dreading his jealousy and anger, spent the time in devising means not for achieving success and drawing down his enmity, but for pleasing him by remaining quiet. Parthian affairs with no outside interference underwent a severe revolution from the following cause. Orodes their king succumbed to age and grief for Pacorus combined, and while still alive delivered the government to Phraates, the eldest of his remaining children. He in his discharge of it proved himself the most impious of men. He treacherously murdered his brothers, sons of the daughter of Antiochus, because they were his superiors in excellence and (on their mother's side) in family: when Antiochus chafed under this outrage he killed him in addition and after that destroyed the noblest men in the remaining population and kept committing many other abuses. Consequently a number of the more prominent persons abandoned him and betook themselves to various places, some going to Antony, among whom was Monaeses. This happened in the consulship of Agrippa and Gallus.

[B.C. 36 (a. u. 718)]

[-24-] During the remainder of winter, when Gallus and Nerva were holding office, Publius Canidius Crassus made a campaign against the Iberians that inhabit this portion of the world, conquered in battle their king Pharnabazus and brought them into alliance; with this king he invaded Albanis, the adjoining country, and, after overcoming the dwellers there and their king Zober, conciliated them likewise. Antony was elated at this and furthermore based great hopes upon Monaeses, who had promised him to lead his army and bring over to him most of Parthia without conflict. Hence the Roman took up the war against the Parthians in earnest and besides making various presents to Monaeses gave him three Roman cities to govern until he should finish the war, and promised him in addition the Parthian kingdom. While they were so occupied Phraates became terrified, especially because the Parthians took the flight of Monaeses very much amiss, and he opened negotiations with him, offering him anything whatever, and so persuaded him to return. When Antony found this out, he was naturally angry, but did not kill Monaeses although the latter was still in his power; for he felt sure he could not win the confidence of any other of the barbarians, in case he should do such a thing, and he wanted to try a little trick against them. He accordingly released Monaeses, apparently supposing the latter was going to bring the Parthian affairs under his control, and sent envoys with him to Phraates. Nominally he was arranging for peace on the condition of getting back the standards and the prisoners captured in the disaster of Crassus, intending to take the king off his guard while the latter was expecting a pacific settlement; but in fact he was putting everything in readiness for war. [-25-] And he went as far as the Euphrates, thinking it was free of guards. When, however, he found that whole region carefully guarded, he turned aside from it, but led a campaign against Artavasdes, the king of the Medes, persuaded thereto by the king of Greater Armenia, who had the same name and was an enemy of the aforementioned. Just as he was he at once advanced toward Armenia, and learning there that the Mede had gone a considerable distance from his own land in the discharge of his duties as an ally of the Parthian king, he left behind the beasts of burden and a portion of the army with Oppius Statianus, giving orders for them to follow, and himself taking the cavalry and the strongest of the infantry hurried on in the confidence of seizing all his opponent's strongholds at one blow; he assailed Praaspa, the royal residence, heaped up mounds and made constant attacks. When the Parthian and the Medan kings ascertained this, they left him to continue his idle toil,—for the walls were strong and many were defending them,—but assailed Statianus off his guard and wearied on the march and slew the whole detachment except Polemon, king of Pontus, who was then accompanying the expedition. Him alone they took alive and released in exchange for ransom. They were able to accomplish this because the Armenian king was not present at the battle; but though he might have helped the Romans, as some say, he neither did this nor joined Antony, but retired to his own country. [-26-] Antony hastened at the first message sent him by Statianus to go to his assistance, but was too late. For except corpses he found no one. This outcome caused him fear, but, inasmuch as he fell in with no barbarian, he suspected that they had departed in some direction through terror, and this lent him new courage. Hence when he met them a little later he routed them, for his slingers were numerous, and as the latter could shoot farther than would the bows they inflicted severe injury upon the men in armor. However, he did not kill any remarkable number of them, because the barbarians could ride fast. So he proceeded again against Praaspa and besieged it, though he did no great damage to the enemy; for the men inside the walls repulsed him vigorously, and those outside could not easily be entrapped into a combat. Thus he lost many of his own men in searching for and bringing provisions, and many by his own discipline. At first, as long as they could get their food from somewhere in the neighborhood, they had no difficulty about either undertaking: they could attend to the siege and safely secure supplies both at once. When, however, all material at hand had been used up, and the soldiers were obliged to go to some distance, it happened to them that if few were sent anywhere, not only did they not bring anything, but they perished as well; if a number were sent, they left the wall destitute of besiegers and meantime lost many men and many engines at the hands of the barbarians, who would make a sortie against them. [-27-] For this reason Antony gave them all barley instead of wheat and destroyed every tenth man in some instances: indeed, the entire force which was supposed to be besieging endured the hardships of persons besieged. The men within the walls watched carefully for opportunities to make sallies; and those outside harassed fearfully the Romans that remained in position as often as they became separated, accomplishing this by making a sudden charge and wheeling about again in a narrow space: this force outside did not trouble the food trains while the latter were en route to the villages, but would fall upon them unexpectedly when scattered in the homeward march. But since Antony even under these conditions maintained his place before the city, Phraates, fearing that in the long run he might do it some harm either by himself or through securing some allied force, secretly sent some men to open negotiations with him and persuaded him by pretending that it would be very easy to secure peace. After this, when men were sent to him by Antony, he held a conference with them seated upon a golden chair and twanging his bowstring; he first inveighed against them at length, but finally promised that he would grant peace, if they would straightway remove their camp. On hearing this Antony was both alarmed at his boastfulness and ready to believe that a truce could be secured if he himself should shift his position: hence he withdrew without destroying any of his implements of siege but behaved as if in friendly territory. [-28-] When he had done this and was awaiting the truce, the Medes burned the engines and scattered the mounds, while the Parthians made no proposition to him respecting peace but suddenly attacked him and inflicted very serious damage. He found out that he had been deceived and did not venture to employ any further envoys, being sure that the barbarians would not agree to any reasonable terms, and not wishing to cast the soldiers into dejection by failing to arrange a truce. Therefore he resolved, since he had once started, to hurry on into Armenia. His troops took another road, since the one by which they had come they believed to have been blocked entirely, and on the way their sufferings were unusually great. They came into unknown regions where they wandered at random, and furthermore the barbarians seized the passes in advance of their approach, digging trenches outside of some and building palisades in front of others, spoiled the water-courses everywhere, and drove away the flocks. In case they ever got a chance to march through more favorable territory, the enemy would turn them aside from such places by false announcements that they had been occupied beforehand, and caused them to take different roads along which ambuscades had been previously posted, so that many perished through such mishaps and many of hunger. [-29-] As a result there were some desertions, and they would all have gone over, had not the barbarians shot down before the eyes of the others any who dared to take this course. Consequently the men refrained from this, and from Fortune's hands obtained the following relief. One day when they fell into an ambush and were struck with fast-flying arrows, they suddenly made by joining shields the testudo, and rested their left knees on the ground. The barbarians had never seen anything of the kind before and thought that they had fallen from their wounds and needed only one finishing blow; so they threw aside their bows, leaped from their horses, and drawing their daggers came close to put an end to them. At this the Romans rose to their feet, spread out the phalanx at a word, and each one attacked the man nearest and facing him; thus they cut down great numbers since they were contending armed against an unprotected foe, men prepared against men off their guard, heavy infantry against archers, Romans against barbarians. All the survivors immediately retired and no one followed them for the future.

[-30-] This testudo and the way in which it is formed deserve a word of explanation. The baggage animals, the light-armed troops, and the cavalry are marshaled in the center of the army. Those infantrymen who use the oblong, hollow, grooved shields are drawn up around the edges, making a rectangular figure; and, facing outward with spear-points projecting,[52] they enclose the rest. The other infantrymen, who have flat shields, form a compact body in the center and raise their shields above themselves and above all the rest, so that nothing but shields can be seen in every part of the phalanx alike and all the men by the density of formation are under shelter from missiles. It is so marvelously strong that men can walk upon it, and when ever they get into a hollow, narrow passage, even horses and vehicles can be driven over it. Such is the method of this arrangement, and this shows why it has received the title of testudo,[53]—with reference to its strength and to the excellent shelter it affords. They use it in two ways: either they approach some fort to assault it, often even enabling men to scale the very walls, or where sometimes they are surrounded by archers they all bend together,—even the horses being taught to kneel and recline,—and thereby cause the foe to think that they are exhausted; then, when the others draw near, they suddenly rise, to the latter's great alarm.

[-31-] The testudo, then, is the kind of device just described. As for Antony, he suffered no further harm from the enemy, but underwent severe hardships by reason of the cold. It was now winter, and the mountain districts of Armenia, through which, as the only route open to him, he was actually thankful to be able to proceed, are never free from snow and ice. The wounds, of which the men had many, there created especial discomfort. So many kept perishing and were continually rendered useless for fighting that he would not allow reports of each individual case, but forbade any one to bring him any such news; and although he was angry with the Armenian king for deserting them, and anxious to take vengeance on him, he nevertheless humiliated himself before the monarch and paid court to him for the purpose of obtaining provisions and money from him. Finally, as the soldiers could not hold out to march farther, in the winter time, too, and were at any rate going to have their hardships for nothing since he was minded to return to Armenia before a great while, he flattered the prince tremendously and made him many attractive promises, to get him to allow the men to winter where they were; he said that in the spring he would make another campaign against the Parthians. Money also came to him from Cleopatra, so that to each of the infantrymen was given one hundred denarii[54] and to the rest a proportionate allowance. But inasmuch as the amount sent was not enough for them he paid the remainder from his own funds, and though the expense was his own he gave Cleopatra the credit of the favor. For he both solicited contributions from his friends and levied a great deal of money upon the allies.

[-32-] Following these transactions he departed for Egypt. Now the Romans at home were not ignorant of anything that had taken place in spite of the fact that his despatches did not contain the truth; for he concealed all his unpleasant experiences and some of them he described as just the opposite, making it appear that he was progressing famously: but, for all that, rumor reported the truth and Caesar and his circle investigated it carefully and discussed it. They did not, however, make public their evidence, but instead sacrificed cattle and held festivals. Since Caesar at that time was still getting the worst of it against Sextus, the truth of the facts could not be rendered fitting or opportune. Besides his above actions Antony assigned positions of government, giving Gaul to Amyntas, though he had been only the secretary of Deiotarus, and also adding to his domain Lycaonia with portions of Pamphylia, and bestowing upon Archelaus Cappadocia after driving out Ariarathes. This Archelaus on his father's side belonged to those Archelauses who had contended against the Romans, but on his mother's side was the son of Glaphyra, an hetaera. It is quite true that for these appointments Antony, who could be very magnanimous in dealing with the possessions of other people, was somewhat less ill spoken of among the soldiers.

But in the matter of Cleopatra he incurred outspoken dislike because he had taken into his family children of hers,—the elder ones being Alexander and Cleopatra, twins at a birth, and the younger one Ptolemy, called also Philadelphus,—and because he had granted to them a great deal of Arabia, both the district of Malchus and that of the Ituraeans (for he executed Lysanias, whom he had himself made king over them, on the charge that he had favored Paccrus) and also a great deal of Phoenicia and Palestine together with parts of Crete, and Cyrene and Cyprus.

[B.C. 35 (a. u. 719)]

[-33-] These are his acts at that time: the following year, when Pompeius and Cornificius were consuls, he attempted to conduct a campaign against the Armenian prince; and as he placed no little hope in the Mede, because the latter was indignant at Phraates owing to not having received from him much of the spoils or any other honor, and was anxious to punish the Armenian king for bringing in the Romans, Antony sent Polemon to him and requested friendship and alliance. And he was so well satisfied with the business that he both made terms with the Mede and later gave Polemon Lesser Armenia as a reward for his embassy. First he summoned the Armenian to Egypt as a friend, intending to seize him there without effort and make away with him; but when the prince suspected this and did not obey, he plotted to deceive him in another fashion. He did not openly evince anger toward him, in order not to alienate him, but to the end that he might find his foe unprepared set sail from Egypt with the avowed object of making one more campaign against the Parthians. On the way Antony learned that Octavia was arriving from Rome, and went no farther, but returned; this he did in spite of having at once ordered her to go home and later accepting the gifts which she sent, some of them being soldiers which she had begged from her brother for this very purpose.

[-34-] As for him, he became more than ever a slave to the passion and wiles of Cleopatra. Caesar meantime, since Sextus had perished and affairs in Libya required settlement, went to Sicily as if intending to take ship thither, but after delaying there found that the winter made it too late for crossing. Now the Salassi, Taurisci, Liburni, and Iapudes had not for a long time been behaving fairly toward the Romans, but had failed to contribute revenue and sometimes would invade and harm the neighboring districts. At this time, in view of Octavius's absence, they were openly in revolt. Consequently he turned back and began his preparations against them. Some of the men who had been dismissed when they became disorderly, and had received nothing, wished to serve again: therefore he assigned them to one camp, in order that being alone they might find it impossible to corrupt any one else and in case they should wish to show themselves rebellions might be detected at once. As this did not teach them moderation any the more, he sent out a few of the eldest of them to become colonists in Gaul, thinking that thus he would inspire the rest with hopes and win their devotion. Since even then they continued audacious, some of them paid the penalty. The rest displayed rage at this, whereupon he called them together as if for some other purpose, had the rest of the army surround them, took away their arms, and removed them from the service. In this way they learned both their own weakness and Caesar's force of mind, and so they really experienced a change of heart and after urgent supplications were allowed to enter the service anew. For Caesar, being in need of soldiers and fearing that Antony would appropriate them, said that he pardoned them, and he found them most useful for all tasks.