[-6-] "To begin first with the smallest matter, it will be requisite that you procure a large supply of money from all sides. It is impossible that our present revenues should suffice for the very expenses, and particularly for the support of the soldiers. This need exists also in democracies, for it is not possible to organize any government without expense. But under such a system many give largely in addition to what is required, and do it frequently, making it a matter of rivalry and securing proper honors for their liberality. Or, if perchance there are compulsory levies upon everybody, they endure it because they can persuade themselves that it is wise and because they are contributing in their own behalf. Under sovereignties they think that the ruling power alone, to which they credit boundless wealth, should bear the expense: they are very ready to search out the ruler's sources of income, but do not make a similar careful calculation about the outgo. They are not inclined to pay out anything extra personally and of their own free will, nor will they hear of voluntary public contributions. The former course no one would choose, because he would not readily admit that he was rich, and it is not to the advantage of the ruler to have it happen. So liberal a citizen would immediately acquire a reputation for patriotism among the mass of the people, would become conceited, and cause a disturbance in politics. On the other hand, a general levy weighs heavily upon them all and chiefly because they endure the loss whereas others take the gain. In democracies those who contribute money as a general rule also serve in the army, so that in a way they get it back again. But in monarchies one set of people usually farm, manufacture, carry on maritime enterprises, engage in politics,—the principal pursuits by which fortunes are secured,—and a different set are under arms and draw pay.
"This single necessity, then, which is of such importance [-7-] will cause you trouble. Here is another. It is by all means essential that whoever from time to time commits a crime should pay some penalty. The majority of men are not brought to reason by suggestion or by example, but it is absolutely requisite to punish them by disenfranchisement, by exile, and by death; and this often happens in so great an empire and in so large a multitude of men, especially during a change of government. Now if you appointed other men to judge these wrongdoers, they would acquit them speedily, particularly all whom you may be thought to hate. For judges secure a pretended authority when they act in any way contrary to the wish of the ruling power. If, again, any are convicted, they will believe they have been condemned on account of instructions for which you are responsible. However, if you sit as judge yourself, you will be compelled to chastise many of the peers,—and this is not favorable,—and you will certainly be thought to be setting some of them right in anger rather than in justice. No one believes that those who have the power to use compulsion can execute judgment with justice, but everybody thinks that out of shame they spread out a mere phantom and rough picture of government in front of the truth, in order that under the legitimate name of court they may fulfill their desire. This is what happens in monarchies. In democracies, when any one is accused of committing a private wrong, he is made defendant in a private suit before judges who are his equals: or, if he is accused for a public crime, such a man has empaneled a jury of his peers, whoever the lot shall designate. It is easier for men to bear their decisions, since they do not think that any verdict rendered is due to the power of the judge or has been wrung from him as a favor.[1]
[-8-] "Then again there are many, apart from any criminals, some priding themselves on birth, others on wealth, others on something different, in general not bad men, who are by nature opposed to the conception of monarchy. If a ruler allows them to become strong, he cannot live in safety, and if he undertakes to impose a check on them, he cannot do so justly. What then shall he do with them? How shall he treat them? If you root out their families, diminish their wealth, humble their pride, you will lose the good-will of your subjects. How can it be otherwise, if no one is permitted to be born nobly or to grow rich honestly or to become strong, brave, or learned? But if you allow all the separate classes to grow strong, you will not be able to deal with them easily. If you alone were sufficient for carrying on politics and war well and opportunely, and needed no assistant for any of them, it would be a different story. As the case stands, however, it is quite essential for you to have many helpers, since they must govern so large a world: and they all ought to be both brave and prudent. Now if you hand over the legions and the offices to such men, there will be danger that both you and your government will be overthrown. It is not possible for a valuable man to be produced without good sense, and he cannot acquire any great good sense from servile practices. But again, if he becomes a man of sense, he cannot fail to desire liberty and to hate all masters. If, on the other hand, you entrust nothing to these men, but put affairs in charge of the worthless and chance comers, you will very quickly incur the anger of the first class, who think themselves distrusted, and you will very quickly fail in the greatest enterprises. What good could an ignorant or low-born person accomplish? What enemy would not hold him in contempt? What allies would obey him? Who, even of the soldiers themselves, would not disdain to be ruled by such a man? What evils are wont to result from such a condition I do not need to describe to you, for you know them thoroughly. I feel obliged to say only this, that if such an assistant did nothing right, he would injure you far more than the enemy: if he did anything satisfactorily, his lack of education would cause him to lose his head, and he would be a terror to you.
[-9-] "Such a question does not arise in democracies. The more men there are who are wealthy and brave, so much the more do they vie with one another and up-build the city. The latter uses them and is glad, unless any one of them wishes to found a tyranny: him the citizens punish severely. That this is so and that democracies are far superior to monarchies the experience of Greece makes clear. As long as the people had the monarchical government, they effected nothing of importance: but when they began to live under the democratic system, they became most renowned. It is shown also by the experience of other branches of mankind. Those who are still conducting their governments under tyrannies are always in slavery and always plotting against their rulers. But those who have presidents for a year or some longer period continue to be both free and independent.
"Yet, why need we use foreign examples, when we have some of our own? We Romans, ourselves, after trying a different social organization at first, later, when we had gone through many bitter experiences, felt a desire for liberty; and having secured it we attained our present eminence, strong in no advantages save those that come from democracy, through which the senate debated, the people ratified, the force under arms showed zeal, and the commanders were fired with ambition. None of these things could be done under a tyranny. For that reason, indeed, the ancient Romans detested it so much as to impose a curse upon that form of government.
[-10-] "Aside from these considerations, if one is to speak about what is disadvantageous for you personally, how could you endure the management of so many interests by day and night alike? How could you hold out in your enfeebled state? How could you participate in human enjoyments? How could you be happy if deprived of them? What could cause you real pleasure? When would you be free from biting grief? It is quite inevitable that the man who holds so great an empire should reflect deeply, be subject to many fears enjoy very little pleasure, but hear and see, perform and suffer, always and everywhere, what is most disagreeable. That is why, I think, both Greeks and some barbarians would not accept government by a king when offered to them.
"Knowing this beforehand, take good counsel before you enter upon such an existence. For it is disgraceful, or rather impossible, after you have once plunged into it to rise to the upper air again. Do not be deceived by the greatness of the authority nor the abundance of possessions, nor the mass of body-guards, nor the throng of courtiers. Men who have great power have great troubles: those who have large possessions are obliged to spend largely: the crowd of body-guards is gathered because of the crowd of conspirators: and the flatterers would be more glad to destroy than to save any one. Consequently, in view of these facts, no sensible man would desire to become supreme ruler. [-11-] If the fact that such rulers can enrich and preserve others and perform many other good deeds, and that, by Jupiter, they may also outrage others and injure whomsoever they please leads any one to think that tyranny is worth striving for, he is utterly mistaken. I need not tell you that to live licentiously and to do evil is base and hazardous and hated of both gods and men. You are not that sort of man, and it is not for these reasons that you would choose to be sole ruler. I have elected to speak now not of everything which one might accomplish who handled affairs badly, but of what even the very best are compelled to do and endure when they adopt the system. The other point,—that one may bestow abundant favors,—is worthy of zeal, to be sure: yet when this disposition is indulged in private capacity, it is noble, august, glorious, and safe, whereas in monarchies it is first of all not a sufficient offset to the other, more disagreeable matters, that any one should choose monarchy for this especially when one is to grant to others the benefit to be derived therefrom, and accept himself the unpleasantness involved in the rest of the conduct of the office.
[-12-] "In the next place, the matter is not simple, as people think. No one could render assistance enough to satisfy all who need help. Those who think they ought to receive some gift from the sovereign are practically all mankind, even though no favors can at once be seen to be due them. Every one naturally has his own approbation and wishes to enjoy some benefit from him who is able to give. But the presents which can be given them,—I mean honors and offices, and sometimes money,—can be counted quite easily as compared with so great a multitude. This being so, more hatred would fall to the monarch's lot from those who fail to get what they want than friendship from such as obtain their desires. The latter take what they regard as due to them and think there is no particular reason for being very thankful to the one who gives it, since they are getting no more than they expected. Moreover, they actually shrink from such behavior for fear they may appear in the light of persons undeserving of generous treatment. The others, who are disappointed of their hopes, are grieved for two causes. First, they feel that they are robbed of what belongs to them, for by nature all persons think that everything which they desire is their own: second, they feel as if they were finding themselves guilty of some wrong, if they show resignation at not obtaining what they expect. The man who gives such great gifts rightly of course investigates before all else each person's worth: some he honors, others he neglects. As a result, then, of his judgment, some are filled with pride and others with vexation by their own consciousness of its correctness. If any one were to wish to guard against this outcome and distribute his presents without system, he would fail utterly. The base, being honored contrary to their deserts, would become worse; for they would decide either that they were approved as being good or, if not so, that they were courted as dangerous persons: the excellent, on attaining no higher place than they, but held merely in equal honor with the base, would be more indignant at their reduction to the latter's level than the others would rejoice to be deemed valuable. Accordingly, they would give up the practice of better principles and strive to emulate less worthy men. Thus, even as a result of the very honors, those who bestow them would reap no benefit and those who receive them would become worse than before. So that this consideration, which would please some persons most in the monarchical constitution, has been proved to be a most difficult problem for you to deal with.
[-13-] "Reflecting on these facts and the rest which I mentioned a little earlier, be prudent while you may, and restore to the people the arms, the provinces, the offices, and the funds. If you do it at once and voluntarily, you will be the most famous of men and the most secure. But if you wait for some force to be applied, perhaps you might suffer some disaster together with ill repute. Here is evidence. Marius, Sulla, Metellus, and Pompey at first, when they got control of affairs, refused to become princes, and by this attitude escaped harm. Cinna, however, and Strabo,[2] the second Marius, Sertorius, and Pompey himself at a later date, through their desire for sovereignty perished miserably. It is hard for this city which has been under a democracy for so many years and rules so many human beings to be willing to be a slave to any one. You have heard that the people banished Camillus when he used white horses for his triumph: you have heard that they overthrew Scipio after condemning him for some fraudulent procedure: you remember how they behaved toward your father because they had some suspicion that he wanted monarchy. Yet there have never been any better men than these.
"Moreover, I do not advise you merely to relinquish dominion, but to accomplish beforehand all that is advantageous for the public, and by decrees and laws to settle definitely whatever business needs attention, just as Sulla did. For even if some of his ordinances were subsequently overthrown, yet the majority of them and the more important still hold their ground. Do not say that even then some will indulge in factional quarrels, or I may be tempted to say again that all the more the Romans would not submit to a single ruler. If we were to review all the calamities that might befall a nation, it would be most unreasonable for us to fear dissensions which are the outgrowth of democracy rather then the tyrannies which spring from monarchy. Regarding the terrible nature of the latter I have not even undertaken to say a word. It has been my wish not merely to inveigh against a proposition so capable of censure, but to show you this,—that it is naturally such a régime that not even the most excellent men….[3]