A perfectly benevolent being is one who invariably wills the most good and the least evil in his power. An imperfectly benevolent being is one who does not invariably will thus.
The degree in which a being is ranked as wise and good is estimated by the extent to which his willing good or evil corresponds with his power.
Thus it appears that, in a system where evil exists, the very idea of perfect benevolence and wisdom involves the supposition of a limitation of power.
To return, then, to the question as proposed at the commencement of the chapter—Is the Creator a being who prefers good to evil invariably, or is he one who only sometimes prefers evil to good, and at other times prefers good to evil, with the varying humors of man; or does he invariably choose what is best for all, even in cases where it may cost personal sacrifice and suffering to himself?
It will be the object of what follows to prove that the last supposition is the true one.
In attempting this, we again take the principle of common sense, that “the nature of any contrivance proves the design and character of the author.” Then we proceed to a review of the nature, first of mind, and next of the material world, to prove that the design or chief end of the Creator is, not to make happiness [pg 105] irrespective of the amount, but to produce the greatest possible happiness with the least possible evil. In other words, we are to seek for proof that God has done all things for the best, so that he has no power to do better.
In still another form, we are to seek for evidence, in the nature of God's works, that he has ever done the best he could, so that the amount of evil that ever was or ever will exist, is not caused by his willing it, but by his want of power to prevent it; so that any change would be an increase of evil and a lessening of good to the universe as a whole.
In pursuing this attempt, it will be needful to reproduce two or three chapters of a work by the author, already before the public, entitled, The Bible and the People; or, Common Sense applied to Religion.
In this work the nature of mind is presented very much more in detail, for the same purpose as that here indicated. What will now follow is a brief review of previous chapters in that work, as a summary of the evidence there presented that the chief end of God in all his works is to produce the greatest possible happiness with the least possible evil.
Whenever we find any contrivances all combining to secure a certain good result, which, at the same time, involve some degree of inevitable evil, and then discover that there are contrivances to diminish and avoid this evil, we properly infer that the author intended to secure as much of the good with as little of the evil as possible. For example, a traveler finds a deserted mine, and all around he discovers contrivances for obtaining gold, and, at the same time, other contrivances for getting rid of the earth mixed with it. The [pg 106] inevitable inference would be that the author of these contrivances designed to secure as much gold with as little earth as possible; and should any one say that he could have had more gold and less earth if he chose to, the answer would be that there is no evidence of this assertion, but direct evidence against it.