Common Sense Applied to Religion; Or, The Bible and the People

by Catharine Esther Beecher

In shorter terms, in this relation every human mind is perfect, both in constitution and in action, so long as it acts as near right as is in its present power. At the same time, in relation to the infinite and eternal standard of rectitude, its action may be very imperfect.

We next inquire as to the evidence of a perfect mind in this secondary relation; that is to say, how can we know when a mind does reach the full measure of its power in voluntary right action?

In regard to this we have two sources of evidence: first, the mental consciousness of the acting mind itself, and, next, the results of its action. In regard to the first, every mind, in reference either to its mental states or external deeds, can have as much certainty as to the extent of its power as it can of any thing. If we choose to feel in a given way, or to perform a given act, and what we choose does not follow, we are certain we have no power to do the thing. All the idea of power we have is that volition is followed by the result chosen. All the idea we have of want of power is that the result chosen does not follow the volition.

Every mind, then, in regard to every specific volition, has the most perfect of all evidence as to the extent of its powers in its own experience.

But the question is a more difficult one in reference to a generic governing volition. A perfectly acting mind, according to our definition, is one that has formed a generic governing volition to feel and act right in all respects; that is, it decides that the chief end of existence shall be to promote the greatest possible happiness with the least possible evil, in obedience to all, physical, social, and moral laws of the Creator, so far as it is within the reach of its powers.

Now, as to this simple act of choice, a mind can have the highest possible evidence in its own consciousness. The only question of difficulty would be as to the extent of its powers to carry out this decision, and the correspondence of all its subordinate volitions with this generic purpose.

To ascertain the truth on this point, let us suppose a mind that has the highest evidence (that of internal consciousness) that it has formed such a purpose. Then comes a case where a subordinate decision is to be made—say it relates to the existence of a certain feeling or emotion, such as love, fear, gratitude, or sorrow. It has been shown that these emotions are not to be evoked into existence by a simple act of will. The mode by which the mind controls its own desires and emotions is set forth on page 162. If, then, the person chooses to do all that is in its power at the given time to awaken these emotions, its action is perfect in this respect: it has fulfilled the measure of its power. It reaches the limit of its power when it can find nothing more that an act of choice will secure that it perceives will tend to accomplish the end chosen. That is to say, at each given moment, when a mind is aiming to know what is right, and to do it, if it has done all it perceives can be done by any act of will toward this end, then its decision or mental action is perfect; it is as good as is possible in the nature of things.

We have the same method of testing our power in regard to the prevention of desires and emotions. No matter how painful or inappropriate may be the desires and emotions of any mind, it is acting perfectly when it goes to the full extent of its power to extinguish or to control them according to the rules of rectitude. If it wills to have them otherwise, and uses the appropriate modes to have them so, this is all it has power to do.

In reference to external actions, there are an infinite variety of circumstances that must decide the character of actions as right or wrong. An action which is wise and benevolent in one set of circumstances becomes foolish and selfish in another combination. More than half the questions of right and wrong action are to be decided as to their character by the surrounding circumstances, while no mind but the one that is infinite and omniscient can pronounce with certainty on actions whose character is dependent on circumstances and probable future results.

What, then, is the limitation of power in these cases? How can we know when we act as nearly right as it is in our power?