Common Sense Applied to Religion; Or, The Bible and the People

by Catharine Esther Beecher

Not only are certain forms, colors, motions, and sounds the medium by which we gain a knowledge of the intellectual operations and emotions of other minds, but they are the means by which we discover and designate those material objects which are causes of comfort, utility, and enjoyment. Thus it is by the particular form and color that we distinguish the fruits and the food which minister to our support. By the same means we discriminate between noxious and useful plants and animals, and distinguish all those conveniences and contrivances which contribute to the comfort of man. Of course, certain forms and colors are connected in the mind with certain emotions of pleasure that have attended them as causes of comfort and enjoyment.

In what precedes, it appears that it is those emotions which are awakened by the apprehension of certain intellectual operations and emotions of intelligent minds which are most delightful; that all our ideas of such operations and emotions are gained by means of certain forms, colors, motions, and sounds; that we designate objects of convenience and enjoyment to ourselves by the same mode; that perceptions can recall the emotions which have been connected with them, even after the mind has forgotten the connection, and that perceptions recall associated emotions much more vividly than conceptions.

In consequence of these considerations, the inference seems justifiable that the emotions of beauty and sublimity are not owing either simply to the perceptions produced, nor to the conceptions recalled by the principle of association. But they are accounted for in a great degree by the fact that certain colors, forms, motions, and sounds have been so often connected with emotions awakened by the apprehension of qualities in other minds, or of emotions which arise in view of causes of enjoyment to ourselves, that the perception of these colors, sounds, forms, and motions recall such agreeable emotions, even when the mind can not trace the connection in past experience.

As an example of this, the emotion of pleasure has been so often connected with the clear blue of the sky and with the bright verdure of the foliage, that the sight of either of these colors recalls the emotions, though we may not be able to refer to any particular time when this previous connection existed. In like manner, the moaning sound of the wind in a storm, or the harsh growl which sometimes attends it, has so often been united with sorrowful or disagreeable emotions, that the sounds recall the emotions.

But there is another important fact in regard to the causes of the emotions of taste. It is found that the character of the combination of sounds, forms, colors, and motions has as much to do with the existence of such feelings as the nature of these objects of perception. The very same colors and forms, in certain combination, are very displeasing, when in others they are beautiful. Thus, also, certain motions in certain circumstances are very beautiful or sublime, and in others very displeasing. The very same sounds, also, may be made either very disagreeable or very delightful, according to their combination.

To account for this, it is necessary to understand that objects which tend to awaken emotions of a directly opposite nature can not both operate on the mind without causing disagreeable feelings. If we are surrounded by objects of awe and solemnity, it is painful to notice objects that are mean or ludicrous. If we are under the influence of sprightly and humorous feelings, it is painful to encounter solemn and pensive scenes, with which, perhaps, at other times, we should be pleased. In order, therefore, to awaken emotions of beauty and sublimity, there must exist a congruity in the arrangement and composition of parts which will prevent the operation of causes that would awaken incongruous emotions.

But there is another principle which has a still more powerful operation in regard to the effect of combination and composition. We are always accustomed to view objects with some reference to their nature and use. We always feel that every effect must have a cause, and that every contrivance has some design which it was made to accomplish.

There is no intellectual attribute of mind which is regarded with more admiration than wisdom, which is always shown in selecting the best means for accomplishing a given end; and the more interesting or important is the object to be secured, the more is the mind pleased with discovering the wisdom exhibited in adapting means to secure this end. Almost every construction of nature or of art is regarded by the mind as having some use and design. No mind, except one bereft of its powers, would ever employ itself in designing any thing which has no possible use, either in benefiting or pleasing the designer or others; and should any such object be found, it would cause only disgust, as exhibiting the fatuity of a mind which spent its powers in contriving so useless a thing.

There are many objects which meet the eye of man for which he in vain seeks the use and design; but such objects are never attended with the conviction that there is no possible use to which they can be applied; on the contrary, they more frequently provoke curiosity, and awaken desire to discover their nature and their use. There is a never-failing conviction attending all our discoveries of new objects in nature that there is some design or contrivance of which they form a link in the chain.

Whenever the object of any design is ascertained, immediately there commences an examination of the modes by which this object is to be effected. If every thing is found to harmonize—if a relation of fitness and propriety is discovered in every part, the mind is satisfied with the exhibition of wisdom which is thus discovered. But if some parts are found tending to counteract the general design of the contrivance, the object is displeasing. Every work of art, then, depends, for the pleasure it affords, not alone on the various forms, colors, sounds, and motions which are combined to affect the senses, but on the nature of the design intended, and on the skill which is shown in so composing and arranging the several parts that each shall duly aid in effecting this design. This is the particular in which the genius of the painter, the sculptor, the architect, the musician, and the poet is especially exhibited.