CHAPTER XVIII.
THE WILL.
It is the power of choice which raises man to the dignity of an intellectual and moral being. Without this principle, he would be a creature of mere impulses and instincts. He would possess susceptibilities of happiness to be excited, and intellect to devise and discover the modes of securing enjoyment; but without governing principle, the soul would be led captive with each successive desire, or be the sport of chances whenever conflicting desires were awakened.
He who formed man in his own perfect image left not his work without this balance-power to regulate the complicated springs of so wonderful an existence. Man is now not only the image of his Creator as lord of this lower world, but is, like him, the lord and master of his own powers.
It has been shown that the constitution, both of mind and of the world, is such that it is impossible in the nature of things to gain every object which is the cause of enjoyment. There is a constant succession of selections to be made between different modes of securing happiness. A lesser good is given up for a greater, or some good relinquished altogether to avoid some consequent pain. Often, also, some painful state of mind is sought as the means of securing some future good, or of avoiding some greater evil. Thus men endure want, fatigue, and famine to purchase wealth. Thus the nauseous draught will be swallowed to avoid the pains of sickness; and thus the pleasures of domestic affection will be sacrificed to obtain honor and fame. The whole course of life is a constant succession of such decisions between different modes of securing happiness and of avoiding pain.
Specific and Generic Volitions.
In noticing the operation of mind, it will be seen that there is a foundation for two classes of volitions or acts of choice, which may be denominated specific and generic.
A specific volition is one that secures some particular act, such as the moving of the arm or turning of the head. Such volitions are ordinarily consequent on some more general purpose of the mind, which they aid in accomplishing, and which is, therefore, denominated a generic volition. For example, a man chooses to make a certain journey: this is the generic volition, and, in order to carry it out, he performs a great variety of acts, each one of which aids in carrying out the generic decision. These specific acts of will, which tend to accomplish a more general purpose, may also be called subordinate, because they are controlled by a generic volition.
It can be seen that the generic volitions may themselves become subordinate to a still more comprehensive purpose. Thus the man may decide to make a journey, which is a generic volition in reference to all acts subordinate to this end. But this journey may be a subordinate part of a more general purpose to make a fortune or to secure some other important end.
It is frequently the case that a generic purpose, which relates to objects that require a long time and many complicated operations, exists when the mind seems almost unconscious of its power. For example, a man may form a generic purpose to enter a profession for which years will be required to prepare. And while his whole course of action is regulated by this decision, he engages in pursuits entirely foreign to it and which seem to engross his whole attention. These pursuits may sometimes be such as are antagonistic to his grand purpose, so as at least to imperil or retard its accomplishment. And yet this strong and quiet purpose remains, and is eventually carried out.
It is the case, also, that a generic volition may be formed to be performed at some particular time and place, and then the mind becomes entirely unconscious of it till the appointed period and circumstances occur. Then the decision becomes dominant, and controls all other purposes.