Hannibal Crosses the Alps

by Cecil Torr

6. Roman roads were not built capriciously; and the road from Spain would not have crossed the Rhone at Tarascon unless there was some substantial reason for crossing it just there rather than a little higher up or a little lower down. This reason must have existed at the time when Hannibal crossed the Rhone a few years before the road was made; and by reckoning Hannibal’s march according to the Roman milestones, Polybios rather implies that Hannibal came that way. In any case Hannibal cannot have deviated greatly from the Roman road, as that ran near the coast, and Polybios says (iii. 41. 7) that Hannibal kept the sea upon his right hand (dexion echôn) as he marched.

7. After mentioning (iii. 37. 8) that the Rhone entered the sea by several mouths, Polybios says (iii. 42. 1) that Hannibal crossed it where it was a single stream, about four days’ march from the sea. It ceases to be a single stream at Arles, and divides there into branches leading to the mouths; and Arles is eight English miles below Tarascon and five-and-twenty from the sea. Four days at ten miles a day—see paragraph 3—would give 40 Roman miles, or 37 English, for the distance from Tarascon to the sea. But as Hannibal was coming from the west, he would have to turn inland at the westernmost mouth of the Rhone, somewhere near Aigues Mortes, whence the distance would be fully forty miles. No doubt, there were many crossing-places on the Rhone, and any of them might be known as a Diabasis—see paragraph 2—as this is merely the Greek for crossing. But there were many crossing-places on the Rhine, yet there was only one Trajectum, and many on the Euphrates, but only one Zeugma; and Polybios always speaks of the Diabasis of the Rhone as if there were no other.

8. According to Polybios (iii. 41. 2, 4–9, 44. 3, 45. 1–6, 47. 1, 49. 1) Scipio was taking a Roman army from Italy to Spain by sea, but stopped at the easternmost mouth of the Rhone and disembarked the army there, on hearing that Hannibal had already reached the crossing of the Rhone. He sent out cavalry to scout, and Hannibal likewise sent out cavalry, having heard of the arrival of the Roman ships. These two forces met: Scipio’s drove Hannibal’s back and pushed on far enough to see his camp, and then returned with information. Scipio forthwith (parautica) re-embarked the baggage and then marched up along the river with his whole force, as he was eager (speudôn) to attack the enemy. But on reaching the crossing, he found that the enemy had left their camp three days before, having started the morning after the encounter of the cavalry.

9. If the camp was at Tarascon, Scipio’s cavalry had a ride of sixty or seventy English miles, there and back, besides some fighting on the way; and after their return there was the embarcation of the baggage; so that Scipio could hardly have begun his march till the next morning or next afternoon. He may have been marching on three days, though not a full day’s march on the first day and perhaps not on the third; and he would entrench his camp each night with extra care, as the enemy were not far off. Even so, his progress seems a little slow; but had he gone ten miles further in the time, there would have been a serious check.

10. Ten miles above Tarascon the river Durance flows into the Rhone. Livy (xxi. 31) says that, of all the rivers of Gaul, the Durance was far the most difficult to cross, longe difficillimus transitu; and he mentions that it happened to be swollen by rains (forte imbribus auctus) at the time when Hannibal was there. If Hannibal had crossed the Rhone more than ten miles above Tarascon, he would have had the Durance between Scipio’s forces and his own; and Polybios says nothing to suggest that there was any obstacle between.

11. At this period the Romans had only a militia; and Scipio’s marches must not be calculated on the scale of marches by the regular army that Marius created a century later on. Still less should they be calculated from statements by Vegetius, who lived six centuries later and dealt with marches along Roman roads to established forts and towns. At this period a Roman force entrenched itself each night, and the entrenching took some time.

12. According to Polybios (iii. 49. 5–7) Hannibal marched up along the river after leaving his camp at the crossing of the Rhone, and arrived in four days at the Island, a populous and fertile place with the Rhone running along one side of it and the Scôras along the other. It was not strictly an island, but was (Polybios says) of the shape and size of the Delta of the Nile, with river on two sides and a range of mountains instead of the sea for the third side. Livy (xxi. 31) follows Polybios almost word for word in saying that Hannibal marched up along the Rhone to a district called the Island, where another river flowed into the Rhone. But he calls the other river the Arar, which is the Saône, and thus brings Hannibal up to Lyons, 200 miles from the sea. This would mean an average of 25 miles a day, the confluence being four days from the crossing and the crossing being four days from the sea, whereas Polybios gives an average of only 7 miles a day for the whole march and 10 miles a day for 250 miles out of the final 325 after the crossing of the Rhone: see paragraphs 3, 4.

13. As a reason for Hannibal’s going so far inland, Livy says (xxi. 31) that Hannibal did not wish to fight a battle against the Romans till he was actually in Italy, and the further he kept away from the sea, the less was the risk of meeting the enemy. But this is not borne out by what he says just afterwards (xxi. 32) where he is copying from Polybios, iii. 49. 2, 3. He says there that Scipio marched back to his ships on finding that the enemy had quitted their camp at the crossing of the Rhone, re-embarked the army and sent the bulk of it on to Spain, and returned to Italy himself to take command there if Hannibal got through the Alps. The march-back and the embarcation must have been as brisk as the march-up, Polybios using the same term for both, speudôn, iii. 45. 4, 49. 4. Hannibal had good information: he soon knew of the arrival of the Roman ships at the mouth of the Rhone—see paragraph 8—and would soon know of their departure; and he would not go 200 miles inland to avoid the enemy if he knew they were not there.

14. In order to reduce the distance, the editors of Livy have tampered with the text, and have printed “Isara” in place of “Arar,” thus changing the Saône into the Isère. They seem to have forgotten Silius Italicus, iii. 442–476. He was almost a contemporary of Livy—born only eight years after Livy’s death—and in his description of Hannibal’s march he not only speaks of the confluence of the Arar and the Rhone, but contrasts the rapidity of the Rhone with the quiet flow of the Arar; and that is just the difference between the Rhone and the Saône at Lyons, a difference remarked by Seneca (LUDUS, 7) and other ancient writers. Silius goes on to speak of the Tricastini and the Vocontii and the river Durance exactly as Livy (xxi. 31) goes on to speak of them, and in almost the same words. It seems clear that Silius had Livy’s words before him when he wrote, and that he found “Arar” there, not “Isara,” and had no doubts about the river being the Saône. That really is decisive for the text of Livy. The only pretext of the editors is that there is a mark like an s between the words ibi and Arar in one of the manuscripts of Livy.

15. These editors were very unwise in making Livy say “Isara,” as he would not have mentioned the confluence of the Isère and the Rhone without saying a good deal more. The monuments of the victory of 8 August 121 B.C. were at the confluence of the Isère and the Rhone. Strabo mentions them (iv. 1. 11) and Livy, who was his contemporary, must have known that they were there. (Livy described the victory in one of his lost books, lxi, the contents of which are known from the epitome.) Livy says (xxi. 31) that as soon as Hannibal reached the confluence of the Saône and the Rhone, he secured the support of the Allobriges. If this had happened at the confluence of the Isère and the Rhone, Livy would have made a telling point of the contrast between Hannibal’s securing the support of the Allobriges for his onslaught on Rome, and their subjugation by the Romans at the very same place a century later on.