Hannibal Crosses the Alps

by Cecil Torr

43. In the next part of his narrative (xxi. 32–35) Livy says exactly what Polybios says (iii. 50–53) though he says it more rhetorically; but where Polybios (iii. 50. 1) merely says “the river,” Livy (xxi. 32) says “the Durance.”

44. On quitting the river and beginning the ascent, Hannibal proceeded very cautiously, as he suspected that the Allobriges and other natives would attack him. On the first day he soon halted, and sent his guides out for intelligence: on the second day he merely moved into position for a night attack, and had no fighting till the third day, when he was going through a gorge. He had occupied the summits on the previous night while the natives were off guard; but the natives made their way along the slopes and stampeded the cavalry-horses and the baggage-animals—the natives were too much frightened of the elephants to go anywhere near them. As the track was not only steep and narrow but ran along a cliff, many of the animals were pushed over and fell down the cliff; and the stampede got worse still when Hannibal charged down from the summits to drive the natives off. He killed most of the Allobriges, and then took the town that served them as a base; and he remained there for a day, that is, the fourth day. He made fair progress on the next three days, but on the fourth day (that is the eighth day of the march) he was attacked again while going through a gorge. The natives were on the higher ground, and rolled rocks down or came down the slopes themselves and threw stones by hand, causing a stampede again with heavy loss of animals and men. Hannibal himself got through with the advance-guard, but the remainder of the army spent the whole night in getting through. The next day (the ninth) he reached the summit of the pass.

45. There is next to nothing in all this to indicate the route. As for the Allobriges whom Polybios (iii. 51. 9) mentions in the fight at the first gorge, they certainly were not the population of the district, as he says (iii. 49. 13–50. 3) they had been following Hannibal’s army for a hundred miles or more, not daring to attack it till it was entangled in hill-country where its cavalry could not act. Narrow gorges can be found on any Alpine route, and also rocks such as Polybios describes. He says (iii. 53. 5) that Hannibal halted on the eighth night at a defensible white rock, ti leukopetron ochyron. But “white rock” means no more than “bare rock,” for he says elsewhere (x. 30. 5) that the white rocks themselves could be climbed up by active men; and, clearly, the colour of the rock would make no difference in the climb. There is, however, a rock that is not only bare but white, the Roche Blanche, on the Little St Bernard, another (near St Michel) on the Mont Cenis, and others on other passes, all identified as Hannibal’s; but Polybios (iii. 53. 4, 5) places the rock at the far end of a gorge into which Hannibal was led by the treachery of his guides. Thus, unless the rock was at the point where he regained the proper route, it will not be found on the main road of any pass at all; nor will the gorge be found on the main road of any pass, as it was on a deviation. Yet people have been identifying gorges on the main roads of the different passes as the very gorge that Hannibal passed through by deviating from the proper route.

46. Polybios (iii. 53. 5, 6) remarks, as something quite unusual, that Hannibal was separated from a large part of his force on the eighth night of the march. If the whole force was brought together on the other nights, the rate of marching would be very slow. Polybios (iii. 56. 4) says that, in spite of heavy losses in the Alps, Hannibal arrived in Italy with 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry; and such a force, with elephants and baggage-train, would form a column of enormous length when marching along a narrow track. The head could not advance beyond a point which the rear could reach on the same day; and the distance would be much less than the average march—see paragraph 3—which Polybios reckons as 10 Roman miles a day.

47. It is about forty Roman miles from the Durance at Mont Dauphin to the summit of the Col de la Traversette, and also about forty from the Durance at La Bréole to the summit of the Col d’Argentière. Hannibal, however, deviated from whatever route he meant to take. Polybios says (iii. 52. 3–8) that Hannibal was led into a dangerous gorge by the treachery of some guides he had engaged two days before, their object being to draw him into a position where he could be attacked on every side from higher ground. (Polybios has not made it clear why these guides were engaged: he states in iii. 44. 5, 7, 48. 11 that guides had come over from Italy to meet Hannibal at the crossing of the Rhone—perhaps they were all killed at the first gorge.) Livy (xxi. 35) suggests that instead of following the guides, Hannibal took a line of his own as soon as he lost confidence in them, and thus went astray into impassable places, per invia pleraque et errores. His actual march must have been a good deal longer than his intended route.

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48. According to Polybios (iii. 54. 1–3) Hannibal made a speech at the summit of the pass, telling the soldiers that the worst part of their march was done; and he not only pointed to the plain of the Po spread out before them, but indicated the position (topos) of Rome itself. As he was a good 300 miles from Rome, he could not have managed this unless he used a map. Herodotos says (v. 49. 1, 5) that Aristagoras used a map to show the route, when he was trying to induce the Spartans to march through Asia Minor in 500 B.C.; and Hannibal may likewise have used a map in 218 B.C., when maps were commoner. No doubt, a map could not be seen except by men who were close by, but a speech could not be heard by men who were far off; and I conceive that when Hannibal (or any other general) addressed an army of 20,000 or 30,000 men, he relied on those who heard him to convey the substance of his speech to those who could not hear. The more important officers would be standing near the general, and they would see the map and tell the others about it.

49. He must at any rate have had a good view of the plain from the summit of the pass he crossed—else his speech would be absurd—and there are (I believe) only two passes with summits commanding such a view. In the old ALPINE GUIDE, pt. 1, p. 25, ed. 1863, Ball describes the Col de la Traversette. “To those who approach from the side of France, the view suddenly unfolded at the summit, extending (in clear weather) across the entire plain of Piedmont as far as Milan, is extremely striking.” On p. 55 he endorses Bonney’s description of the Cenis passes. “Between the plateau of the Little Mont Cenis and La Grande Croix [on the Great Mont Cenis] a ridge can be gained by a few minutes’ walk, whence is seen the country to the east of the Po, and the south of the Tanaro, as far as the Apennines.” He says nothing (p. 57) of any view from the Col du Clapier, just south of the Cenis passes though north of the Cenis tunnel; but a similar view can be obtained in a few minutes’ walk from there.—Polybios (iii. 54. 3, 4) says that Hannibal made his speech about the view while the army was encamped upon the summit of the pass, but Livy (xxi. 35) puts the speech the following day, immediately on starting on the downward march; and he says that Hannibal halted the men at an eminence (in promontorio quodam) commanding that great view, and made his speech there. The word promontorium suggests a point of view a little way off the road.

50. Several of the passes have a plateau at the top; and Hannibal may have gone over one of these, as Polybios (iii. 53. 9) and Livy (xxi. 35) say that he encamped at the top, and the plateau would be a suitable place for camping. But they say nothing about a plateau, only saying that he encamped to rest the men who had arrived, and wait for the arrival of the others. And as that is all they say, a plateau is not really so essential as a view for determining which pass he crossed. In fact, if a plateau was essential for his camping, he must have found a plateau every night all through his march.

51. On the first day of his march down from the summit, he came to a bad place where a landslip had destroyed the track for a distance of about 300 yards, and he had to encamp there, as the baggage-animals and elephants could not get past. One day’s repairs made the track passable for the baggage-animals, and these and the cavalry-horses were sent on ahead and turned out to graze on the pastures down below. But three days’ repairs were needed to make the track passable for the elephants, who meanwhile nearly died for want of food.—That is the substance of what Polybios says, iii. 54. 4–7, 55. 6–8, and Livy follows him.