Turning from the material causes of foreign wars the authors of The Federalist examine the possible sources of danger from domestic discord among the states, regarded as independent sovereignties. And how may such domestic discord arise? The North will probably grow strong and formidable and be tempted to despoil the South: nor “does it appear to be a rash conjecture,” says Jay, “that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.”[[431]]
Then the apple of discord may be thrown among the states by foreign countries if several confederacies take the place of union. And what is this apple of discord? Each of the proposed confederacies, says Jay, “would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties be essentially different.” Treaties are subject to the law of greatest economic pressure. “Different commercial concerns,” he continues, “must create different interests, and of course different degrees of political attachment to and connection with different foreign nations.”[[432]] The degrees of political attachment also follow the law of greatest economic pressure; and if foreign nations come to blows among themselves, their allies in America are likely to be drawn into the conflict. Thus domestic discord may arise among the states indirectly through their material connections with other countries.
But internecine warfare will more probably arise from causes operating within the states; and what may be the real sources of such conflict? asks Hamilton.[[433]] They are numerous: lust for power and dominion, the desire for equality and safety, the ambitions of leaders. Has it not invariably been found, he adds, “that momentary passions, and immediate interests have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general and remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice?... Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion?”
Of course such acute observers as the authors of The Federalist do not omit to remark that the personal ambitions of monarchs have been a cause of wars, and the passions of men for leadership have been a source of domestic insurrections. But they are quick to add that the aggrandizement and support of their particular families are among the motives that have led monarchs to undertake wars of conquest;[[434]] and as to personal element in domestic insurrections, Hamilton expresses a doubt whether Massachusetts would recently have been plunged into civil war “if Shays had not been a desperate debtor.”[[435]]
Turning from the question as to the extent of the economic motive in the personal element, Hamilton makes an inquiry into the more probable sources of wars among the states in case a firmer union, endowed with adequate powers, is not established. These he enumerates:[[436]]
1. “Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations.” The several states have an interest in the Western Territories, and “to reason from the past to the future, we shall have good ground to apprehend that the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences.”
2. “The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention.” Each state will pursue a policy conducive to its own advantage, and “the spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by which particular states might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens.” The economic motive will thus probably override all considerations of interstate comity and all considerations of international law. But that is not all; says Hamilton, in italics, “We should be ready to denominate injuries those things which were in reality the justifiable acts of independent sovereignties consulting a distinct interest.” Commerce will have little respect for the right of other peoples to protect their interests, and it will stigmatize as an “injury” anything which blocks its enterprise.
3. “The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision between the separate states or confederacies.” Some states would oppose paying the debt. Why? Because they are “less impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the question.” But other states, “a numerous body of whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond the proportion of the state in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for some equitable and effective provision.” In other words, citizens who had nothing at stake would be indifferent, and those who had something to lose would clamor. Foreign powers also might intervene, and the “double contingency of external invasion and internal contention” would be hazarded.
4. “Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions on the rights of those states whose citizens are injured by them, may be considered as another probable source of hostility.” Had there not been plenty of evidence to show that state legislatures, if unrestrained by some higher authority, would attack private rights in property? And had there not been a spirit of retaliation also? “We reasonably infer that in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not of parchment, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social justice.”
These, then, are the four leading sources of probable conflict among the states if not united into a firm union: territory, commerce, the national debt, and violations of contractual rights in property—all as severely economic as could well be imagined.