President Cleveland, repudiated by his own party and having no desire to "play the game of politics," assumed an attitude of neutrality in the conflict and denied to the Cubans the rights of belligerents. He offered to Spain the good offices of the United States in mediation with the insurgents—a tender which was rejected by Spain with the suggestion that the United States might more vigorously suppress the unlawful assistance which some of its citizens were lending to the revolutionists. Mr. Cleveland's second administration closed without any positive action on the Cuban question.
Within four months after his inauguration, President McKinley protested strongly to Spain against her policy in Cuba, and during the summer and autumn and winter he conducted a running fire of negotiations with Spain. Congress was impatient for armed intervention and fretted at the tedious methods of diplomacy. Spain shrewdly made counter thrusts to every demand advanced by the United States, but made no outward sign of improvement in the affairs of Cuba, even after the recall of General Weyler. In February, 1898, a private letter, written by De Lôme, the Spanish minister at Washington, showing contempt for Mr. McKinley and some shifty ideas of diplomacy, was acquired by the New York Journal and published. This stirred the country and led to the recall of the minister by his home government. Meanwhile the battleship Maine was sent to Havana, officially to resume friendly relations at Cuban ports, but not without an ulterior regard for the necessity of protecting the lives and property of Americans in jeopardy. The incident of the Spanish minister's letter had hardly been closed before the Maine was blown up and sunk on the evening of February 15, 1898. The death of two officers and two hundred and fifty-eight of the crew was a tragedy which moved the nation beyond measure, and with the cry "Remember the Maine" public opinion was worked up to a point of frenzy.
A commission was appointed at once to inquire into the cause of the disaster, and on March 21 it reported that the Maine had been destroyed by an explosion of a submarine mine which set off some of the ship's magazines. Within a week, negotiations with Spain were resumed, and that country made generous promises to restore peace in the Island and permit a Cuban parliament to be established in the interests of local autonomy. None of Spain's promises were regarded as satisfactory by the administration, and on April 4, General Woodford, the American representative in that country, was instructed to warn the ministry that no effective armistice had been offered the Cubans and that President McKinley would shortly lay the matter before Congress—which meant war. After some delay, during which representatives of the European powers and the Pope were at work in the interests of peace, Spain promised to suspend hostilities, call a Cuban parliament, and restore a reasonable autonomy.
On the day after the receipt of this promise, President McKinley sent his war message to Congress without explaining fully the latest concessions made by Spain. It was claimed by the Spanish government that it had yielded absolutely everything short of independence and that all of the demands of the United States had been met. Some eminent editors and publicists in the United States have since accepted this view of the affair and sharply criticized the President for not making public the full text of Spain's last concession on the day that he sent his war message to Congress. Those who take this view hold that President McKinley believed war to be inevitable and desirable all along, but merely wished to bring public opinion to the breaking point before shifting the responsibility to Congress. The President's defenders, however, claim that no credence could be placed in the good faith of Spain and that the intolerable conditions in Cuba would never have been removed under Spanish administration, no matter what promises might have been made.
In his war message of April 11, 1898, Mr. McKinley brought under review the conditions in Cuba and the history of the controversy, coming to the conclusion that the dictates of humanity, the necessity of protecting American lives and property in Cuba, and the chronic disorders in the Island warranted armed intervention. Congress responded by an overwhelming vote on April 19, in favor of a resolution declaring that Cuba should be free, that Spain's withdrawal should be demanded, and the President be authorized to use the military and naval forces of the country to carry the decree into effect. In the enthusiasm of the hour, Congress also specifically disclaimed any intention of exercising "sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for the pacification thereof." Thus war was declared on the anniversary of the battle of Lexington.
In the armed conflict which followed, the most striking and effective operations were on the sea. In anticipation of the war, Commodore Dewey, in command of the Asiatic station, had been instructed as early as February to keep his squadron at Hongkong, coaled, and ready, in event of a declaration of hostilities, to begin offensive operations in the Philippine Islands. The battleship Oregon, then off the coast of Washington, was ordered to make the long voyage around the Horn, which has now become famous in the annals of the sea. At the outbreak of the war, Rear Admiral Sampson, in charge of the main squadron at Key West, was instructed to blockade important stretches of the coast of Cuba and to keep watch for the arrival of the Spanish fleet, under Admiral Cervera, which was then on the high seas, presumably bound for Cuba.
The first naval blow was struck by Admiral Dewey, who had left Chinese waters on receiving news of the declaration of war and had reached Manila Bay on the evening of April 30. Early the following morning he opened fire on the inferior Spanish fleet under the guns of Cavité and Manila, and within a few hours he had destroyed the enemy's ships, killed nearly four hundred men, and silenced the shore batteries without sustaining the loss of a single man or suffering any injuries to his own ships worthy of mention. News of this extraordinary exploit reached the United States by way of Hongkong on May 6, and the hero of the day was, by popular acclaim, placed among the immortals of our naval history.
While celebrating the victory off Manila, the government was anxiously awaiting the arrival of the Spanish fleet in American waters which were being carefully patrolled. In spite of the precautions of Admiral Sampson, Cervera was able to slip into the harbor of Santiago on May 19, where he was immediately blockaded by the American naval forces. An attempt was made to stop up the mouth of the harbor by sending Lieutenant Richmond P. Hobson to sink a collier at the narrow entrance, but this spectacular move, carried out under a galling fire, failed to accomplish the purpose of the projectors, and Hobson and his men fell into the hands of the Spaniards.
The time had now come for bringing the land forces into coöperation with the navy for a combined attack on Santiago, and on June 14 a large body of troops, principally regulars, embarked from Tampa, where men and supplies had been concentrating for weeks. The management of the army was in every respect inferior to the administration of the navy. Secretary Alger, of the War Department, was a politician of the old school, who could not allow efficiency to interfere with the "proper" distribution of patronage; and as a result of his dilatory methods (to put it mildly) and the general unpreparedness of the army, the camp at Tampa was grossly mismanaged. Sanitary conveniences were indescribably bad, supply contractors sold decayed meat and wretched food to the government, heavy winter clothing was furnished to men about to fight in the summer time in a tropical climate, and, to cap the climax of blundering, inadequate provisions were made for landing the troops when they reached Cuba on June 22.
The forces dispatched to Cuba were placed under the command of General Shafter, but owing to his illness the fighting was principally carried on under Generals Lawton and Wheeler. The most serious conflicts in the land campaign occurred at El Caney and San Juan Hill, both strategic points near Santiago. At the second of these places the famous "Rough Riders" under Colonel Roosevelt distinguished themselves by a charge up the hill under heavy fire and by being the first to reach the enemy's intrenchments. In spite of several engagements, in which the fortunes of the day were generally on the side of the Americans, sickness among the soldiers and lack of supplies caused General Shafter to cable, on July 3, that without additional support he could not undertake a successful storming of Santiago.