The recall, like direct democracy, was not new to American politics. Both were understood, at least in principle, by the framers of the Federal Constitution and rejected decisively. The recall seems to have made its appearance first in local form,—in the charter of Los Angeles, adopted in 1903. From there it went to the Seattle charter of 1906, and two years later it was adopted as a state-wide system applicable to all elective officers by Oregon. Its progress was swiftest in municipal affairs, for it quite generally accompanied "the commission form" of city government as a check on the commissioners in their exercise of enlarged powers.
The state-wide recall, however, received a remarkable impetus in 1911 from the controversy over the admission of Arizona, which attracted the attention of the nation. That territory had framed a constitution containing a radical form of the recall based on the Oregon plan, and in August, 1911, Congress passed a resolution admitting the applicant, on condition that the provision relating to the recall should be specifically submitted to the voters for their approval or rejection. President Taft was at once stirred to action, and on August 15 he sent Congress a ringing message, displaying unwonted vigor and determination, vetoing the resolution and denouncing the recall of judges in unmeasured terms. "Constitutions," he said, "are checks upon the hasty action of the majority. They are the self-imposed restraints of a whole people upon a majority of them to secure sober action and a respect for the rights of the minority.... In order to maintain the rights of the minority and the individual and to preserve our constitutional balance we must have judges with courage to decide against the majority when justice and law require.... As the possibilities of such a system [as the recall] pass in review, is it too much to characterize it as one which will destroy the judiciary, its standing, and its usefulness?"
Acting upon the recommendation of President Taft, Congress passed a substitute resolution for admitting Arizona only on condition that the obnoxious recall of judges be stricken from the constitution of the state.[72] The debates in Congress over the admission of Arizona covered the whole subject of direct government in all its aspects, and these, coupled with the President's veto message, brought the issue prominently to the front throughout the country. Voters to whom it had previously been an obscure western device now began to take a deep interest in it; the press took it up; and one more test for "progressive" and "reactionary" was put in the popular program.
The movement for direct popular participation in state and local government was inevitably accompanied by a demand for more direct government within the political party; in other words, by a demand for the abandonment of the representative convention in favor of the selection of candidates by direct primary. During the decade of the great Populist upheaval, legislation relative to political parties was largely confined to the introduction of the Australian ballot and the establishment of safeguards around the primaries at which delegates to party conventions were chosen. The direct primary, like the initiative and referendum, grew out of a discontent with social and economic conditions, which led to an attack on the political machinery that was alleged to be responsible for them. Like the initiative and referendum, also, it was not an altogether new device, for it had been used for a long time in some of the states as a local institution established by party custom; but when it was taken up by the state legislatures, it made a far more rapid advance.
It was not, however, until the opening of the new century that primary legislation began to engross a large share of legislative activities. In 1903, "the first state-wide primary law with fairly complete provisions for legal supervision was enacted by the state of Wisconsin"; Oregon, making use of the new initiative system, enacted a thoroughgoing primary law in 1904; and the following year Illinois adopted a state-wide measure. Other states, hesitating at such an extensive application of the principle, contented themselves at first with laws instituting local primaries, such, for example, as the Nebraska law of 1905 covering cities of over 125,000, or the earlier law of Minnesota covering only Hennepin county. "So rapid was the progress of public opinion and legislation," says Mr. Merriam, "that in many instances a compromise law of one session of the legislature was followed by a thoroughgoing law in the next. For example, the North Dakota law of 1905 authorized direct primaries for all district nominations, but did not include state offices; but in 1907, a sweeping act was passed covering practically all offices."
The vogue of the direct primary was confined largely to the West at first, but it steadily gained in favor in the East. Governor Hughes, of New York, in his contest with the old organization of the Republican party, became a stanch advocate of the system, recommended it to the legislature in his messages, campaigned through the state to create public sentiment in favor of the reform, and labored unsuccessfully to secure the passage of a primary law, until he closed his term to accept an appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States. In 1911, the Democratic party, which had carried New York state at the preceding election, enacted a primary law applicable to local, but not to state, offices. About the same time Massachusetts, Maine, and New Jersey joined the long list of direct primary states. Within almost ten years the principle in its state-wide form had been accepted in two thirds of the states, and in some local form in nearly all of the other commonwealths.
Meanwhile, the theory and practice of direct government made their way upward into the Federal government. As early as 1826, Mr. Storrs, a representative from New York, introduced in the House a constitutional amendment providing for the popular election of United States Senators, and from time to time thereafter the proposal was urged upon Congress. President Johnson, who had long been an advocate of this change in the Federal government, made it the subject of a special message to Congress in 1868; but in his contest with that body the proposed measure was lost to sight. Not long afterward it appeared again in the House and the Senate, and at length the lower house in 1893 passed an amendment providing for popular election by the requisite two-thirds vote, but the Senate refused to act. Again in 1894, in 1898 (by a vote of 185 to 11), in 1900 (240 to 15), and in 1902 by practically a unanimous vote, there being no division, the House passed the amendment; still the Senate resisted the change.
In the Senate itself were found occasional champions of popular election, principally from the West and South. Mitchell, of Oregon, Turpie, of Indiana, Perkins, of California, Berry, of Arkansas, and Bailey, of Texas, took the leadership in this contest for reform. Chandler, of New Hampshire, Depew, of New York, Penrose, of Pennsylvania, Hoar, of Massachusetts, Foraker, of Ohio, and Spooner, of Wisconsin, leveled their batteries against it. State after state legislature passed resolutions demanding the change, until at length three fourths had signified their demand for popular election.