CHAPTER XIII
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1912
Long before the opening of the campaign of 1912, the dissenters in the Republican party who had added the prefix of "Progressive" to the old title, began to draw together for the purpose of resisting the renomination of Mr. Taft and putting forward a candidate more nearly in accord with their principles. As early as January 21, 1911, a National Progressive Republican League was formed at the residence of Senator La Follette in Washington and a program set forth embracing the indorsement of direct primaries, direct elections, and direct government generally and a criticism of the recent failures to secure satisfactory legislation on the tariff, trusts, banking, and conservation. Only on the changes in our machinery of government did the League take a definite stand; on the deeper issues of political economy it was silent, at least as to positive proposals. Mr. Roosevelt was invited to join the new organization, but he declined to identify himself with it.
For a time the Progressives centered their attacks upon Mr. Taft's administration. Their bill of indictment may be best stated in the language of Senator La Follette: "In his campaign for election, he [Mr. Taft] had interpreted the platform as a pledge for tariff revision downward. Five months after he was inaugurated he signed a bill that revised the tariff upward.... The President started on a tour across the country in September, 1909. At the outset in an address at Boston he lauded Aldrich as the greatest statesman of his time. Then followed his Winona speech, in which he declared the Payne-Aldrich bill to be the best tariff ever enacted, and in effect challenged the Progressives in Congress who had voted against the measure.... During the succeeding sessions of Congress, President Taft's sponsorship for the administration railroad bill, with its commerce court, its repeal of the anti-trust act in its application to railroads, its legalizing of all watered railroad capitalization; his course regarding the Ballinger and Cunningham claims, and the subterfuges resorted to by his administration in defense of Ballinger; his attempt to foist upon the country a sham reciprocity measure; his complete surrender to the legislative reactionary program of Aldrich and Cannon and the discredited representatives of special interests who had so long managed congressional legislation, rendered it utterly impossible for the Progressive Republicans of the country to support him for reëlection."[84]
A second positive step in the organization of the Progressive Republicans was taken in April, 1911, at a conference held in the committee room of Senator Bourne, of Oregon, at the Capitol. At this meeting a number of Republican Senators, Representatives, newspaper men, and private citizens were present, and it was there agreed that the Progressives must unite upon some candidate in opposition to Mr. Taft. The most available man at the time was Senator La Follette, who had been an uncompromising and vigorous exponent of progressive doctrines since his entrance to the Senate in 1906; and the members of this conference, or at least most of them, assured him of their support in case he would consent to become a candidate for nomination. The Senator was informed by men very close to Mr. Roosevelt that the latter would, under no circumstances, enter the field; and he was afforded the financial assistance necessary to open headquarters for the purpose of advancing his candidacy. No formal announcement of the adherence of the group to Mr. La Follette was then made, for the reason that Senator Cummins, of Iowa, and some other prominent Republicans declined to sign the call to arms.[85]
In July, 1911, Senator La Follette began his active campaign for nomination as an avowed Progressive Republican, and within a few months he had developed an unexpected strength, particularly in the Middle West, which indicated the depth of the popular dissatisfaction with Mr. Taft's administration. In October of that year a national conference of Progressive Republicans assembled at Chicago, on the call of Mr. La Follette's campaign manager, and indorsed the Senator in unmistakable language, declaring him to be "the logical Republican candidate for President of the United States," and urging the formation of organizations in all states to promote his nomination. In spite of these outward signs of prosperity, however, Mr. La Follette was by no means sure of his supporters, for several of the most prominent, including Mr. Gifford Pinchot and Mr. James R. Garfield, were not whole-hearted in their advocacy of his cause and were evidently unwilling to relinquish the hope that Mr. Roosevelt might become their leader after all.
Indeed, Senator La Follette came to believe that many of his supporters, who afterward went over to Mr. Roosevelt, never intended to push his own candidacy to the end, but employed him as a sort of "stalking horse" to interest and measure progressive sentiment for the purpose of putting the ex-President into the field at the opportune moment, if the signs proved auspicious. This was regarded by Mr. La Follette not merely as treachery to himself, but also as treason to genuine progressive principles. In his opinion, Mr. Roosevelt's long administration of seven years had failed to produce many material results. He admitted that the ex-President had done something to promote conservation of natural resources, but called attention to the fact that the movement for conservation had been begun even as early as Harrison's administration.[86] He pointed out that Mr. Roosevelt had vigorously indorsed the Payne-Aldrich tariff in the New York state campaign of 1910; and that during his administration the formation and overcapitalization of gigantic combinations had gone forward with unprecedented speed, in spite of the denunciation of "bad trusts" in executive messages. Furthermore, the Senator directly charged Mr. Roosevelt with having used the power of the Federal patronage against him in his fight for progressive reforms in Wisconsin.
So decided was Senator La Follette's distrust of Mr. Roosevelt's new "progressivism," that nothing short of a lengthy quotation can convey the spirit of it. "While Mr. Roosevelt was President," says the Senator, "his public utterances through state papers, addresses, and the press were highly colored with rhetorical radicalism. His administrative policies as set forth in his recommendations to Congress were vigorously and picturesquely presented, but characterized by an absence of definite economic conception. One trait was always pronounced. His most savage assault upon special interests was invariably offset with an equally drastic attack upon those who were seeking to reform abuses. These were indiscriminately classed as demagogues and dangerous persons. In this way he sought to win approval, both from the radicals and the conservatives. This cannonading, first in one direction and then in another, filled the air with noise and smoke, which confused and obscured the line of action, but when the battle cloud drifted by and quiet was restored, it was always a matter of surprise that so little had really been accomplished.... He smeared the issue, but caught the imagination of the younger men of the country by his dash and mock heroics. Taft coöperated with Cannon and Aldrich on legislation. Roosevelt coöperated with Aldrich and Cannon on legislation. Neither President took issue with the reactionary bosses of the Senate upon any legislation of national importance. Taft's talk was generally in line with his legislative policy. Roosevelt's talk was generally at right angles to his legislative policy. Taft's messages were the more directly reactionary; Roosevelt's the more 'progressive.' But adhering to his conception of a 'square deal,' his strongest declarations in the public interest were invariably offset with something comforting for Privilege; every phrase denouncing 'bad' trusts was deftly balanced with praise for 'good' trusts." It is obvious that a man so deeply convinced of Mr. Roosevelt's insincerity of purposes and instability of conviction could not think of withdrawing in his favor or of lending any countenance to his candidacy for nomination. To Senator La Follette the "directly reactionary" policy of Mr. Taft was far preferable to the "mock heroics" of Mr. Roosevelt.